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SUMMARY
Distributed learning is the iterative process of decision-making in the presence of
other decision-makers. In recent years, researchers across fields as disparate as engineering,
biology, and economics have identified mathematically congruous problem formulations at
the intersection of their disciplines. In particular, stochastic processes, game theory, and
control theory have been brought to bare on certain very basic and universal questions.
What sort of environments are conducive to distributed learning? Are there any generic
algorithms offering non-trivial performance guarantees for a large classof models?
The first half of this thesis makes contributions to two particular problems in distributed
learning, self-assembly and language. Self-assembly refers to the emergence of high-level
structures via the aggregate behavior of simpler building blocks. A number of algorithms
have been suggested that are capable of generic self-assembly of graphs. That is, given a
description of the objective they produce a policy with a corresponding performance guar-
antee. These guarantees have been in the form of deterministic convergence results. We
introduce the notion of stochastic stability to the self-assembly problem. The stochastically
stable states are the configurations the system spends almost all f its time in as a noise
parameter is taken to zero. We show that in this framework simple procedures exist that
are capable of self-assembly of any tree under stringent locality onstraints. Our procedure
gives an asymptotically maximum yield of target assemblieswhile obeying communication
and reversibility constraints. We also present a slightly more sophisticated algorithm that
guarantees maximum yields for any problem size. The latter algorithm utilizes a somewhat
more presumptive notion of agents’ internal states. While it is unknown whether an algo-
rithm providing maximum yields subject to our constraints can depend only on the more
parsimonious form of internal state, we are able to show thatsuch an algorithm would not
be able to possess a unique completing rule— a useful featurefor analysis.
iii
We then turn our attention to the problem of distributed learning of communication pro-
tocols, or, language. Recent results for signaling game models establish the non-negligible
possibility of convergence, under distributed learning, to s ates of unbounded efficiency
loss. We provide a tight lower bound on efficiency and discuss its implications. Moreover,
motivated by the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift,we study the signaling game
under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We again make use of stochastic stability analysis
and show that the long-run distribution of states has support limited to the efficient com-
munication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of
evolutionary dynamic, a fact that is intuitively captured by the game’s potential function
corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar
to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we expect monomor-
phic language states to eventually predominate. Homophilyhas been identified as a feature
that potentially stabilizes diverse linguistic communities. We find that incorporating ho-
mophily in our stochastic model gives mixed results. While th monomorphic prediction
holds in the small noise limit, diversity can persist at higher noise levels or as a metastable
phenomenon.
The contributions of the second half of this thesis relate tomore basic issues in dis-
tributed learning. In particular, we provide new results onthe problem of distributed con-
vergence to Nash equilibrium in finite games. A recently proposed class of games known
as stable games have the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria
under many learning dynamics. We show that stable games can be formulated as passive
input-output systems. This observation enables us to identify passivity of a learning dy-
namic as a sufficient condition for global convergence in stable games. Notably, dynamics
satisfying our condition need not exhibit positive correlation between the payoffs and their
directions of motion. We show that our condition is satisfiedby the dynamics known to
exhibit global convergence in stable games. We give a decision-theoretic interpretation
for passive learning dynamics that mirrors the interpretation of stable games as strategic
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environments exhibiting self-defeating externalities. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility
of the passivity condition to study the impact of applying various forecasting heuristics to
the payoffs used in the learning process. Finally, we show how passivity can be used to
identify strategic tendencies of the players that allow forc nvergence in the presence of
information lags of arbitrary duration in some games.
Thesis supervisor: Jeff S. Shamma
Title: Julian T. Hightower Chair in Systems & Controls and Professor of Electrical and
Computer Engineering
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In recent decades engineered systems have begun to approachthe scale and complexity of
biological and social systems. These advances have sparkedsignificant research interest
in modeling, prediction, and control of large scale interconnected systems. These prob-
lems lie at the intersection of engineering, social, and natural sciences. General problem
formulations in this domain suffer from typical tractability limitations such as high dimen-
sionality, constraints on communication and information processing, and fragility due to
unmodeled phenomena. Despite these pitfalls, we observe biological systems, transporta-
tion, networks, and the internet, among others, managing tofunction efficiently without
substantial centralized infrastructure for aggregating loca information and coordinating
decisions. Evidently these systems possess a high level of structure. It is this structure that
enables these systems to behave effici ntly.
This thesis identifies structural properties of large-population multi-agent systems.These
structures provide theoretical guarantees for performance d allow for tractable analyses
that facilitate predictions.
In the first half of this thesis we study two particular examples of large-scale multi-
agent systems arising in engineering and natural science. These are self-assembly and
language evolution. First, we consider the problem of programmable self-assembly. Pro-
grammable self-assembly is an engineering problem concerned with identifying local in-
teraction rules that enable an ensemble of distributed agents to aggregate into a desired
network configuration. These agents could be mechanical, biological, or even inorganic
chemical depending on the particular application. While there is a long history of interest in
such systems, theoretical possibility results for general, abstract models have only begun to
appear in recent years. We provide a constructive algorithmthat demonstrates the possibil-
ity of self-assembly of graphs under communication constraints. Existing procedures [1],
1
[2] required communication between connected agents in order to achieve self-assembly.
Our algorithms give an asymptotically optimal performanceguarantee without the need
for communication. In general, if one can assume less about agents’ communication and
computation capabilities in a model then any conclusions reach d will be applicable to a
broader range of real application domains.
The form of convergence observed in our self-assembly modelis stochastic stability.
Loosely, the stochastically stable states are the states observed with non-vanishing proba-
bility in the long run for sufficiently small levels of noise. Stochastic stability will bean
important overarching theme for the dissertation. This is because stochastic stability is a
relatively weak form of probabilistic convergence compared to stronger notions like con-
vergence almost surely. In large-population multi-agent sys ems there are often elements
of persistent idiosyncratic randomness that negate the possibility of stronger forms of con-
vergence. Stochastic stability is also often easy to establi h. In fact, it has been used to
describe performance guarantees for many algorithms in thecontext of potential games.
The potential game property is a very general and useful structural feature that we will
have a lot to say about. In fact, generalizing potential games is taken up later on in this
thesis.
We provide a second algorithm that gives optimal performance for any problem size,
as opposed to only in the asymptotic sense. This improvementcomes at a price, how-
ever. While we continue to obey stringent communication constraints, we require a more
presumptive notion of state for the agents. Assuming that agents have access to some
on-board dynamic memory may be reasonable in many contexts,but there are certainly ap-
plications where this is problematic (e.g. chemicals). We provide some theoretical basis for
the conjecture that no algorithm can guarantee optimal performance without such a notion
of state.
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The second problem studied in the first half of this thesis is concerned with mathe-
matical modelling of language learning, particularly as itpertains to early language evo-
lution. While at face-value a science problem, it is also of interest to engineers because
understanding conditions and procedures conducive to language acquisition has important
consequences for artificially intelligent systems. Our work is motivated by surprising re-
cent results in the literature showing that, in a particularmodel, evolution may not lead to
the emergence of an efficient communication system [3], [4], [5]. The result is troubling
precisely because the underlying model is indeed very sensibl . The model is of the game-
theoretic variety. We will concentrate on game-theoretic models for the remainder of the
dissertation1. We show that despite potentially unbounded efficiency losses, the emergence
of a binary communication system can be guaranteed for almost all initial conditions.
Different approaches exist for explaining away the ineffici ncy exhibited by the lan-
guage model. One unrealistic feature of the model is the assumption of an infinite pop-
ulation. This is a powerful heuristic in large-population multi-agent systems. Essentially,
using an infinite population (really a continuous mass of agents) can be shown to be approx-
imate a sufficiently large population over short time spans. Evolution is ormally associ-
ated with long time spans, providing a basis for skepticism rega ding the infinite population
models. We analyse a finite-population version of the model and show that in the long-run
evolution guarantees efficient communication in the sense of stochastic stability. Previous
analyses showed that efficient states were robust to isolated stochastic shocks [6],but did
not demonstrate that persistent random shocks sufficed to “learn” the efficient states.
We next consider the possibility of multiple efficient communication systems existing
side-by-side. That is, the question of why linguistic diversity is observed. We suggest
the co-evolution of linguistic community structure and language as an explanatory device.
While such an approach had been shown to lead to elaborate network structures in a related
1We do not use game theoretic terminology explicitly in our work n self-assembly. Game theoretic
concepts are nevertheless implicit. We opt to use different terminology and notation for that problem in order
to be consistent with the self-assembly literature and because the prevalent notation of graph-grammars is
particularly elegant and well-suited.
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model that did not feature persistent random excitation [7], our results differ. In our model
we find that non-trivial network structures are unstable in the presence of persistent random
shocks. That is, we find that the states exhibiting stochastic stability are just those same
states that predominated in our model that had no linguisticcommunity structure. However,
these conclusions are in the form of stochastic stability, which may not be the most appro-
priate analysis. For higher noise levels, simulation results suggest that diverse linguistic
communities may be persistent. Alternatively, this diversity may be an effectively stable,
or metastable, arrangement due to the process exhibiting anextremely slow convergence
rate, or, mixing time.
In the second half of this thesis, we assume a more general andabstract approach to
the study of distributed learning. More specifically, we make contributions to the field of
learning in games, or, evolutionary game theory. Despite around a half century of efforts,
the basic question of how distributed agents can “lean to play” an equilibrium in a game
theoretic setting is still largely open. This fact is perhaps unsurprising given the sheer num-
ber of problems across so many fields that such results would impact. Indeed, in recent
years many researchers have produced negative results thathave cast some doubt on the
validity of more general formulations of this question. These objections come in two ba-
sic forms. First, in many formulations the possibility of equilibrium computation alone,
even by centralized methods, has been shown to contradict known hardness results from
the computer science literature [8]. Second, if mild constrain s on the agents access to in-
formation and ability to process it are assumed, then games can be constructed for which
no learning dynamic can exhibit stable equilibria [9]. Ongoing research has concentrated
on two main directions. First, algorithms with very generalperformance guarantees have
been proposed that are successful at learning equilibria ifthe mentioned considerations are
neglected [10], [11], [11]. Second, classes of games gave been id ntified that do not include
the pathological examples the negative results exploit andtherefore can lend themselves to
efficient distributed learning procedures. We contribute to the latter approach.
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The shining example of a class of games with the mentioned “nice” properties is the po-
tential games [12]. Moreover, a very wide range of learning dynamics have been shown to
guarantee distributed convergence to equilibrium in potential games. The most significant
drawback of the potential game property is that it is defined by equalities. Given a poten-
tial game, there is no guarantee that small perturbations ofthe model will remain potential
games. A number of different generalizations of potential games have been suggested, ach
attempting to preserve a particular subset of the features [13], [14]. A recently suggested
class are the stable games [15]. Stable games encompass the somewhat restricted class
of potential games known as concave potential games2, but also include much more. The
most attractive property of the stable game structure is that they exhibit stability under a
wide range of system dynamics. In control-theoretic terminology, stable games are plants
that are stabilized by controllers satisfying certain veryreasonable axioms. Unfortunately,
stability results for stable games were developed on a case-by-case basis. There was no
sufficient condition for the dynamics that guarantees convergence u der stable games. We
identify such a sufficient condition. We find that stable games can be formulated as passive
input-output systems. It follows that learning dynamics satisfying the passivity condition
guarantee convergence to equilibria. We show that many dynamics from the literature are
in fact passive.
The list of dynamics that are known to exhibit convergence toqulibria in stable games
is long. Still, while these dynamics differ in particulars, they are all static mappings from
payoffs to changes in strategy. Such dynamics are often referred toas “myopic” because
they are insensitive to past payoffs and do not attempt to forecast where payoffs are go-
ing. More sophisticated dynamics can be described as higherord r dynamical systems.
Examples include fictitious play, regret matching, and various of forms of anticipatory
augmentations of myopic dynamics. Also, such policies are implicitly assumed in the
equilibrium definitions relevant to dynamic and repeated games, but these approaches are
2It may be more appropriate to view stable games as an alternative to potential games, rather than a
generalization. Suffice it to say they are two very useful concepts with substantial i ersection.
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rarely constructive. Very little is understood about the behavior of many higher order learn-
ing schemes in broad classes of games. We find that the passivity condition introduced for
myopic dynamics can be exploited to demonstrate convergence guarantees for higher order
dynamics. We show that in a subclass of the congestion games many dynamic versions of
passive learning schemes continue to exhibit global convergence to equilibrium. These dy-
namic modifications include smoothing and anticipation of payoffs as well as other learning
schemes that can be arrived at through cascade interconnection with linear systems.
The final set of contributions addresses the presence of information lags in distributed
learning. Such lags are ubiquitous in practice, but rarely addressed in models. We extend
the results for passivity of stable games and their dynamicsto the infinite-dimensional
setting to accommodate time delays in the measurement of payffs. We show that certain
crowd-avoiding, or, contrarian tendencies of the agents which can be described as infinite-
dimensional modifications of existing learning dynamics have no consequences for global
convergence in stable games. Moreover, these tendencies also provide robustness to time
delays in many congestion games.
The last chapter of this thesis identifies some central issues that emerge from consider-
ation of the different aspects of the thesis in tandem and suggests some new directions for
research.
This thesis is organized as follows. It is divided into threechapters focusing on the
three main areas of self assembly, language, and passivity of s able games. Each of these
chapters is intended to be self-contained apart from some gen ral mathematical preliminar-
ies reviewed in the next chapter. Therefore a reader interested in only one of these three
areas can pick up the necessary background in the next chapter and then skip to the chapter
of interest. Readers with a firm understanding of game theoretic learning can probably just
proceed directly to the chapter of interest. While each chapter concludes with a discussion
of the results, the final concluding chapter provides a more overarching discussion of issues





Game theory is the study of interactive decision making. These are strategic situations
where the consequences of one’s choices depend on the choices of others. While the theory
has its roots in mathematics and the social sciences, in recet decades games have been
used to model systems of interest to the natural sciences andengineering.
A gameis a triple,G = (P,A,U), whereP = {P1,P2, ...,PN} is a set ofN players, the
collection of setsA = {A1,A2, ...,AN} specifies the actions available to each player, and






A j → R,
indicating the utility each playeri receives given a particular joint action. In this thesis we
only consider circumstances whereP and eachAi are finite1. In order to clarify these ideas
we visit the classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Example 2.1.1 (The prisoner’s dilemma)In the prisoner’s dilemma we haveP = {1, 2},
A = {{C,D}, {C,D}}, and utility functions specified by the bimatrix:
C D
C 2, 2 −1, 3
D 3,−1 1, 1
Player 1 is the row player and player 2 is the column player. The first element of each
pair in the bimatrix gives the utility for the row player and the second element gives the
utility for the column player. The highest average utility,2, is received when both players
play C, or, choose to cooperate. However, if one player cooperates, the other player can
1We will demonstrate how to model infinite populations in thisframework below.
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play D, or, choose to defect and improve her utility from 3 to 4. If both players defect, they
each receive a utility of 1.§
An immediate question is whether any particular joint action is “the right one”— the
actions we would expect to see in practice. The answer to thisque tion is extremely sensi-
tive to considerations that are typically exogenous to the description of the game itself. For
example, whether the players are people, robots or animals and any constraints on avail-
able information materially impact what sort of play shouldbe expected. Many different
solution concepts exist, however most are either generalizations or refinements of the Nash








wherea−p = (a1, a2, ..., ap−1, ap+1, ..., aN) are the actions other thanap in the joint actiona.
In words, a joint action is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to unilaterally
deviate from the joint strategy given that the other playersplay according to the joint action.
Games can possess zero, one, or several pure Nash equilibria. The prisoner’s dilemma has
a single unique pure Nash equilibrium, (D,D). The “pure” qualifier restricts each player to
a single, deterministic action choice.
In order to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium, weneed to allow randomized,
or mixed, actions. We refer to a mixed action for playerp as an elementxp of the |Ap|-
dimensional simplex






so thatxp is a probability distribution over the pure actions inAp. We abuse notation
somewhat and write the expected utility for playerp associated with a mixed joint actionx
as








A mixed joint actionx∗ ∈
∏
p∈P X




Every finite game has at least one mixed Nash equilibrium [16].
One interpretation of mixed strategies is that players literally randomize over their avail-
able actions. An alternative interpretation is that the elem nts ofP arepopulationsand the
distributionxp gives the proportion of populationp utilizing each strategy available to that
population. In this case, each player is an infinitesimal using a particular pure strategy in
Ap. We will refer to this viewpoint as the infinite-population,or continuum agent, model.
A population game2 is a tripleG = (P,A,U), whereP = {P1,P2, ...,PN} is a set ofN pop-
ulations, the collection of setsA = {A1,A2, ...,AN} specifies the actions available to each
population, andU = {U1,U2, ...,UN} is the set of population-specific utility functions. The
utility functions are continuous maps
Up : X→ R|A
p|,
indicating the utility received by users of each strategy inpopulationp. Population games
model large populations. In large populations we expect anysi gle individual’s actions to
have minimal effect on other agents’ utilities. Moreover, agents interact anonymously. A
Nash equilibrium of the population game is a joint actionx ∈ X such thatxpi > 0 implies
Upi (x) = maxj∈Ap
Upj (x).
As mentioned previously, Nash equilibria may not be unique.Furthermore, even when
a unique Nash equilibrium exists, such play may not be realizd under particular dynamics
of strategy change. The study of the dynamics of strategy change is referred to aslearning
in gamesor evolutionary game theory3. This branch of game theory is of special interest
to engineers as it provides insights into the design of system with predictable and efficient
2We conserve notation by overloading the only slightly different formulation above. Which game we refer
to will always be clear from context.
3There are a number of excellent monographs on the subject, includi g [17]
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behavior. Equilibrium selection concerns the analysis anddesign of dynamics of strategy
change, orlearning dynamicsthat select a particular equilibrium from among many. Later
on, we will see something akin to equilibrium selection in the context of self-assembly.
Deadlocked states are inefficient equilibria of the system that can hurt the performanceof
naive algorithms. Our algorithms select equilibria with associated performance guarantees.
In the next section we review a special class of games called potential games. Potential
games possess a number of attractive properties, some of which relate directly to learning
in games.
2.1.1 Potential games
A potential game [12] is a game4 endowed with a potential functionΦ : A → R such that
for any playerp, any joint actiona ∈ A and any actiona ∈ Ap we have
Up(a) − Up(a, a−p) = Φ(a) −Φ(a, a−p).
In a potential game, the consequences ofany individual player’s change in strategy are im-
plied by the potential function. While general games need not possess pure Nash equilibria,
this is not the case for potential games [12].
Theorem 2.1.1 Every potential game possesses at least one pure Nash equilibria.
Beyond merely possessing pure Nash equilibria, potential games also provide a straight-
forward mechanism for agents to learn to play a pure Nash equilibri m, best response
dynamics. The best response dynamic is the simplest of the learning dynamics we will
consider. At each discrete time instantt, a playerp is selected uniformly at random. That
player selects a new action that maximizes her utility, withthe other players holding their
actions fixed, resulting in a new joint actiona[t + 1] = (a[t + 1], a−p[t]) where
a[t + 1] = arg max
a∈Ap
Up(a, a−p[t]).
4We provide the definition here for the finite-population version of the potential game here. The analog
for population games is postponed until our discussion of stable games in Chapter 5.
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Since this procedure corresponds to local maximization ofΦ, and local maximizers ofΦ
are pure Nash equlibria, we have the following [12].
Theorem 2.1.2 Best response dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibria in potential games.
Of course, best response dynamics do not guarantee convergec to any particular Nash
equilibria. In some situations extremely undesirable Nashequilibria exist. We can “select”
a particular equilibrium, namely the global maximum ofΦ, if we utilize a more sophisti-
cated learning dynamic known as the logit dynamic. We will see more learning dynamics
later on, including logit and learning dynamics for population games. The next sections
explore in greater depth a motivating example of the potential games— the congestion
games.
2.1.2 Infinite population potential games
We have seen the definition of the potential game in the finite-population setting, the
infinite-population version [26] is similar. A population game is a potential game if there
exists aC1 functionΦ : X→ R such that
∇Φ(x) = projT X(F(x)) ∀x ∈ X,









We note that the gradient operator here cannot be computed inthe usual manner because
f is a function on the setX having dimensionn− 1, and thus its partial derivatives do not
exist. The appropriate workaround is the affine calculus, see [27]. Potential games have
important equilibrium and dynamical properties. The congestion games are an important




Congestion games [18] are models of distributed network resource allocation. In this sec-
tion we will review some of the basic properties of congestion games. The second half
of this thesis includes some new results for this class of games. We consider the infinite-
population version of the congestion game, sometimes referred to as the non-atomic con-
gestion game. A congestion game models utilization of a setΓ of facilities. Action a ∈ Ap
utilizes some setΓpa ⊂ Γ of facilities. The setρp(γ) = {a ∈ Ap : γ ∈ Γ
p
a} indicates actions in



























One problem that has been studied extensively in the congestion game literature is
efficiency of equilibria. Consider an example:
Example 2.1.2 (A simple two resource game)Consider a single population with two ac-
tions, each utilizing one of two facilities inΓ = {1, 2}. The cost functions are c1(u) = u
and c2(u) = 1. One Wardrop equilibriumx∗ = (1, 0) 5 has all users using the first facility,
giving a social welfare of one. The optimal allocation is theone maximizing W(x), namely
x̂ = (12,
1
2), which gives W(x̂) = −
3
4. The social welfare associated with the equilibrium is
W(x∗) = −1, which is indeed the worst case equilibrium social welfare.§
5We refer to equilibria in the congestion games as Wardrop equilibria due to historical considerations.
They are the same as the Nash equilibria.
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2.1.4 The price of anarchy
The worst case efficiency loss at equilibrium in games with negative utilitiesis quantified





whereE is the set of equilibrium joint action distributions. If, asin the language game, the





In words, the price of anarchy is the worst case ratio of optimal social welfare to equilibrium
social welfare. We also refer to the price of anarchy of a class of games as the maximum
of this ratio among all games in the class. When we introduce amodel of language later
on, we will find that equilibrium action distributions with constant social welfare can be
constructed for any instance of the game. Since the optimal social welfare is unbounded,
the price of anarchy for this class of games is unbounded.
The situation for congestion games is not nearly as bleak. Ifwe fix the form of the cost
functions then the price of anarchy will be a constant [20].
Theorem 2.1.3 The price of anarchy for congestion games with non-decreasing affine cost
functions is43.
In other words, allowing users to choose facilities selfishly results in at most a 33%
loss in efficiency relative to the global optimum. However, even this modest optimality gap
can be bridged by instituting tolls on the facilities in a particular manner— the so-called
Pigouvian tolls [21].
2.1.5 Marginal cost pricing
The reason that equilibrium allocations fail to achieve maxi um social welfare is that users
do not experience disutility from negative externalities imposed on others. The idea of
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marginal cost pricing is to institute tolls on the facilities so as to internalize these externali-
ties. The net cost of a particular facility becomes proportional to the marginal contribution
to social welfare, so that the individual and centralized problems optimize proportional
objectives.
Suppose the non-decreasing, non-negative cost functions each have the formcγ(u) =
aγu+ bγ. Let x̂ be an optimal action distribution and define the toll for eachfacility γ ∈ Γ
as
τγ = aγuγ(x̂).
The equilibria of the tolled game with cost functions
ĉγ(u) = cγ(u) + τγ
maximize social welfare in the original game. The presumption is that the tolls can be
redistributed so that they do not impact social welfare other an through incentivizing
particular behaviors. Tolling is generally not helpful when the tolls cannot be redistributed
[22].
A critical assumption of marginal cost pricing is that userstrade-off tolls and congestion
in the same units. This assumption is removed by consideringcost functions for the tolled
game having the form,
ĉγ(u) = cγ(u) + βτγ.
This way users equateβ toll units with one unit of congestion. A more general model,
where different populations trade-off the two quantities differently has been considered.
It is shown that algorithms exist for computing tolls that can enforce not only optimal
congestions, butany feasible congestion [23], [24]. These procedure do howeverassume
that the network manager has full knowledge of the users’ preferences. Quantifying the cost
of not knowing this information for particular tolling policies is an open issue in congestion
pricing. We have constructed an example to illustrate this po nt.
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Example 2.1.3 (Unintended consequences)Consider again a single population with two
actions, each utilizing one of two facilities inΓ = {1, 2}. The cost functions are c1(u) = 34u
and c2(u) = 1. The optimal action distribution iŝx = (23,
1
3), giving a social cost of
2
3. The
equilibrium distribution is x∗ = (1, 0), which has a social cost of34. In order to recapture
this efficiency loss the network manager institutes tolls accordingto marginal cost pricing.




2, while the second facility is not tolled
because a2 = 0. Suppose thatβ = 2so that users are more sensitive to tolls than congestion.
The equilibrium allocation is now̃x = (0, 1), giving a social cost of 1. In effect, the
managers’ heavy-handed tolling has produced a situation where the social cost is higher
than if she had not tolled at all!§
Networks can be constructed that give arbitrary efficiency losses for largeβ. However,
it is unknown how exactly these worst-case efficiency losses change withβ. In the next
section we will introduce the concept of stochastic stability, which will be used extensively
in the first half of this thesis.
2.2 Stochastic stability
LetMǫ be an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain transition matrix over a finite set of













for somer(z, z′) ≥ 0 wheneverMǫz,z′ > 0 for someǫ > 0 thenM
ǫ is a regular perturbed
Markov process. We callM0 the unperturbed process. IfMǫz,z′ = 0 for all ǫ, then we define
r(z, z′) = ∞. It is straightforward to see thatPǫm,n is a regular perturbed Markov process,
with P0m,n being the reducible Markov chain obtained by substituingǫ = 0.
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In order to characterize the stochastically stable states of Pǫm,n, we will make use of the
theory of resistance trees [14]. LetR1, ...,RJ ⊂ Z be the recurrent communication classes
ofM0. Given two recurrent communication classesRi andRj, let {z0, z1, ..., zK} be a path
satisfyingz0 ∈ Ri andZK ∈ Rj. We call the quantity
∑K−1
k=0 r(zk, zk+1) the resistanceof the
path. With slight abuse of notation we definer i j to be theleast resistanceamong all such
paths.
Consider a graphG whose vertex set is the set of recurrent communication classes. An
Ri-treeT is a spanning tree inG such that for any vertexRj , j , i there is a unique directed






whereTRi is the set of allRi trees inG, which we refer to as thestochastic potentialof Ri.
We have the following theorem [14], which characertizes exactly the set of stochastically
stable states.
Theorem 2.2.1 LetMǫ be a regular perturbed Markov process and let R1, ..,RJ be the
recurrent communication classes of the unperturbed processM0. Then the stochastically
stable states are precisely those states contained in the recurrent communication classes
with minimum stochastic potential.
Example 2.2.1 (A three-state process)Figure 1 illustrates a simple three state Markov
process, P0. Each state Si, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is a singleton recurrent class, also referred to as an
absorbing state. The state transition matrix is given by
















































Figure 1: A simple three-state Markov process,P0. The system stays in its initial state for
all t.
It is easy to see that all state distributions are stationaryin this example because the tran-
sition matrix is the identity matrix. This process is not particularly interesting, until we
introduce the perturbation and arrive at Pǫ as shown in Figure 2. It can easily be verified
that Pǫ is a regular perturbed Markov process, so it must have at least one stochastically
stable state. In this example, we can easily see that the minimum resistance rooted trees for
each state (as each is a recurrent class of P0) must be
S1→ S3→ S2, r = 2+ 1 = 3
S3→ S2→ S1, r = 1+ 1 = 2
S2→ S1→ S3, r = 1+ 2 = 3
where the resistance is also noted. All other rooted trees will involve crossing states more
than once, so that all other trees rooted at Si will have a single edge equal to the resistance
above in addition to other non-zero resistance edges. We canconclude in this example
that there is one stochastically stable state, S1. This result is intuitively satisfying because
among the three states, the probability of leaving S1, ǫ2, is least.§
In cases with more edges inPǫ and more states, finding the minimum resistance tree
rooted atSi will be more difficult, although it is always a finite search. We do note, however,
that the search applies only to recurrent classes of states and these are oftentimes much










Figure 2: The perturbed processPǫ hasr(S1,S2) = 2, r(S3,S2) = 1, r(S2,S1) = 1.
2.2.1 Logit dynamics
In finite population potential games we saw that the best response dynamics converge to
a pure Nash equilibrium. However, which equilibrium is reached depends on the starting
action profile and the order that players revise their strategies. Other dynamics, notable the
logit dynamics, can guarantee that play lingers around a particular subset of equilibria—
the global maximizers of the potential function. We review the form of the logit dynamic
and its fundamental guarantee for performance. Suppose that at e ch discrete time instant
t, a single player is selected at random uniformly to update her action, with all other players
maintaining their current action. The updating playerPi updates her action according to












for eacha ∈ Ai and the temperatureǫ > 0. The temperature parameter specifies the
likelihood of playeri updating to a suboptimal action. In the smallǫ limit, we recover
the best response dynamics. In a potential game with potential functionΦ, the stationary









. Thus, for smallǫ the stationary distribution concentrates probability on the states that
maximize the potential function. Identifying the parameter ǫ as the perturbation term in a
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regular perturbed Markov process, it is also the case the theset of potential function max-
imizers are the stochastically stable states. Stochastic stability is rarely established in this
manner. The logit dynamic is one of the rare instances where an explicit characterization of
the stationary distribution in closed form exists for allǫ. In general, tools that characterize
only the set of stochastically stable states, such as resistance trees, are utilized. The next
section considers dynamics in the infinite population setting.
2.3 Convergence of evolutionary dynamics
Population games model strategic interactions in large populations. Evolutionary dynamics
model the behavior of the players. There are three defining featur s of evolutionary dynam-
ics. First, players only occasionally update their actions. Second, players are short-sighted
and thus choose actions in myopic fashion. Third, players possess limited information
about other players’ strategies. These principles reinforce each other and are motivated by
large population settings where gathering information andexact optimization are costly.
Evolutionary dynamics can be shown to closely approximate stochastic decision poli-
cies over finite time spans with sufficiently large finite populations [28]. We proceed to
formally define evolutionary dynamics.
An evolutionary dynamicis a map6
V : X→ TX.
We use the subscript to identify the utility function, i.e.VU. This is because the dynamic is











j (x)] = (V
p
U)i .
The general form of the overall system isẋ = VU(x).
6Although evolutionary dynamics can, in principle, be set-valued maps leading to differential inclusions,
we simplify here to keep the presentation concise.
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Part of the allure of potential games is that the potential function serves as a Lyapunov
function for many dynamics.
Theorem 2.3.1 Let G = (P,A,U) be a potential game with potential functionΦ. Suppose
the evolutionary dynamiċx = VU(x) satisfies




ThenΦ is a strict Lyapunov function for VU.
This fact is most of what is needed to show convergence to equilibri m for a broad range
of dynamics. The alignment condition in the theorem is knownas positive correlation
(PC). Absent the potential game structure, convergence is far from guaranteed. Indeed,
limit cycles and even chaos are produced under certain games. Unfortunately, the potential
game is a brittle property. Since it is defined by equalities,p rturbations to a potential game
will generally lose the potential structure. Since we desire results that are insensitive to
modelling details very generally, this is disappointing, to say the least. A recently proposed




Self-assembly1 refers to the emergence of high-level structures via the aggregate behav-
ior of simpler building blocks. Researchers have long been interested in understanding
self-assembly with an eye towards exploiting this understanding in engineered systems. A
number of algorithms have been suggested that are capable ofgeneric self-assembly. That
is, given a description of the objective they produce a policy with a corresponding perfor-
mance guarantee. These guarantees have been in the form of deterministic convergence
results. Not unlike in natural self-assembling systems that exhibit and often depend on pro-
cess noise, we consider the benefits of relaxing our expectations to allow for probabilistic
performance guarantees. In particular, we introduce the notio f stochastic stability to the
self-assembly problem. The stochastically stable states are the configurations the system
spends almost all of its time in as a noise parameter is taken to zero. We show that, in
this framework, simple procedures exist that are capable ofself-assembly of any tree un-
der stringent locality constraints. Our procedure gives anasymptotically maximum yield
of target assemblies while obeying communication and reversibility constraints. We also
present a slightly more sophisticated algorithm that guarantees maximum yields for any
problem size. The latter algorithm utilizes a somewhat morepresumptive notion of agents’
internal states. While it is unknown whether an algorithm providing maximum yields sub-
ject to our constraints can depend only on the more parsimonious form of internal state, we
are able to show that such an algorithm would not be able to possess a unique completing
rule— a useful feature for analysis. We examine the impact ofthe reversibility constraint
by showing how each algorithm can be modified to achieve better performance when the
constraint is relaxed. We also revisit a related algorithm from the literature to better under-
stand its performance in the context we study. We give analytic proofs of correctness for
1The results described in this chapter appear in [29], [30], and [31]
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our algorithms and provide simulation results for further insight.
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3.1 Introduction
Self-assembly is the phenomenon of an ordered structure emerging from the aggregate
behavior of simpler constituent entities acting autonomously. Galaxies self-assemble and
so do humans, but little is understood about such processes.Self-assembly has been the
subject of a great deal of research. The reasoning is twofold. First, understanding self-
assembly generically is essential to elucidating natural self-assembling systems. Second,
techniques applicable to the manufacture and operation of self-a sembling engineered sys-
tems can potentially be developed. The level of complexity inherent in the former circum-
stance suggests tremendous scalability, reliability, andparallelization advantages for suc-
cessful exploitation of self-assembly in the latter. Whileinterest in generic self-assembly
dates back to at least the 1950’s [32], the treatment of foundational possibility results has
only begun to appear in the literature in recent years. What follows is intended as a brief
overview of the state of the art and an attempt to frame the problems we address in a broader
context.
One branch of self-assembly research addresses the issue oforigins. That is, how do
self-assembling systems emerge spontaneously? The process f natural selection assumes
the existence of organisms that self-assemble and subsequently replicate in the presence
of selection forces. The question is then begged— how do the blind processes of physics
and chemistry conspire to set such processes into motion? Some approaches to this ques-
tion center around the identification and characterizationof intrinsic tendencies towards
order in nature. Self-organized criticality refers to a wide range of results spanning across
several fields, largely initiated by the seminal paper [33].Roughly speaking, many dy-
namical systems (e.g. snowflake formation) with a critical point as an attractor exhibit
self-organization. The common theme in this area of self-assembly is the emergence of
order from disorder. We do not address this problem. Instead, our agenda is prescriptive.
We are interested in inducing self-assembly in models that would not otherwise support it.
The severe assumption in the “programmable” self-assemblyprocesses we explore is
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that the constituent parts will each need to harbor complexity internally that is increasing in
the complexity of the assembly task. For instance, in animalembryos self-assembly can be
thought of as an expression of the information in the genome.Th refore, the complexity of
the mature animal is already present, although latent, in the earlier stages of development.
In contrast with the problem of origins, we are interested not i the production of order
from disorder, but the realization of order from an already very structured and explicit
instruction set.
Mutation and selection forces are known to modify DNA and augment the complexity
and functionality of the organism in the long-run. We are notexpressly concerned with
this phenomenon either. We are interested in identifying the instructions that can be loaded
by the parts and the performance of the induced dynamic systems. We ask, given very
general and straightforward dynamics and certain basic constrai ts on the parts’ ability to
carry out their instructions, under what circumstances canrules be synthesized such that
the system will behave in a predictable, desirable way? In particular, for various constraints
on agents capabilities we establish the possibility of generic self-assembly. In each case,
we attempt to make the class of achievable assemblies as large as possible while providing
the strongest possible performance guarantee. In some cases, the nature of the constraints
is such that the performance guarantees must be weaker than in other cases.
The structure of the rule sets and the underlying dynamics that execute the rules will be
fixed. We propose algorithms for the synthesis of rules from adescription of the assembly
goal. Target assemblies are represented by specific graph topologies. We desire that a
graph with at least as many nodes as the target graph “assemble” the target graph by having
it’s nodes create and sever edges according to preloaded local rules. When there are many
more nodes than the target, we prefer as many copies of the targ t to be assembled as
possible. Our approach is obviously much more simple than the processes that inspire it.
However, we tolerate more stringent constraints than existing generic algorithms in the
literature. A key innovation in our approach is our allowingfor probabilistic performance
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guarantees. We utilize the notion of stochastic stability.These are the states in the support
of the stationary distribution of a family of Markov chains a perturbation term is taken
to zero.
The ability to achieve self-assembly directives through loca rules exclusively is a prob-
lem that is relevant to biology, robotics, manufacturing and other application areas. Thus
far, self-assembly theory is yet to prove itself a disruptive force in any defining killer app.
Consequently, no particular model is especially canonical. The model we introduce will
invariably be suited more to some application areas than others. It may not be meaning-
ful to speak of programmability at all in the context of crystallization and polymerization
processes that are governed solely by thermodynamics. We introduce constraints on the
capabilities of the agents to assuage these concerns. Each application area has its own lim-
its on agents’ locomotion, sensing, memory, and computation. We demonstrate that under
even very stringent constraints, a high level of self-assembly performance is achievable.
Since the possibility of self-assembly is our concern, we donot at this point comment on
convergence rates outside of empirical observations basedon simulation results.
Our model is straightforward. The system is a graph that evolv s over time. Each vertex
is an identical atom. The finite number of vertices is fixed at the outset and the set of edges
is dynamic. Each node also has an internal state taking on values from a finite set. At each
iteration, two nodes are selected at random. If there is a rule in the finite rule set that applies
to the nodes, they either apply the rule (changing the graph)or do nothing depending on
the probability associated with that particular rule. If multiple rules apply, one is selected
at random. The rules are described using the notation of graph grammars [34]. We desire a
maximum number of disjoint maximal connected subgraphs isomorphic to a target graph.
More plainly, we want to maximize the yield of desirable assemblies.
We operate under communication and reversibility constraints. The communication
constraint is observed in all of the algorithms we present, it enforces a strong notion of lo-
cality in our procedures because information cannot propagate (e.g. by way of a connected
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graph) so that ostensibly global information concerning graph structure can be made avail-
able to the agents. This way, we are faced with a decision problem at the individual com-
ponent level as opposed to the sub-assembly level. Reversibility is a necessary property
in many application areas— we explore the impact of this constraint by considering both
processes that obey and neglect it. Beyond these constraintwe pay special attention to the
internal states that our algorithms require the agents to maintain. Internal states that can
be recovered from the unlabeled graph (up to an isomorphism)are desirable because they
imply that heterogeneity in agent behavior is a consequenceof their position in a graph
only. This way, we do not assume that identical atoms are distinguished from each other
based on anything other than their roles in particular graphto ologies. To illustrate this
distinction we make an analogy to the hydrogen atom. A hydrogen atom participating in
hydrogen gas (H2) would not be expect to behave similarly to alone hydrogen atom. How-
ever, we expect every hydrogen gas molecule and every lone hydrogen atom to behave in
the same way. Whether it is reasonable to expect the agents tomaintain internal states that
cannot be recovered from the unlabeled graph is application-dependent.
Another desirable feature of the internal states is uniqueness. Once an assembly is com-
pleted it is advantageous for each part to have a different state. This way the process will
be naturally composable in higher level self-assembly processes. Rules can be synthesized
that use the states of complete assemblies at the lower levelas a starting point. If there is
redundancy than their will be limitations on the configurations that the higher level process
can realize. We suggest a very simple procedure that gives maximum yields asymptotically
in the total number of available parts. A slightly more sophisticated procedure gives maxi-
mum yields for any number of parts, but introduces internal state that cannot be recovered
from the graph. We suspect that algorithms giving both maximum yields and recoverable
internal states exist. However, if we insist on uniqueness of states in complete assemblies
as well, the situation is less clear. We show that a feature ouanalysis depends on, the
presence of a unique completing rule, can never be guaranteed for an algorithm with both
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unique and recoverable states.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we highlight other self-assembly
research that is either prior or parallel to our own. Section3.3 provides the definitions we
will rely upon. We give a simple algorithm with asymptotically maximum yields in Section
3.4. We introduce an algorithm that always gives a maximum yield in Section 3.5. We
compare the two algorithms and comment on potential consequences for the internal states
when we insist on maximum yields in Section 3.6. The final two sections of this chapter
describe an algorithm combining some desiderata of both ouralgo ithms, and a look at how
an existing algorithm from the literature performs in our model.
3.2 Related Work
The synthesis problem for programmable self-assembly of graphs was introduced in [2].
There, the procedure depends upon communication between agents participating in an
assembly and decisions are made according to a policy that relies on exhaustive search
through all possible sub-assemblies. The notion of deadlock (multiple partial assemblies as
undesirable equilibria) is also introduced. In [1] the formalism of graph grammars is first
utilized in self-assembly of graphs and algorithms for synthesizing rules are presented. In
particular, theMakeTree algorithm uses only constructive and destructive binary rules so
that our communication constraint is observed. This procedure has a performance guaran-
tee for all acyclic graphs when the number of agents is infinite. However, to avoid deadlock
when the number of agents is finite, a disassociation rule must be added which depends
upon implementation of a consensus algorithm inconsistentwith the communication con-
straint we insist on. This stream of work has contributed many other results in this area
including optimal non-deterministic behavior for some cases, and a robotic programmable
parts testbed [35].
Designing self-assembly rules that are optimal with respect to onvergence rates subject
to a probabilistic performance constraint was considered in [36]. Stochastic stability has
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also been used as an equilibrium concept in a mildly related network formation game [37].
A similar notion of stability has been applied to the analysis of gene regulatory networks
[38].
Another stream of research has represented programmable self-as mbly using cellular
automata [39]. The generic algorithms are applicable to allassemblies that are filled, non-
cantilevered, and convex in each layer. However, the agentsare assumed to know their
exact global position at all times. This can be guaranteed aslong as the agents know their
positions initially.
Another model that has actually seen some experimental succe s is the tile [40] (another
form of cellular automata). Basic self-assembly and computation capabilities have been
demonstrated with DNA-based tiles. This model also has various associated theoretical
results relating to computational and self-assembly tasks, see for instance [41].
Numerous robotic self-assembling systems have been developed, notably [42] and [43].
Some mathematical formalization of these methods has also been done [44]. General
global-to-local techniques for self-assembly are considere in [45]. A synopsis of vari-
ous contributions in robotic self-assembly is available [46].
While most approaches to self-assembly have focused on structural assembly tasks,
[47] has instead emphasized the function of resulting assembli s.
3.3 Definitions
3.3.1 Graph Grammars
In this section we succinctly reproduce the notion of graph grammars introduced in [1].
We will use a slightly different formulation that is tailored to our setting. A simple labeled
graph is a tripleG = (V,E, l) whereV = {1, ...,N} are vertices (or parts),E ⊂ V × V are
pairs of vertices (or edges), andl : V → S is a labeling function indicating the internal
state of each node. The number of identical atoms, or parts, is N. Parts are attached if their
indices are one of the pairs inE. Pairs of nodes{x, y} ∈ E are denoted byxy. The label
l(x) of a partx is its internal state information from the finite set of statesS. We use the
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subscript notationVG, EG, lG to refer to respectively, the vertex set, edge set, and labeling
function of a graphG. We also usenE(k) to refer to the neighbors of vertexk relative to the
edge setE. The set of unlabeled graphs with vertex setV is denotedGV.
Our self-assembly objectives will be related toE only. V will be static andl will in-
fluence howE changes, but will not be material to our objectives intrinsically. In this
framework, assemblies are network topologies. In [30] we usweighted graphs to con-
fer geometric orientations on the edges, but we omit these details here in the interest of
simplicity.
We say that two graphs are anisomorphism, or one graph isisomorphicto another when
they obey an equivalence relation. That isG1 ≃ G2 if ∃h : VG1 → VG2 bijective such that
i j ∈ EG1 ⇔ h(i)h( j) ∈ EG2.
The isomorphism islabel-preservingif lG1(x) = lG2(h(x)) ∀ x ∈ VG1.
Due to the vertices being identical atoms, any element of an equivalence class of graphs
represents the same assembly. Since it is self-assembly performance that we are concerned
with, our objective will be phrased in terms of equivalence classes of graphs.
Given I ⊂ V we define thesubgraph G∩ I = (V ∩ I ,E ∩ I × I , l|I×I ). We say thatG
containsH if a subgraph ofG is isomorphic toH. A connected subgraph is maximal if there
are no nodes in the original graph that could have been added to the subgraph while still
leaving the subgraph connected. We will use the terms assembly and maximal connected
subgraph interchangeably.
Definition 3.3.1 A rule is an ordered pair of graphs r= (L,R) such that VL = VR. The
graphs L and R are theleft hand sideandright hand sideof r. Thesizeof r is |VL| = |VR|.
We refer to rules of size two asbinary rules. If EL ( ER a rule is calledconstructive.
If EL ) ER a rule is calleddestructive. Otherwise, the rule ismixed. Note that we define
these set inequalities strictly, unlike some others. Visually we can represent a binary rule
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as
a− b ⇀ c d
where the letters are the labels and the vertices are suppressed, with the left node of the left
hand side corresponding to the left node of the right hand side, and similarly for the right
nodes. A rule represents a local change in a graph, i.e.|VG| ≥ |VL|.
Definition 3.3.2 A rule r = (L,R) is applicableto a graph G if there exists a subgraph
G ∩ I and a label-preserving isomorphism h: VG ∩ I → VL. In this case h is called a
witnessand the triple(r, I , h) is called anaction.
Definition 3.3.3 When(r, I , h) is an action with r= (L,R) on G, theapplicationof (r, I , h)
to G gives a new graph G′ = (VG,EG′ , lG′) defined by

















lG(x), if x ∈ VG − I
lR ◦ h(x), otherwise
We writeG
r,I ,h
−−→ G′ to indicate thatG′ was obtained fromG via application of (r, I , h). We




−−→ G′′ = G.
If we have a set of rulesΦ then we can begin to examine sequences of graphs obtained
from successive application of the rules.




























a a ⇀ b− c, (r1)
c a ⇀ d − e, (r2)
e b ⇀ f − g. (r3)
From the initial graph G0 = ({1, 2, 3}, {∅}, l0(·) = a) there is only one possible trajectory















Figure 3: The rules in Example 3.3.1 can be applied successively to generate the cycle on








Figure 4:r4 effectively acts as a communication step, updating the agent labeledd that the
cycle has been closed.
Example 3.3.2 (Binary communication) Continuing with the previous example, consider
the label d. When r3 is applied, the chain closes into a cycle, but the node with label d is
unaffected. Considering labels as representing the local information available to each
agent, the agents with labels f and g know the exact structureof the graph since these
labels are only adopted coinciding with r3. If we augment the rule set with a mixed rule:
Φ̂ = Φ ∪ {d − f ⇀ h− f , (r4)}
then the agent labeled d is apprised that the cycle is completed by its neighbor with label
f , so that in the final graph, all agents are aware of the complete structure of the assembly
they participate in. The effect of r4 is illustrated in Figure 4.§
In order to disallow communication, the algorithms we present will be constrained so
that they can only synthesize a finite number of binary rules—each one being either con-
structive of destructive. We also point out that if the number of vertices in the example
where greater, it would be possible forr3 to occur between two different subgraphs, pro-
ducing a long chain instead of a cycle. This reflects a very general limitation with finite
binary rule sets [1]. For this reason, we will concentrate only acyclic assembly objec-
tives.
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Since we will only be concerned with binary rules, we will introduce random pairwise
selection dynamics to place the application of rules in a systematic framework.
3.3.2 Random pairwise selection dynamics
A random pairwise selection dynamic graph is a quadrupleΣ = (G0, F,Φ,R). The graph
G0 is an initial condition. The setΦ is the rules. The family of random variablesF(G),G ∈
GVG0 take on values in{(x, y) : x, y ∈ VG0, x , y} so that eachF(G) selects two vertices with-
out replacement.R : Φ → (0, 1] assigns a Bernoulli distribution parameter to each rule.
With these definitions, we can generate a random sequence of graphs{Gt}∞t=1 as follows:
1. Initialize with t = 0 andG0.
2. Increment.
3. F(Gt) is realized, giving a pair of vertices{x, y}.
4. Let
Φt = {r ∈ Φ : ∃ h s.t. (r, {x, y}, h) is an action onGt−1}.
5. If Φt = {∅} let Gt = Gt−1 and return to step 2.






















Gt−1. w.p. 1− R(r)
9. Return to step 2.
We will be interested in characterizing the asymptotic behavior of {Gt} for various
choices ofΦ andR. The random sequence of selections,F(Gt) will be considered exoge-














Figure 5: Successful realizations of{Gt} occur with positive probability
i.e. no random behavior is introduced intentionally. Random pairwise selection dynam-
ics can therefore be thought of as a model in which agents interact via random encounters
and then behave according to the rules and their associated probabilities. The interaction
probabilities depend on the current graphGt. SinceF(Gt) is exogenous, we will have lim-
ited control over the trajectories of{Gt}, still, we hope to influence the long-run properties
of the system throughΦ andR. This model is appropriate for systems where agent mo-
tion is stochastic, such as in a liquid solution. Alternatively, we can think of the model
as corresponding to a system with deterministic agent motion that is abstracted away or
approximated via random encounters.
The selection at timet, F(Gt), could alternatively be defined so that the probabilities
associated with various selections depend on a finite history {Gτ}tτ=t−T . Our results will
depend on the overall system being finite-state Markov and anassumption that the proba-
bility associated with any particular selection is always bounded away from zero. So long
as these assumptions are obeyed, the exact statistical dependencies of the selection process
F are immaterial to our analyses. More formally, we assume throughout that there exists
F̄ > 0 such that
Pr
[
F(G) = {i, j}
]
≥ F̄ ∀ i, j ∈ V, i , j and allG ∈ GV0.
The specific method used to pick between rules in step 6 could also be more general.
Again, at issue is that the probability of selecting any particular agent is bounded away
















Figure 6: Unfortunately, the system in Example 3.3.3 can exhibit deadlock.
3.3.3 The self-assembly problem
Let G0 be an initial graph and̂G an unlabeled target graph. Theyield of a graphG with
respect to a target̂G, YĜ(G), is the number of disjoint maximal connected subgraphs inG
that are isomorphic tôG. Building on this definition we define the set:
GĜVG0
= {G : VG = VG0,YĜ(G) = ⌊|VG0|/|VĜ|⌋}
as the set of maximum yield graphs. For all the graphs inGĜVG0
, it is impossible for any
rules to increase the number of completed assemblies. We do not specify any preference
for the remainder nodes when|VG0| is not an integer multiple of|VĜ|.
The self-assembly problem is, givenF andG0, to find a set of rulesΦ and associated
probabilitiesR so that{Gt} will enter and remain inGĜVG0
.
Example 3.3.3 (Deadlock)Consider the systemΣ = (G0, F,Φ,R) defined by
G0 = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {∅}, l0(·) = a)

















a a ⇀ b− c, (r1)
c a ⇀ d− e, (r2)
R(·) = 1.
SupposeĜ = ({1, 2, 3}, {12, 23}). Figure 5 gives a possible trajectory for{Gt}. In this
case, the process was successful since Gt ∈ ĜV for all t ≥ 2. However, another possible
trajectory is shown in Figure 6. In this case, the system has re ched an undesirable steady
state and we have Gt < GĜV for all t. Notice that each maximal connected subgraph of Gt
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is isomorphic to a subgraph of̂G— this is the phenomenon referred to as deadlock [2].
Deadlock is an issue because we consider G0 with finitely many vertices only, so the supply
of parts can become exhausted in undesirable graphs that areinvariant underΣ. This
issue is addressed in [1] for a very similar situation. It is suggested that the agents run a
consensus algorithm to estimate if deadlock has occurred, an if they deem it has, to sever
their edges so that they will be available to complete other assemblies. In this paper we
will show that deadlock can be avoided without recourse to communication.§
Depending on the constraints introduced onΦ andR it may not be possible to make
GĜV an invariant set of the systemΣ. In this case, we will be limited to making probabilistic
statements aboutYĜ(Gt). We introduce one of these constraints now.
3.3.4 Reversibility
One very natural constraint onΦ andR is related to the reversibility of the various rules.
In many settings, reversibility is a necessary constraint in order for models to be realistic
[48], [49].
Definition 3.3.4 The pair(Φ,R) is reversibleif for any r ∈ Φ we havēr ∈ Φ.
Those familiar with chemical reaction networks will recognize this definition as analo-
gous to the notion of reversibility in that context. Later weill analyze{Gt} as a Markov
process. The reader is advised that the above definition of reversibility does not imply
that{Gt} is a reversible Markov process. A reversible Markov Processwith state transition
matrix P satisfies the detailed balance condition
Pi jπi = P jiπ j
for all i, j, whereπi andπ j are the stationary probabilities associated with statesi and j,
respectively. The notion of reversibility in Definition 3.3.4, in terms of the Markov process
{Gt} (with each possible graph a state), isPi j > 0⇔ P ji > 0.
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Clearly it is impossible for{Gt} to stay inGĜV when (Φ,R) is reversible. Because of this,
the best we can do is synthesizeΦ andR so that{Gt} will be in GĜV with a high probability,
orYĜ(Gt) is close to⌊|V|/|VĜ|⌋ with high probability. In order to formalize these notions,
we will utilize the concept of stochastic stability [50]. The application of stochastic stability
to self-assembly is novel, although a similar notion has been applied to the analysis of gene
regulatory networks [38]. A review of stochastic stabilityand the resistance tree method is
provided in the mathematical preliminaries.
Before introducing our synthesis algorithms, we describe some desirable features ofΦ
andR.
3.3.5 Recoverable states
We will be interested inΦ andR that maintain a natural relationship between the unlabeled
graph (VG,EGt) and the labeling function at timet, lGt . In particular, we would like to be
able to generate the labeled graph from the unlabeled graph so that the two agree up to a
label-preserving isomorphism. There are some clear benefits to this feature. First, insist-
ing on such a degenerate internal state limits the freedom inspecifying agent behavior in
a manner appropriate for certain applications where agent homogeneity cannot be circum-
vented so easily. Second,Σ could be augmented (perhaps on a different time-scale) with
periodic global information updates that can be used to corre t any errors in the internal
states.
Definition 3.3.5 Given G0 and F, we say thatΦ and R produce aΣ with recoverable
statesif there exists̃l : 2VG×VG ×VG0 → S such that for any G that is observed with positive
probability underΣ we have that(VG0,EG, lG) and(VG0,EG, l̃(EG, ·)) are a label-preserving
isomorphism.
We will be chiefly interested in the initial graph


































Figure 8: The system in Example 3.3.4 can also exhibit deadlock. The labels in the third
graph pictured are not derivable from the set of edges alone.
Furthermore, since we consider onlyF bounded away from zero, definition 3.3.5 will be a
property ofΦ andR alone. While the definition may appear a bit cumbersome, it will be
straightforward to see if a particularΦ andR produce recoverable states only.
Of the examples above, it is easy to verify that only Example 3.3.2 does not produce
recoverable states. However, that example also violated our communication constraint as
it utilized a mixed rule. Since we will be interested in algorithms synthesizing rules that
obey both desiderata, we give another example.
Example 3.3.4 (Multiple applicable rules) A straightforward way to generateΣwith non-
recoverable states is to introduce rules with identical left hand sides. Consider the system
Σ = (G0, F,Φ,R) defined by
G0 = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {∅}, l0(·) = a)



























a a ⇀ b− c, (r1)
a a ⇀ d − e, (r2)
c e ⇀ f − g, (r3)
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R(·) = 1.
SupposeĜ = ({1, 2, 3}, {12, 23, 34}); a chain of four vertices. Notice that r1 and r2 are
both applicable when two singleton nodes with label a are selct d. Figure 7 illustrates a
successful trajectory, while Figure 8 illustrates the possibility of deadlock. Notice that the
third graphs in each figure are identical apart from their labels, implying that the labels
cannot be determined unambiguously from the unlabeled graphs.§
One algorithm we will consider will synthesize rules that introduce non-recoverable
states and it is precisely this phenomenon (multiple applicab e rules) that will be responsi-
ble. A second feature we will strive for is uniqueness of labes in complete assemblies.
3.3.6 Uniqueness of final states
It is desirable for the agents participating in a complete assembly to know their role in
that assembly. If they do not, then it is not possible for nodes sharing redundant labels
to exhibit distinct behaviors. Self-assembly will often beonly a part of a larger system
objective. In this case if an agent’s state does not imply their position in the final assembly
unambiguously then system architects are limited in the divrs ty of behaviors they can
induce in the self-assembled structures. Even if self-assembly is the lone objective, non-
unique final states limit the composability of self-assembled structures in higher-level self-
assembly processes. This restricts the level of parallelization and decentralization that is
attainable. Motivated by these considerations we propose the following definition:
Definition 3.3.6 Given G0, Ĝ and F, we say thatΦ andR produce aΣ with unique final
statesif there exists an injective labeling functionl̂ : VĜ → S such that any subgraph ob-
served with positive probability that is isomorphic toĜ is a label-preserving isomorphism
of {VĜ,EĜ, l̂}.
All of the examples we have encountered thus far produce unique final states. We give



















Figure 9: The labels in the fourth graph pictured are not uniqe.
Example 3.3.5 (Non-unique final states)Consider the systemΣ = (G0, F,Φ,R) defined
by
G0 = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {∅}, l0(·) = a)

















a a ⇀ b− c, (r1)
c c ⇀ d − e, (r2)
R(·) = 1.
SupposeĜ = ({1, 2, 3}, {12, 23, 34}); a chain of four vertices. Figure 9 illustrates a
successful trajectory. Two agents have state b so the process does not give unique final
states.§
Next, we introduce our first algorithm,Singleton, which provides self-assembly per-
formance guarantees and satisfies both constraints (constructive/destructive binary, reversibil-
ity) and at the same time guarantees both recoverable statesand unique final states.
3.4 A serial algorithm
TheSingleton algorithm generates a rule setΦ from a target grapĥG = (VĜ,EĜ). In [30]
we presented a nearly identical algorithm as a standalone syst m without the notation of
graph grammars. We use numbers instead of letters for labels. The algorithm is a recursion.
In line 8, we use the reversible arrows,⇋, to indicate that the rule is to be understood
as two rules; the second being the rule obtained by switchingt e left and right hand sides.
Evident from line 8 is the reason behind the name: all constructive rules involve a node
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Algorithm 1 Singleton(V,E, k, s)
1: Φ← {∅}
2: if |nE(k)| = 0 then
3: return (s,Φ)
4: else
5: {vj : j = 1, 2, ..., |nE(k)|} ← nE(k)
6: s̄← s
7: for j = 1 to |nE(k)| do
8: Φ← Φ ∪ {s̄ 0 ⇋ (s+ 1)− (s+ 2)}
9: s̄← s+ 1
10: s← s+ 2
11: let (V j ,E j) be the component of (V,E − {kvj}) containingvj
12: (sj ,Φ j)← Singleton(V j,E j , vj, s)





with label 0—the label reserved for nodes not participatingin any edges. To obtain a rule
set, we runSingleton(VĜ,EĜ, k, 0) for anyk ∈ VĜ. The target grapĥG must be connected
and acyclic. The algorithm is simple. We treatk as the root of the tree. The algorithm
iterates throughk’s neighbors one at a time. Assuming|VĜ| > 0 the first rule is always
0 0⇋ 1− 2,
where 1 is the label assigned to the node that will play the rolof the root and 2 is the label
of it’s neighbor. If this neighbor has no other edges we proceed to the next neighbor and
add the rule
1 0⇋ 3− 4,
so that the node playing the role ofk forms an edge with a singleton thereby filling a
vacancy, and updates its label. Since the node playing the role of k has changed its label,
there is no longer an applicable deconstructive rule between it and the node with label
2. We continue to proceed in this manner for each neighbor of the k-node. If one of the










































Figure 10: The system in Example 3.4.1 can assemble itself throug application of the
odd-numbered (constructive rules) in order, but may then apply destructive rules and dis-
assemble.
the neighbor as thek-node (i.e. the root) of the graph obtained by making a cut betwe n
the originalk-node and the neighbor. We keep track of the largest labels so that each new
node added is assigned a unique label.
At a high-level, the algorithm succeeds because each singleto added on is able to
determine its role in the target graph from the label of the node it forms an edge with.
This information determines what vacancies, if any, it has for new nodes. The internal
states thus provide only limited information about the overall structure of the subgraph that
agents participate in. After a singleton joins up and receives a role, it may update its state
as it fills vacancies, but will not know whether its neighborshave filled their vacancies. The
rule set returned bySingleton is not necessarily immune to deadlock, but an appropriate
choice ofR, the function assigning rule probabilities, will be accompanied by a strong
performance guarantee. Next we provide a simple example of theSingleton algorithm.
Example 3.4.1 (Singleton algorithm) Consider the target grapĥG = (VĜ,EĜ) defined
by
VĜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
EĜ = {12, 13, 14, 15, 56}.
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0 0 ⇋ 1− 2, (r1, r2)
1 0 ⇋ 3− 4, (r3, r4)
3 0 ⇋ 5− 6, (r5, r6)
5 0 ⇋ 7− 8, (r7, r8)
8 0 ⇋ 9− 10. (r9, r10)
Now consider a completeΣ as follows
G0 = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {∅}, l0(·) = 0)
F ∼ i.i.d. uniform
R(·) = 1.
Figure 10 illustrates an execution of this system that successfully assembles via the appli-
cation of the constructive rules in order. Unfortunately, in the last graph the application of
a destructive rule has taken the system out ofGĜV. §
3.4.1 Analysis ofSingleton
A consequence ofΦ being a reversible set of rules is that completed assembliescannot
be made stable— removing a part from a complete assembly and lowering the yield by
one occurs with positive probability. This phenomenon was ob erved in the preceding
example. However, the reversibility has the benefit of freeing the system from deadlock.
Properly balancing these two attributes viaR will be necessary in order to provide any sort
of performance guarantee forSingleton systems.
Consider an arbitrary connected, acyclicĜ = (VĜ,EĜ) and the initial graph
G0 = ({1, 2, ...,N}, {∅}, l0(·) = 0)
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ar , r is constructive
ǫ, r is destructive
whereΦ is obtained fromSingleton(VĜ,EĜ, k, 0) for anyk ∈ VĜ. The valuesar ∈ (0, 1]
are arbitrary constants.
This Σ is a regular perturbed Markov process over the space of graphs, henceforth
referred to asPǫ . In particular, each state ofPǫ is an equivalence class of graphs that
are isomorphic to each other. The unperturbed process,P0, is obtained by removing the
destructive rules fromΦ andR. The following result is immediate.
Lemma 3.4.1 The absorbing states of P0 are all states where each subgraph of G is iso-
morphic to a subgraph of̂G. Either|nEG(i)| ≥ 1∀i ∈ VG or there exists one i∈ VG such that
|nEG(i)| = 0.
In other words, every assembly in every absorbing state ofP0 is a partial or complete
assembly. The only circumstance were a node without any edges persists is when all other
nodes participate in complete assemblies. Otherwise, the singleton node and some other
node would comprise a left hand side of a constructive rule inΦ, which would contradict
the state’s being absorbing. ClearlyP0 has many states inGĜV as well as many states with
nearly maximum yields, but also has quite a few deadlock state with low yields. The
absorbing states are the only states we need to consider in determining the stochastically
stable states ofPǫ.
The performance guarantees for theSingleton algorithm rely on the following theo-
rem:
Theorem 3.4.1 The stochastically stable states of Pǫ are the absorbing states of P0 with
the minimum number of disjoint maximal connected subgraphs. In particular, there are
⌊|VG0|/|VĜ|⌋ such subgraphs in each and every one of the stochastically stble states.
43
Proof: The proof is based on the construction of rooted trees for theclaimed class
of stochastically stable states and comparison with the tres corresponding to all other
absorbing states. LetZ0 be the absorbing states ofP0. We will partitionZ0 into disjoint sets
Zm where each state inZm hasm assemblies, so that
⋃
m∈M
Zm = Z0,M = {⌈|VG0|/|VĜ|⌉, ⌈|VG0|/|VĜ|⌉ + 1, ..., ⌊|VG0|/2⌋}.
The rooted trees for each absorbing state contain|Z0| −1 edges. There is nonzero resistance
associated with each of these edges because the states are all absorbing. ForPǫ, the resis-
tance is at least one for each edge. We will show that a rooted tre satisfying this minimum
resistance of|Z0| − 1 can be constructed for each state inZ⌈|VG0 |/|VĜ|⌉.
To shorten the proof we restrict our interest to the case where bothN = |VG0| and|VĜ|
are even. A similar construction exists for the cases where eith r N, |VĜ|, or both are odd.
Let zN/2 ∈ ZN/2 be the state with all assemblies as pairs of nodes. LetzN/2−1 ∈ ZN/2−1 be
the state arrived at by applying the appropriate destructive rule on one of the pairs and
then applying constructive actions to attach the two free atoms to one of the other pairs.
We proceed like this for eachzm ∈ Zm letting zm−1 be arrived at by breaking up a pair and
transferring the pieces to the largest possible assembly. This requires a destructive rule
followed by two constructive rules. Figure 11 illustrates an example of this procedure.
We will first construct the tree rooted atz⌈N/|VĜ|⌉. There are edges corresponding to the
zm as follows:
z⌊N/2⌋ → z⌊N/2⌋−1→ ...→ z⌈N/|VĜ|⌉.
Each edgezm → zm−1 represents breaking up one assembly of two nodes (resistance of
one), and then having those nodes form together. This will form the backbone of the tree.
Figure 12 illustrates the concept we will use to complete thetre rooted atz⌈N/|VĜ|⌉.
Each row contains the states with a particular number of assembli s. What remains to
be shown is that all states inZm can reachzm via a path through states inZm with all edges
































Figure 12: The structure of the tree rooted atz⌈N/|VĜ|⌉; note thatM = ⌈N/|VĜ|⌉.
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assemblies, completed assemblies, and at most one other assembly. Let xm refer to the
largest incomplete assembly ofzm (let it be a two-node assembly if that is the largest). We
can construct the path tozm for the two cases fory:
Case 1: There exists a maximal connected subgraph ofy that is isomorphic toxm. In
this case, we take the smallest assembly with more than two nodes and shift a node to
the largest incomplete assembly other than the one that is isomorphic toxm. We continue
this process until we obtainzm. Each step in the process involves one destructive rule and
therefore an edge with resistance one linking to a distinct absorbing state inZm.
Case 2: There is no maximal connected subgraph ofy that is isomorphic toxm. In this
case, we take the smallest assembly with more than two nodes an shift a node to the largest
maximal connected subgraph that is isomorphic to a subgraphof xm. We proceed like this
until we obtain a maximal connected subgraph that is isomorphic to xm, and then continue
as in case 1.
We can repeat this process until we have covered all of the stat s inZm, avoiding any
redundancies so that we form precisely|Zm|−1 edges. Once we have applied this technique
for all mwe have obtained a rooted tree with each edge having resistance one so thatz⌈N/|VĜ|⌉
is stochastically stable.
This construction can be extended for all the other states inZ⌈N/|VĜ|⌉. For an arbitrary
statez′ ∈ Z⌈N/|VĜ|⌉, z
′
, z⌈N/|VĜ|⌉ we construct the tree just as above for the states in the
setsZm,m > ⌈N/|VĜ|⌉ and for z⌈N/|VĜ|⌉. Then we insert the edges betweenz⌈N/|VĜ|⌉ and
z′ in the same way as above except that the directions are reversed. Then we apply the
exact same procedure as above for the remaining states inZ⌈N/|VĜ|⌉, again avoiding any
redundancies. These trees will also all have resistance oneat every edge so that all of
Z⌈N/|VĜ|⌉ is stochastically stable.
For any state inZm,m , ⌈N/|VĜ|⌉ the rooted trees all must include an edge that goes
from a state with a smaller number of assemblies to a state with a larger number of assem-
blies. This can only be accomplished by application of two consecutive destructive rules
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corresponding to an edge with resistance two. Since all other edges are at best resistance
one, all of these rooted trees have resistance equal to at least |Z0|. We therefore conclude
that the stochastically stable states are preciselyZ⌈N/|VĜ|⌉, the states with the minimum num-
ber of assemblies.
Unfortunately, not all stochastically states ofPǫ are inGĜV . However, there is a signifi-
cant exception.
Corollary 3.4.1 If N = m|VĜ| for some m∈ Z then all stochastically stable state have all
maximal connected subgraphs of G isomorphic toĜ.
This result is immediate from the preceding Theorem. Of course, such a strong result
will not hold whenN is not an integer multiple of|VĜ|. This leads to the following curiosity:
We can decrease the minimum yield among the stochastically st ble states by increasing
N. This is somewhat surprising given thatSingleton generates rules without any consid-
eration ofN, and increasingN makes more parts available for assembly. This phenomenon
leads to weak performance forSingleton whenN is both not much larger than|VĜ| and
not an integer multiple of|VĜ|. Nevertheless, the situation is much better whenN is large.
Theorem 3.4.2 All stochastically stables states of Pǫ have no more than(|VĜ| − 1)
2 nodes
not part of a connected subgraph isomorphic toĜ. Further, at most|VĜ| − 1 subassemblies
are incomplete.
Proof: Let N = (|VĜ| − 1)
2. The maximum number of incomplete assemblies is|VĜ| −
1 assemblies with|VĜ| − 1 nodes in each assembly. Each increase ofN by one, must
add one complete assembly and reduce the number of nodes not participating in complete
assemblies by|VĜ| − 1. This continues until we reachN = |VĜ|(|VĜ| − 1) and there are
zero nodes not part of complete assemblies in the stochastically stable states. This process
repeats for|VĜ|(|VĜ| − 1) + 1 through|VĜ|
2 so that it is easy to show by induction that
(|VĜ| − 1)
2 is always the maximum number of nodes not part of complete assmblies.
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3.4.2 Remarks
Theorem 3.4.2 upper bounds the number of reject assemblies for all N. WhenN ≫ |VĜ|
the yield ofSingleton is only negligibly different from the maximum. It is an open ques-
tion as to whether or this guarantee can be improved upon without compromising on the
constraints or features of the internal states. Empirically, we have found that introducing re-
sistances greater than one for destructive rules applied further from thek-node can improve
performance in some simulations, but these results are yet to be formalized.
Another feature ofSingleton is that parts are only added one-at-a-time. In Appendix
3.9 we present a non-reversible version ofSingleton with non-recoverable states that
converges toGĜV almost surely. Below we will present a process that providesth same
performance guarantee, so this modifiedSingleton process is of interest only if one-at-a-
time assembly is preferable.
The basic action of theSingleton process is to place more probability weight on
assembly than disassembly. The system tends toward assembly because of this. At the
same time, the positive probabilities associated with disassembly alleviate deadlock. The
shortcomings of theSingleton process are related to the fact that it views each edge the
same way. This is why when we have
|VĜ| < N < 2|VĜ|
the probability of observing two incomplete assemblies is comparable to the probability of
observing one complete assembly and one incomplete assembly. Both situations exhibit
the same number of edges and it is the number of edges that the proc ss drives down, or
equivalently, the total number of assemblies.
Next we consider an algorithm for synthesizingΦ when non-recoverable states are
allowed. We will see that this process is able to improve uponthe performance of the
Singleton process by treating some edges differently than others.
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3.5 A parallel algorithm
Under random pairwise comparison dynamics the sequence of graphs{Gt} is random. The
strongest possible performance guarantee that can be provided is that{Gt} converges to the
setGĜV almost surely. Equivalently, we can be arbitrarily close tocertain that the system
will be assembled if we wait long enough to make our observation. If we impose that
Φ is reversible, then this sort of guarantee is not possible. In the previous section we
introduced an alternative for this circumstance in the formf stochastic stability. Stochastic
stability provides a continuum of systems such that the station ry probability of observing
a mostly complete{Gt} goes to one as the parameterǫ goes to zero. We would like to
be able to improve upon the result of the previous section. Inparticular, we would like
the stochastically stable states to be a subset ofGĜV. We will present an algorithm that
accomplishes this feat while observing the constraints that Φ be a reversible set of binary
constructive and deconstructive rules, but will in most cases introduce non-recoverable
states. The process will have unique final states, however. If, in addition, an irreversible
rule is allowed, then the system will converge toGĜV almost surely.
As we saw in Example 3.3.4, non-recoverable states are oftenassociated with non-
uniqueness of the left hand sides inΦ. TheLynchpin algorithm will generate non-recoverable
states precisely because of this issue. Like,Singleton, Lynchpin is a recursion that gen-
eratesΦ from a target grapĥG and an initial nodek.
To obtain a rule set we runLynchpin(VĜ,EĜ, k, 0) for anyk ∈ VĜ. The target grapĥG
must be connected and acyclic. The defining feature of rule sets generated fromLynchpin
is the presence of a completing rule. That is, every assemblyis completed by application
of the same rule. In order to highlight this feature, we next consider an examplêG and
compare the rule sets generated byLynchpin andSingleton.
Example 3.5.1 (Completing rules)SupposeĜ = ({1, 2, 3}, {12, 23, 34}); a chain of four
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Algorithm 2 Lynchpin(V,E, k, s)
1: {vj : j = 1, 2, ..., |nE(k)|} ← nE(k)
2: for j = 1 to |nE(k)| do
3: if |nE(vj)| ≥ 2 then
4: let (V j ,E j) be the component of (V,E − {kvj}) containingvj
5: (sj ,Φ j)← Lynchpin(V j,E j, vj , s)
6: s← sj
7: else
8: sj ← 0
9: Φ j ← {∅}
10: end if
11: end for
12: Φ← Φ1 ∪ {s1 0 ⇋ (s+ 1)− (s+ 2)}
13: s← s+ 2
14: for j = 2 to |nE(k)| do
15: Φ← Φ ∪Φ j ∪ {sj s ⇋ (s+ 1)− (s+ 2)}




















Figure 13: Assembly of̂G viaΦS with r5 being the last rule applied, clearly the order ofr3


















Figure 14: Assembly of̂G viaΦL always culminates withr5.
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vertices, as in Example 3.3.4. Furthermore let


























0 0 ⇋ 1− 2, (r1, r2)
1 0 ⇋ 3− 4, (r3, r4)
4 0 ⇋ 5− 6, (r5, r6)
and


























0 0 ⇋ 1− 2, (r1, r2)
0 0 ⇋ 3− 4, (r3, r4)
2 4 ⇋ 5− 6, (r5, r6)
Figure 13 shows one trajectory forΦS. In this case, the process culminates in application
of r5. However, we can also reverse the order of r5 and r3. The consequence is that there
is no unique completing rule. For this example we could have chosen the starting node
argument k differently in theSingleton algorithm and generated a rule set with a unique
completing rule, but it is easy to constructĜ for which no such choice exists.
Rule sets generated by theLynchpin algorithm always give self-assembly trajectories
that culminate in a unique completing rule. This is true irresp ctive of the starting node
k. Figure 14 illustrates this phenomenon for our present Example. It is this feature of the
Lynchpin algorithm that will enable us to improve upon the guaranteesfor theSingleton
algorithm.§
TheSingleton algorithm does not have a unique completing rule because self-a sembly
proceeds outward from the starting nodek. Since the target graph likely has many branches,
any of a number of leaves can be added on last. In contrast,Lynchpin assembles from each
leaf in towards thek-node so that the overall process culminates with two sub-graphs join-
ing together. These subgraphs are themselves assembled recursiv ly in the same manner.
Recall that the principal action ofSingleton is to seek absorbing states with a mini-
mum number of edges. This process allows up to|VĜ| − 1 incomplete assemblies. WhenN
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is not large this can be a significant limitation. We will see thatLynchpin can easily cir-
cumvent this limitation due to the presence of a completing rule. In particular, suppression
of the complement of the completing rule is all that is needed.
Let ŝ be the label returned byLynchpin. Then there is one rule whose left hand side


















ar , r , r̂
ǫ, r = r̂
wherear ∈ (0, 1] are arbitrary constants. As with theSingleton algorithm, this choice of
R gives a regular perturbed Markov process,Pǫ. The unperturbed processP0 is obtained
by removing ˆr fromΦ.
3.5.1 Analysis ofLynchpin
Before we analyze the random process induced byΦ for our choice ofR, we will establish
some properties ofΦ. First, we show that the rule set returned byLynchpin is, in principle,
capable of constructinĝG.
Lemma 3.5.1 For any treeĜ, letΦ be given byLynchpin (VĜ,EĜ, k, 0). Then there ex-
ists a sequence of constructive actions inΦ that, applied to G0 = {VĜ, {∅}, lG0(·) = 0} in
succession, result in̂G.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the depth of the tree rooted atk. If k has no neighbors
then the algorithm returns no rules and the lemma is satisfiedvacuously. The base case is
a depth of 1. In this case,̂G is a star withk at its center. Line 1 assigns any order to the
neighbors ofk. Lines 2-11 iterate through these neighbors and in this casealways execute
lines 8 and 9 that assignsj = 0 andΦ j = {∅} for each neighborvj because, by assumption,
eachvj has no neighbors other thank. Line 12 gives the first rules{0 0 ⇋ 1− 2}. The
part assigned state 2 will continue on with the role ofk. Each rule added in lines 14-17
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adds another singleton tok. The lemma is satisfied by applying the constructive rules from
Φ in the order that they were added.
For the induction step assume thatLynchpin satisfies the lemma (by applying the con-
structive rules in the order they were added toΦ) when the depth of the tree rooted atk
is at mostD. Now suppose that the depth of the tree rooted atk is D + 1. Now we will
expect to see some ofk’s neighbors having neighbors other thank. In this case we make
the recursive call toLynchpin on line 5 withvj as the newk-node. Since the depth of the
subtree rooted atvj obtained in line 4 is at mostD, we get a sequence of rules that build
this subtree by assumption. We note thatsj is the state ofvj in the completed subtree. We
also note that each recursive call introduces only unused labels. Line 12 gives a rule that
addsk as a singleton to the completed subtree forv1. Lines 14-17 now add the remaining
subtrees tok. If a subtree is justvj thensj = 0 and we add a singleton tok. If the subtree
for vj is not a singleton thensj is the state ofvj once that subtree has finished assembling.
The lemma is once again satisfied by applying the constructive rules fromΦ in the order
that they were added, completing the proof.
The convergence proof depends on one additional property ofL nchpin— the pres-
ence of a uniquecompleting rule.
Lemma 3.5.2 For any treeĜ, letΦ be given byLynchpin (VĜ,EĜ, k, 0). Let G be the
labeled graph obtained by applying the constructive rules in Φ (in the order they were
added) to G0 = {VĜ, {∅}, lG0(·) = 0}. Then there is only one rule inΦ applicable to G and
it is deconstructive and involves k. Furthermore none of thelab ls in G appear in the left
hand sides of the constructive rules inΦ.
Proof: The proof is again by induction on the depth of the tree rootedat k. For the base
case we examine lines 12-17. Each rule adds a singleton tok and increasesk’s state by 2.
Sincek’s state has changed only the last deconstructive rule addedapplies. The final state
of k is also greater than any of the states on the left hand sides ofthe constructive rules.
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For the inductive step assume the lemma holds for trees rooted atk with depth no greater
thanD and suppose that the tree rooted atk has depthD + 1. Then lines 2-11 give rules
that produce subtrees satisfying the lemma. Now, just as in the base case, when we add
these subtrees tok we increasevj ’s state so that it no longer has any applicable rules unless
it was the most recent addition. The final state ofk is also again greater than any of the left
hands sides of constructive rules. Only one rule applies to the finished product and it is the
deconstructive rule severingk andv|nE(k)|— the lynchpin.
The requirement on the left hand sides of constructive rulesis to ensure that the assem-
bly will not “overassemble” in the presence of additional parts. We would like the labels of
complete assemblies arrived at throughΦ to be unique so that the above lemma applies to
all complete assemblies. It turns out that this is indeed thecas .
Lemma 3.5.3 For any treeĜ, letΦ be given byLynchpin (VĜ,EĜ, k, 0). Let G be any
complete assembly obtained by applying constructive rulesin Φ to G0 = {VĜ, {∅}, lG0(·) =
0}. Then G is a label-preserving isomorphism of the graph obtained in Lemma 3.5.2.
Proof: The proof is once again by induction on the depth of the tree rooted atk. The
base case of a star with centerk gives constructive rules that must be applied in the exact
order they were added. This implies that the final labels are unique. For the inductive step
assume the labels are unique for depthD. When the depth isD + 1 the recursive calls give,
by assumption, subtrees with unique labels. Then, similar to the base case, the subtrees
must be combined in a specific order so that the final labels areagain unique.
Note that the different subtrees can be completed in any order so thatLynchpin gives
rules which allow for parallel self-assembly. The rules do not eed to be applied in exactly
the order they were added toΦ (as in Lemma 3.5.2). With these three lemmas in hand we
proceed toward our main result, the performance guaranteesfor random pairwise selection
using rule sets generated byL nchpin.
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While the unperturbed process in the case ofSingleton was especially deadlock-
prone, this is not true of the unperturbed process in this case. In fact, the stationary distri-
bution ofP0 places positive probability on states inGĜV only. Of course,P
0 is not reversible.
Nevertheless, we will first establish the performance guarantee forP0, since the analysis
for Pǫ will be a straightforward extension of that result.
Consider an arbitrary connected, acyclicĜ = (VĜ,EĜ) and the initial graph
G0 = ({1, 2, ...,N}, {∅}, l0(·) = 0).
Φ andR are as specified in the previous section which gives the unperturb d process{Gt}.
Recall thatYĜ(Gt) is the yield ofĜ for the process at timet.
Lemma 3.5.4 For the unperturbedLynchpin process,YĜ(Gt) is nondecreasing in t.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there existsτ > 0 such thatYĜ(Gτ) <
YĜ(Gτ−1). The only way that the number of maximal connected subgraphs ofGτ−1 that are
isomorphic toĜ can decrease is if ˆr is applied, but this contradicts ˆr < Φ for the unperturbed
process.
Next we establish thatYĜ(Gt) increases with positive probability.
Lemma 3.5.5 Suppose thatYĜ(Gt) < ⌊N/|VĜ|⌋, then there exists a length of time T and a





Proof: Since we only needp > 0 we need only find one trajectory with positive proba-
bility. If there are|VĜ| nodes with label 0 then we can select appropriate nodes and apply
constructive rules. If there are insufficient nodes then destructive rules can be applied to
incomplete assemblies to free up parts. In either case, the associated probability is positive
andT is simply the number of rules applied.
The following result is now immediate.
Theorem 3.5.1 For the unperturbedLynchpin process, Gt → GĜV almost surely.
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A subset ofGĜV is the only recurrent class of the process. It follows that these are
precisely the stochastically stable states of the perturbed process.
Theorem 3.5.2 The stochastically stable states of the perturbedLynchpin process are a
subset ofGĜV .
It is interesting to note that the unperturbedLynchpin process utilizes just a single
irreversible rule, yet provides the strongest possible form f performance guarantee. When
the complement of this irreversible rule is introduced as a perturbation, we get the best
possible form of performance guarantee for a reversible self-a sembly process. Note that
it may be possible to devise processes with better convergence rates, but the form of the
performance guarantee would be the same.
3.6 Conservatism of Completing Rules
The Lynchpin gives unique final labels. However, unlikeSingleton the states are not
recoverable. That is, we cannot always infer the correct labels (up to a label-preserving
isomorphism) from the unlabeled subgraph. The implicationis that the agents’ states are
not auxiliary. Each agents behavior depends on more than just the tructure of the assembly
that it is participating in. TheLynchpin algorithm will, in general, produce several rules
of the form{0 0⇋ x− y} with differentx, y for each rule. Consequently, the labels of the
resulting subgraphs cannot be inferred from the associatedunlabeled subgraphs.
While Singleton has both of the aforementioned features, it only gives an asymptot-
ically maximum yield (in|VG0|). We achieve a maximum yield inLynchpin, but sacrifice
the feature of internal states being derivable from the unlabeled graph. It is an open ques-
tion whether any reversible algorithm obeying the communication constraints can satisfy
both desiderata and give maximum yields. However, we will show that if such an algo-
rithm exists, it cannot exploit the notion of a completing rule. The proof is by way of a
counterexample. First, we prove a lemma that gives a condition assembly trajectories
that any rule set exhibiting a completing rule must possess.
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Figure 15: The counterexample is a tree that gives branches with different lengths greater
than 1 from any root.
Lemma 3.6.1 Suppose there is a sequence of constructive rules from a reversible, binary
constructive/deconstructive rule set that producêG when applied successively to G0 =
{VĜ, {∅}, lG0(·) = 0}. Also assume that the complete assembly has only one applicable
deconstructive rule and none of its labels appear in the lefthand sides of the constructive
rules. Then every non-singleton node that forms an edge musthave also participated in the
last edge that its subassembly formed.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a constructive rule in the
sequence that adds an edge to a node that was not among the lastin its subassembly to
form an edge. Reversibility demands that at least one deconstructive rule is applicable to the
subassembly initially, the complement of the last constructive rule applied. If we then apply
a constructive rule that does not involve either of the nodeswhose states were set when the
last rule was applied to that subassembly then there will be two applicable deconstructive
rules. Each successive constructive rule application renders at most one deconstructive rule
inapplicable. It follows that the final assembly has two or more applicable deconstructive
rules, a contradiction
With this lemma we can prove our theorem on the conservatism of completing rules.
Theorem 3.6.1 Any algorithm that gives reversible, binary constructive/deconstructive rule
sets with completing rules must, for some target trees, either ntroduce states that cannot be
determined from the unlabeled graph or give complete assembli s with non-unique states.
Proof: The proof is by counterexample. Consider the graph in Fig. 15We will give the
argument for one particular choice of the completing rule. The arguments for all the other
choices are similar. Suppose that the complement of the completing rule severs the edge
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Table 1: Parameters for simulations of self-assembly algorithms.
parameter value comment
N 14 total number of parts
VĜ {1,2,3,4} target assembly has four parts
EĜ {12,13,14} see Figure 11
G0 ({1, 2, ..., 14}, {∅}, l0(·) = 0) standard initial conditions
ǫ .01 for Lynchpin andSingleton
ar 1 see below
T 10,000 total number of samples for each simulation
F uniform agents are selected uniformly
n 100 number of simulations per algorithm
7 − 8. Then, by the preceding lemma, the next applicable deconstructive rule most sever
6−7, followed by 5−6 and 4−5. This gives a chain of six nodes. The next deconstructive
rule severs either 3− 4 or 4− 9. In the first case we get chains of length 3, in the second
case we get chains of lengths two and four. In any event, proceeding like this we see that
1 − 2 and 9− 10 are two subassemblies that must appear in any trajectory that completes
in the manner we have assumed. These two subassemblies are isomorphic to each other so
in order to satisfy our desiderata they must have the same states. Also, they must have the
same state participate in future edges because otherwise each will have a state appearing in
the left hand side of a constructive rule at the end. It follows that the states corresponding
to nodes 1 and 10 will be identical in the final assembly.
We could have used a smaller counterexample, but we would still be able to get unique
states up to an isomorphism. Our counterexample shows even that is not always possible.
3.7 Simulations
The performance guarantees described for the algorithms inthis paper are analytical. We
present the results of simulations not to assert convergence (as this has already been done),
but to compare performance between algorithms and to comment on transient behavior.


































Figure 16: The maximum yield of three is eventually reached and maintained in all simula-
tions of the two non-reversible processes. ForLynchpin the system lingers around three,
while for Singleton it lingers between two and three.
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We ran 100 simulations for each of the four algorithms:Lynchpin, Singleton, non-
reversibleLynchpin (i.e. ǫ = 0), and non-reversibleSingleton (described in Appendix
3.9). We usedR(r) = ar = 1 in each algorithm except for the rules inLynchpin and
Singleton that depend onǫ. The results of the simulations are displayed in Figure 16,
where we have averaged over the 100 simulations for each algorithm.
The maximum yield for this simulation is three assemblies. The set of states with three
complete assemblies is invariant under the two non-reversibl processes. This is consistent
with the results of the simulation—all runs for both methodsincrease monotonically to the
maximum yield within 2000 iterations and remain there. Since the two reversible processes
do not exhibit such an invariance, both frequently contain fewer than three complete assem-
blies throughout the simulation. In the case ofSingleton, observation of three complete
assemblies is even less likely than observing fewer. Recallth t, from Theorem 3.4.2, we
expect no more than (|VĜ| − 1)
2 = 9 agents to fail to participate in complete assemblies
in stochastically stable states ofSingleton. Based on this bound we would expect to
see only one complete assembly for this application ofSingleton. The fact that we are
almost always observing two or three assemblies highlightstwo deficiencies in the tight-
ness of Theorem 3.4.2 as a bound on performance. First, the tig tness of Theorem 3.4.2
is a function ofN and |VĜ|. WhenN is an integer multiple of|VĜ|, stochastically stable
states all have maximum yield and Corollary 3.4.1 is the relevant bound. Theorem 3.4.2
is a worst-case bound based on Theorem 3.4.1. WhenN ≫ |VĜ| the difference between
the worst-case andN-dependent bounds are small. SinceN = 14 is not very large, the
bound’s lack of tightness is readily apparent. It is straightforward to verify that Theorem
3.4.1 implies that, in this example, all ofSingleton’s stochastically stable states have
at least two complete assemblies. Second, the minimum number of complete assemblies
among stochastically stable states is not the only number weshould expect to regularly
observe. In our simulations, observation of three completeass mblies was nearly as likely
as observation of two. The theory of stochastic stability says only that asǫ goes to zero
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Table 2: Proportion of running time with each possible number of complete assemblies.
algorithm 0 1 2 3 mean
Singleton .0080 .0318 .5964 .3638 2.3161
Non-reversibleSingleton .0002 .0006 .0023 .9969 2.9958
Lynchpin .0002 .0006 .0346 .9646 2.9635
Non-reversibleLynchpin .0002 .0005 .0014 .9979 2.9970
we should expect the states that are not stochastically stable to e observed with vanishing
frequency. Some stochastically stable states can be much more frequently observed than
others. This is why characterization of the set of stochastic lly stable states alone fails to
give a tight bound on performance.
The proportion of time with each number of complete assemblies and the long-run
average number of complete assemblies are summarized for each algorithm in the above
table.
3.8 Discussion
We introduced a stochastic system framework for comparing the performance of different
rule sets. We restricted ourselves to binary constructive and deconstructive rules as a com-
munication constraint. We also insisted on reversibility,recoverable states, and unique final
states. For this framework we presented theSingleton algorithm that could synthesize
rules for any connected acyclic target and provide a performance guarantee in the form of
a bound on the number of reject assemblies among stochastically stable states. We then re-
laxed the constraint on recoverable states and presented theLynchpin algorithm that could
synthesize rules for any connected acyclic target and provide a guaranteed maximum yield
in the form of stochastic stability. We also showed that the maxi um yield could be made
an invariant of the system if even one irreversible rule is allowed.
The matter of whether or not a stronger performance guarantee can be made when
recoverable states and unique final states are required remains an open question. We have
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seen some success in simulations by choosing different resistances for the deconstructive
rules in theSingleton process so as to reduce the relative probability of disassembling
more developed assemblies. Nevertheless, a rigorous analysis of such processes and an
algorithm for finding these resistances for generalĜ remain elusive.
We consider the primary contribution of this paper to be the exist nce results for self-
assembly procedures under each set of constraints. The specific forms of Singleton and
Lynchpin may or may not be especially relevant to self-assembly outside of their useful-
ness for establishing possibility results. We also suggestthat stochastic stability is relevant
to self-assembly, particularly when there is an interest inreversibility.
3.9 The non-reversibleSingleton algorithm
Here we suggest a modification to the rules generated by theSingleton algorithm. With
these rules, the system will converge toGĜV almost surely. However, the process will no
longer be reversible or exhibit recoverable states. Only destructive rules are changed so
that the system still assembles one part a time. We include this version of the algorithm for
the case in which one-at-a-time assembly is preferable.
As before we begin by considering a connected acyclic targetgraphĜ = (VĜ,EĜ) and
let ΦS be the constructive rules from evaluation ofSingleton. Let L be the set of all
the labels inΦS. We also defineM ⊂ L as the set of final labels. That is, the labels that
parts participating in completed assemblies can be assigned. A part with a label inMmay
or may not be participating in a complete assembly, but partswith labels inL\M do not
participate in complete assemblies. Since each creation ofa edge inSingleton assigns
new states to both vertices, the number of edges a node partici tes in, or its degree, can be
inferred from its label. We defined : L → R+ to be precisely this mapping. We also define
dmax = maxs∈L d(s), the maximum degree.
Now we can defineΦ with the appropriate deconstructive rules.
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Φ = ΦS ∪ {{s− s
′ ⇀ Dd̂(s)−1 Dd̂(s′)−1} : s ∈ L\M, s
′ ∈ L}
∪{{Dn − s ⇀ Dn−1 Dd̂(s)−1} : n ∈ {1, 2, ...dmax}, s
′ ∈ L}
∪{{Dn − Dm ⇀ Dn−1 Dm−1} : n,m∈ {1, 2, ...dmax}}.
We add two types of rules. First, we add rules that eliminate any edge involving a
non-final label, with each node adopting aD (deficient) label. The subscript on theD label
indicates the number of remaining edges for that node. Second, we add rules that eliminate
any edge involving aD label, both nodes subsequently adopt the appropriateD labels. We
defineD0 ≡ 0, so that aD node returns to normal once all its edges are severed. There will
be rules inΦ that are never applicable, but we do not refine the rule set her.
We do not need to constrainR at all. The non-reversibleSingleton process, like the
(also non-reversible) unperturbedlynchpin process does not ever reduce the number of
complete assemblies. This is because all the nodes in a complete assembly have final labels.
Furthermore, any incomplete assembly must have at least onenon-final label, so deadlock
is avoided.
The non-reversibleSingleton is similar to the non-reversibleynchpin process. The
non-reversiblelynchpin process never breaks up a complete assembly because it has no
complement for the unique completing rule. The non-reversible Singleton process has
no complements for any of the non-unique completing rules. This alone would lead to
severe deadlock issues, so the additional deconstructive rules are added so that incomplete
assemblies can disassemble. These rules allow the assemblyto disassemble beginning at
any node that is not final. Such nodes are essentially aware ofth missing edges. The orig-
inal Singleton rules only disassembled beginning from extremities (nodeswith a single
edge). Unfortunately, it is possible for an incomplete assembly to have the complement of a
completing rule as the only applicable deconstructive rule. The non-reversibleSingleton




















































Figure 17: The presence of multiple appendages gives multiple completing rules for any
starting nodek.
unlike assembly, disassembly need not occur one-at-a-time.
Example 3.9.1 (Multiple appendages)The distinction between theSingleton process
and its non-reversible modification are evident when considering assemblies with multiple
appendages. Consider̂G = (VĜ,EĜ) defined by
VĜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
EĜ = {12, 23, 14, 45, 16, 67}.
This target graph gives


























































0 0 ⇋ 1− 2, (r1, r2)
2 0 ⇋ 3− 4, (r3, r4)
1 0 ⇋ 5− 6, (r5, r6)
6 0 ⇋ 7− 8, (r7, r8)
5 0 ⇋ 9− 10, (r9, r10)
10 0 ⇋ 11− 12. (r11, r12)











































Figure 18: An example disassembly of a system in deadlock viathe non-reversible
Singleton process.
of Ĝ. Notice that r3 or r7 could also have been the last rule, so all of r3, 5, and r7 are
completing rules.
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0 0 ⇀ 1− 2, (r1)
2 0 ⇀ 3− 4, (r2)
1 0 ⇀ 5− 6, (r3)
6 0 ⇀ 7− 8, (r4)
5 0 ⇀ 9− 10, (r5)
10 0 ⇀ 11− 12, (r6)
1− 2 ⇀ 0 0, (r7)
1− 3 ⇀ 0 D1, (r8)
2− 9 ⇀ 0 D2, (r9)
3− 5 ⇀ D1 D1, (r10)
5− 6 ⇀ D1 0, (r11)
5− 7 ⇀ D1 D1, (r12)
6− 9 ⇀ 0 D2, (r13)
9− 10 ⇀ 0 D2, (r14)
2− D1 ⇀ 0 0, (r15)
2− D2 ⇀ 0 D1, (r16)
3− D1 ⇀ D1 0, (r17)
3− D2 ⇀ D1 D1, (r18)
4− D1 ⇀ 0 0, (r19)
6− D1 ⇀ 0 0, (r20)
6− D2 ⇀ 0 D1, (r21)
7− D1 ⇀ D1 0, (r22)
7− D2 ⇀ D1 D1, (r23)
8− D1 ⇀ 0 0, (r24)
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where we have omitted the rules that are never applicable. Notice that for this graph, two
D nodes never share an edge. Figure 18 illustrates how the added deconstructive rules
can disassemble a structure in deadlock. Notice that one of the subgraphs would only have
complements of completing rules applicable to it under the sandardSingleton process.
The D nodes act as an infection that spreads through the assembly, disintegrating it in the
process.§
The following results are straightforward to verify.
Lemma 3.9.1 For the non-reversibleSingleton process,YĜ(Gt) is nondecreasing in t.
Lemma 3.9.2 Suppose thatYĜ(Gt) < ⌊N/|VĜ|⌋, then there exists a length of time T and a





Theorem 3.9.1 For the non-reversibleSingleton process, Gt → GĜV almost surely.
3.10 TheMakeTree algorithm
The MakeTree algorithm, presented in [1], shares some similarities withthe algorithms
developed in this paper. We review the algorithm here for thesake of completeness and
to clearly delineate the differences. Like our algorithms,MakeTree generates binary con-
structive rules for any connected acyclic target. However,the algorithm is intended for the
case of infinitely many parts and can exhibit deadlock when thnumber of parts is finite.
Here, we consider the performance of theMakeTree algorithm under random pairwise
selection dynamics. Note that we will add in the complementary rules so that we get a
reversible version ofMakeTree. Other than this, the differences are purely notational.
Like the other algorithms,MakeTree is a recursion that generatesΦ from a target graph
Ĝ = (VĜ,EĜ).
We generateΦ usingMakeTree(VĜ,EĜ, 0). Note that line 4 can be implemented in
more than one way, so different implementations ofMakeTree can give different rule sets.
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Algorithm 3 MakeTree(V,E, s)
1: if |V| = 1 then
2: return (∅, {(V, 0)}, s)
3: else
4: choosexy ∈ E
5: let (V1,E1) be the component of (V,E − xy) containingx
6: let (V2,E2) be the component of (V,E − xy) containingy
7: (Φ1, l1, s)← MakeTree(V1,E1, s)
8: (Φ2, l2, s)← MakeTree(V2,E2, s)
9: Φ← Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {l1(x) l2(y) ⇋ (s+ 1)− (s+ 2)}
10: l ← (l1 − {(x, l1(x))}) ∪ (l2 − {(y, l2(y))}) ∪ {(x, s+ 1), (y, s+ 2)}































Figure 19:Maketree is not guaranteed to give rule sets with unique completing rules.
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Example 3.10.1 (Lack of a completing rule)WhileMakeTreewill often produce rule sets
with unique completing rules, we provide a counterexample her . Consider the following
Ĝ = (VĜ,EĜ) defined by
VĜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
EĜ = {12, 13, 34, 15, 56}.

















































0 0 ⇋ 1− 2, (r1, r2)
0 0 ⇋ 3− 4, (r3, r4)
1 3 ⇋ 5− 6, (r5, r6)
0 4 ⇋ 7− 8, (r7, r8)
0 6 ⇋ 9− 10. (r9, r10)
Figure 19 gives an example trajectory for this rule set that builds a target assembly.
We could have reversed the order of r7 and r9, indicating that this rule set does not give a
unique completing rule.§
Example 3.10.1 provides a counterexample to establish thatMakeTree does not behave
like Lynchpin in general. While we were able to impose reversibility on theMakeTree
process by augmenting the rule set with complements, it is clear from the example that
MakeTree does not satisfy the constraint of recoverable states. Neverthel ss, simulations
are suggestive that the reversibleMakeTree process has an associated stochastic stability





Signaling games1 model communication between distributed, self-interested agents. Re-
cent results for non-atomic signaling games establish the non-negligible possibility of con-
vergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss. The effort
to demonstrate that this is merely an artifact of the model has spawned alternatives that
achieve maximum efficiency. Motivated by the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift,
we study the atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. Our model
does not converge in the manner of previously considered models, instead visiting all states
infinitely often in the long-run. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that,
in the small noise limit, its support is limited to the efficient communication systems. We
find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choie of evolutionary dynamic, a fact
that is intuitively captured by the game’s potential function corresponding to average fit-
ness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature
on language competition. That is, we expect monomorphic langu ge states to eventually
predominate. Homophily has been identified as a feature thatpotentially stabilizes diverse
linguistic communities. We find that incorporating homophily in our stochastic model gives
mixed results. While the monomorphic prediction holds in the small noise limit, diversity
can persist at higher noise levels or as a metastable phenomenon.
4.1 Introduction
Biological systems at many different scales depend on reliable and efficient signaling.
Mathematical modeling of signaling may provide insights into conditions conducive to
the emergence of communication in biological [54] and non-biological [55], [56] settings.
A key problem is that of coordination. That is, how do systemscoordinate on consistent














Figure 20: An illustration of the linguistic coherence achieved between a speaker and
hearer.
communication protocols without the benefit of a centralized coordinating entity?
Signaling games [57] model the coordination problem in distribu ed communication.
Researchers began studying these games in a biological context more recently [58], [59].
The strategies available to the players in a signaling game are pairs of mappings. A speak-
ing strategy is a mapping from the set of objects to the set of symbols, while a hearing
strategy is a mapping from the set of symbols back to the set ofobjects. A communication
event involves two players and an object. The player assigned the role of speaker produces
the symbol that her speaking strategy associates with the object. The player assigned the
role of hearer then summons the object her hearing strategy associates with this symbol. If
the final object object agrees with the original one then the event is successful, otherwise,
it is not.
A fundamental question in signaling games is identificationof conditions conducive to
distributed learning of efficient communication systems. In the continuum agent, or, “nn-
atomic” setting it has been shown that the replicator dynamics can converge to neutrally
stable states that do not maximize communicative effici ncy from a set of initial conditions
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with positive measure [3], [4]. We nonetheless show that at le st a binary communication
system is almost always realized. Selection-mutation dynamics have been suggested [60] as
an alternative to explain away the inefficiency. The system is analyzed for the special case
of binary signaling games. The “mass action” perspective ofnon-atomic signaling games is
taken up for analytical convenience. The more realistic disrete agent, or, “atomic” model
is approximated by the non-atomic model over finite time horizons for sufficiently large
populations [28]. Characterization of states favored by selection in the frequency dependent
Moran process [6] has been carried out for the non-atomic signaling game. Essentially, this
analysis says that the efficient states are the most robust to a one-time stochastic shock in
the form of the introduction of a single mutant agent. In thispaper we study the long-run
behavior of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in the non-atomic signaling game. That is,
we examine the behavior of the system under persistent random excitations. Although our
analysis will concentrate on the situation where these shocks cur with arbitrarily low
probability, the outcomes in such a scenario can still be qualitatively different from models
that consider random excitations in isolation or ignore them altogether [61].
As a starting point we show that the non-atomic signaling game is a potential game
[12]. Some algorithms exist (see for instance [25]) that areequipped with substantive per-
formance guarantees for all or some of the potential games. We focus on evolutionary
dynamics that closely mimic the replicator dynamics. If more clever dynamics are utilized
the problem becomes quite trivial, which is good news for theproactive engineering of
communicating agents. In essence, potential games reduce the individual, myopic opti-
mization activities of distributed agents to centralized optimization of the so-called poten-
tial function. Since the potential function of the atomic signaling game is proportional to
average fitness, that dynamics resembling natural selection2 with random mutations achieve
maximum average fitness is intuitively reasonable. We propose a number of evolutionary
2Our results can also be interpreted in the context of cultural evolution, but we emphasize the biological
interpretation first and foremost.
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dynamics achieving just that. In our models, agents mostly coordinate on a single lan-
guage, but the form of that language will change over time consistent with the empirically
observed phenomenon of linguistic drift [62].
While the first part of this paper is concerned with the problem of justifying the emer-
gence of efficient signaling by evolutionary processes, the second partinstead attempts to
explain the failure to observe such perfect coordination inatural language. Some have ar-
gue, using models of language competition that are mathematically similar to our own, that
this state of affairs is transient [63]. More sophisticated models incorporating, for instance,
a spatial dimension [64] have added nuance to the problem. The very same neutrally sta-
ble states that precluded efficient communication in the non-atomic signaling game have
also been brought to bear on this problem [65] as a mechanism for initiating diversity, al-
though exogenous criteria like isolation would be needed tosustain it. In recent years,
homophily, the tendency of individuals to associate with similar others, has been suggested
as a counterweight to the otherwise decisive tendency towards homogeneity in communi-
cation protocols [7]. This approach is consistent with the idea that languange can function
as an in-group marker [66]. We examine whether incorporating such features into dynam-
ics in atomic signaling games succeeds at engendering diverse linguistic communities that
achieve high efficiency internally, but not externally. To this end, we attain mixed results.
We are able to show for a restricted set of parameters that as the frequency of randomizing
behavior is taken to zero the long-run behavior is no different from our original models.
On the other hand, when randomizing activity is more frequent we observe encouraging
results in simulations. Also, even when the crucial randomizing activity is extremely rare,
diversity may persist as a metastable phenomenon.
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4.1.1 Signaling games
Formally, there arem≥ 2 objects andn ≥ 2 symbols. A speaking strategy is represented by
anm× n binary, row stochastic matrix3 P. If Pi j = 1 then the speaking strategy associates
object i with symbol j. Similarly, a hearing strategy is ann × m binary, row-stochastic
matrix Q. If Qi j = 1 then the hearing strategy associates symboli with object j. Thus,






Pi j Q ji = trace(PQ).
We call a joint speaking and hearing strategy (P,Q) a languageand useLm,n to refer to
the set of all such pairs. In this chapter, we will study the both the atomic and non-atomic
signaling game. The difference is whether or not there is a finite set of players, with each
one selecting her own speaking and hearing strategies. We first review the non-atomic
version of the game.
4.2 The non-atomic signaling game
The setLm,n has cardinalitymnnm. Confer any ordering on the elements ofLm,n so that the
mnnm-dimensional simplex




xi = 1, xi ≥ 0 ∀i}
gives the possible distributions of a single population over th set of languages. Let (Pk,Qk)











In other words, the fitness of a player is the expected payoff from uniform random matching
with the population, with equal weighting given to speakingand hearing. Analyses of this
3A binary, row-stochastic matrix is a matrix that has one element per row that is equal to one and all other
elements equal to zero.
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It has been shown [3], [4],[5] that the replicator dynamics do not almost always converge






A population statex is aNeutrally Stable State(NSS) if
x′ f (x) ≥ y′ f (x) ∀y ∈ X,
and if x′ f (x) = y′ f (x) thenx′ f (y) ≥ y′ f (y). The set of attractors of the language game
under replicator dynamics are called the NSS. We may converge on NSS with average
fitness of four for any value ofm or n [60]. This fact is particularly unsettling taking into
account that the maximum average fitness is 2 min{ , }. We find that this is the worst-case.
Theorem 4.2.1 If x is an NSS then
∑
i xi fi(x) ≥ 4 and the bound is tight for all m, n ≥ 2.
The proof can be sketched as follows. If a counterexample exists, i.e. an NSS with a
smaller average fitness, then it can be shown by induction that such an NSS exists for the
case ofm= n = 2. It is then simple to show there is no such NSS whenm= n = 2.
4.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
It is straightforward to construct population states satisfying the bound with equality for
any m, n. To see this, note that we can associate any population statex with the average
speaker and hearer,







This way, the set of average languages is simply the product of the set ofm × n row-
stochastic matrices and the set ofn × m row-stochastic matrices. In [60], NSS achieving
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average fitness of four are described for the case ofm= n. We trivially extend their example
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j µ j = 2, implying an
average fitness of four. That the corresponding population sate is an NSS follows from the
following lemma, which is merely a combination of Theorem 1 and 2 in [6].
Lemma 4.2.1 An average language(P,Q) correponds to an NSS if and only if it satisfies









3. at least one of P,Q has no zero-column, and
4. neither P nor Q has a column with multiple maximal elementsin (0, 1).
The first two conditions are neccesary and sufficient for (P,Q) to be a Nash equilibrium
and the second two conditions are neccesarry and sufficient for a Nash equilibrium to be an
NSS in this setting. In order to prove our theorem, we must show t at no NSS can achieve
average fitness strictly less than four.
Suppose there exists (P̄, Q̄) that is an NSS and satisfies trace(P̄Q̄) < 2, so that it corre-
sponds to an average fitness less than four. It follows that there arem− 1 rows ofP̄ that
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contribute less than one to trace(P̄Q̄). That is, the set
R = {i :
∑
j
P̄i j Q̄ ji < 1},
has cardinality at leastm−1. The next lemma shows that it suffices to consider̄P for which
no two of these rows are the same standard basis vector.
Lemma 4.2.2 Suppose m> 2, n ≥ 2 and (P,Q) is the average language corresponding
to an NSS. Further suppose that there exist i1, i2 such that Pi1k = Pi2k = 1 for some k.
Then there exists(P̂, Q̂) that corresponds to an NSS for the reduced game with dimensions
(m− 1), n and also satisfiestrace(PQ) = trace(̂PQ̂).
Proof: Given (P,Q) and assuming without loss of generality thati1 = 1 andi2 = 2 we can

















P1 j , i = 1
P(i+1) j , i , 1
,
so thatP̂ consolidates the identical first two rows ofP. ForQ, we consolidate by combining

















Qi1 + Qi2, j = 1
Qi( j+1), j , 1
.
In order to complete the proof of the lemma we must verify boththat (P̂, Q̂) corresponds
to an NSS of the reduced-order game and that trace(PQ) = trace(̂PQ̂). The latter is easily




















P(i+1) jQ j(i+1) +
∑
j






P(i+1) jQ j(i+1) +
∑
j







To verify the NSS property we must show that the four conditions in Lemma 4.2.1
are satisfied. For the first condition, assume the contrary, i.e. there exists̃P such that


















P̃1 j , i ∈ {1, 2}
P̃(i−1) j , i < {1, 2}
.













P̃(i−1) j Q ji +
∑
j













= trace(̃PQ̂) > trace(̂PQ̂) = trace(PQ),
implying that (P,Q) does not satisfy the first condition of Lemma 4.2.1.
The second condition can be verified similarly. Assume the contrary, i.e. there exists̃Q


















2 , j ∈ {1, 2}
Q̃i( j−1), j < {1, 2}
,
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= trace(̂PQ̃) > trace(̂PQ̂) = trace(PQ),
implying that (P,Q) does not satisfy the second condition of Lemma 4.2.1.
For the third condition of Lemma 4.2.1 first supposeP has no zero column. Consider
the sum of thej’th column ofP̂. If j = k then
∑
i







as required. Ifj , k then
∑
i
P̂i j = P1 j +
∑
i,1






Pi j > 0,
as required. Instead supposeQ has no zero column. Aside from the first column, all the












Finally, we verify the fourth condition. First considerP̂. Thek’th column has
max
i
P̂ik = P1k = 1,
by assumption. For any other columnj , k we have two cases. If maxi Pi j = 1 then so
does maxi P̂i j . Alternatively if maxi Pi j ∈ (0, 1) then the cardinality of argmaxi P̂i j is still
one becauseP1 j, the deleted element, is equal to zero. Lastly, consider thefirst column of
Q̂. The other columns are unchanged fromQ. Suppose that maxi Q̂i1 ∈ (0, 1). This requires
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that maxi Qi1 ∈ [0, 1) and maxi Qi2 ∈ [0, 1), with at most one of the quantities equal to zero.
Assume without loss of generality that maxi Qi1 ∈ (0, 1). If maxi Qi2 = 0 thenQ̂i1 = Qi1 for






Qi1 = k = argmax
i
Qi2,
which clearly implies the fourth condition. The first equality follows from the second and
third equalities and the definition of̂Q. The second and third equalities can be verified by



























Pi j , i , ĵ
1, i = ĵ, j = k̂
0, i = ĵ, j , k̂
,
so that
trace(̃PQ) − trace(PQ) =
∑
j
P̃ ĵ jQ j ĵ −
∑
j
P ĵ jQ j ĵ
= Qk̂ ĵ − Qk ĵ > 0,
which contradicts condition one of Lemma 4.2.1 for (P,Q). 
As mentioned above, Lemma 4.2.2 allows us to assume thatP̄ contains no two rows that
are the same standard basis vector. This is because we can apply Lemma 4.2.2 inductively
until there are no more repeated standard basis vectors. If acounterexample to the theorem
exists for the higher-dimensional game with the repeated basis vectors, then the existence
of a counter-example is also implied for the lower-dimensioal game sans the repeated
basis vector. That is, so long asm > 2 andn ≥ 2. It turns out that there are no such NSS
whenm= 2.
Lemma 4.2.3 Suppose m= 2, n ≥ 2 and P’s rows are both the same standard basis vector.
Then(P,Q) is not the average language corresponding to an NSS.
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It follows that trace(PQ) = Q11 + Q12. We claim that
1 ∈ argmax
i
Qi j , for j ∈ {1, 2}.




























Pi j , i , ĵ
1, i = ĵ, j = î
0, i = ĵ, j , î
,
and observe that
trace(̃PQ) − trace(PQ) = Qî ĵ − Q1 ĵ > 0,
which contradicts our assumption that (P,Q) is an NSS because the first condition of
Lemma 4.2.1 is violated. Next, assume without loss of generality that 1 > Q11 ≥ 12,
implying 0< Q12 ≤ 12. The strict inequalities are implied by the third conditionf Lemma
4.2.1 along with the preceding claim. The second row must also sum to one, so its maxi-
mum element must be at least12. If the maximum element is in the first column then it must
be strictly less thanQ11 due to the fourth condition of Lemma 4.2.1. It follows that
Q22 = 1− Q21 > 1− Q11 = Q12,
which contradicts our claim. If the maximum element of the second row is in the second
column thenQ22 ≥ 12 ≥ Q12, which contradicts our claim since the fourth condition of
Lemma 4.2.1 impliesQ22 , Q12. .
The two preceding lemmas allow us to assume that no two rows inR are the same





In other words, some element in one of the rows inR is the unique maximum element in its
column. To see this, assume the contrary. That is, each column of P either has its unique
maximum element in the row not included inR, or has multiple maximum elements. If a
column has multiple maximum elements then those elements must all be equal to one by the
fourth condition of Lemma 4.2.1. Since no two rows ofP̄ are the same standard basis vector
this implies that the row not inR contains the other one, with its other elements being zero.
Remaining columns cannot have multiple maximum elements orthei maximum elements
in the row not inR, a contradiction. If all column maxima are unique, then one of the rows
in R must contain such a maximum by row-stochasticity.



























Q̄i j , i , ĵ
1, i = ĵ, j = î
0, i = ĵ, j , î
,
so that
trace(̄PQ̃) − trace(̄PQ̄) = 1− Q̄ ĵ î > 0,
which contradicts the second condition of Lemma 4.2.1. We conclude the proof of Theorem



























P̄i j , i , î
1, i = î, j = î
0, i = î, j , ĵ
,
so that
trace(̃PQ̄) − trace(̄PQ̄) = 1−
∑
j
P̄î j Q̄ jî > 0,
which contradicts the second condition of Lemma 4.2.1, where the inequality is simply the
definition of membership inR. 
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Theorem 4.2.1 establishes that the replicator dynamics almost always leads to at least
a binary communication system. Recall that a communicationsystem wherein two sym-
bols are correctly conveyed in the average communication eve t achieves a fitness of four
because we count both speaking and hearing in our accountingof fitness. The language
game has Nash equilibria achieving fitness as low as two. These equilibria are fixed points
of the replicator dynamics, but they do not attract a set of initial conditions with positive
measure. From an information theoretic perspective, thesetwo situations are vastly differ-
ent since efficient utilization of two symbols corresponds to one bit of information, while
one symbol corresponds to zero bits of information.
In order to reconcile this overall optimality gap with the intuitive notion that evolution
leads to efficient signaling, a number of alternative models have been proposed. Mutation-
selection dynamics, a perturbation of the replicator dynamics have been studied in the bi-
nary case [60]. These dynamics add a “mutation” term to the replicator dynamics, intended
to capture the effect of random mutations. In non-biological contexts this term can be in-
terpreted as experimentation. Any type is equally likely tomutate into any other type, with
emphasis on the limiting behavior as this rate goes to zero. In the next section we will study
a somewhat similar dynamic. However, we instead concentrate on the finite-population, or
“atomic” game. The motivation for considering atomic agents is that it enables us to an-
alyze the long-run behavior of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. A common justification
for studying mass-action heuristics like the non-atomic signaling game is the fact that, over
short time horizons, these models approximate stochastic evolutionary dynamics with suf-
ficiently many atomic agents [28].
4.3 The atomic signaling game
We considerN agents, each utilizing a particular language. Let (P,Q) ∈ LNm,n be an vector













analogous to the infinite-population model. The frequency dependent Moran process has
been analyzed for this game [6], establishing that evolution tends towards efficient states
in the limit of weak selection. We instead seek to characterize the long-run behavior of
this game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. In particular, we suppose that at each
discrete time instantt, a player is randomly selected for a strategy revision oppurtunity
according to a family of probability distributions
F : LNm,n→ int(SN),
where int(·) is the interior of a set. That is, given (P[t − 1],Q[t − 1]), we select a playeri

















(Pk̂,Qk̂), with probability 1− ǫ
rand(Lm,n), with probabilityǫ
(1)
wherek̂ ∈ argmaxk fk(P[t−1],Q[t−1]) and rand(·) indicates the outcome of uniform random
sampling from the given set. The parameterǫ > 0 indicates the mutation probability. We
choosêk from argmaxk fk(P[t−1],Q[t−1]) at random uniformly if the set contains multiple
elements. All other players leave their strategies unchanged, i.e.
(P j[t],Q j[t]) = (P j[t − 1],Q j[t − 1]) ∀ j , i.
This dynamic is of course not exactly like the replicator dynamics. In particular, as opposed
to reproduction in proportion to fitness, reproductive opportunities are afforded to only the
most fit players. On the other hand, the dynamic preserves thefeature of imitation, that
is, unused strategies are not subsequently taken up apart from via rare mutations. We will
revisit the form of the dynamics in Section 4.4 and suggest some variations that are more
realistic. Since the analysis of those models is a straightforward extension of the results for
the present model, we introduce the relevant analytical concepts here.
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4.3.1 Potential games
A game isa potential game[12] if there exists a functionΦ : A → R (the domain being
the set of joint strategies) such that for any playeri, any joint strategys, and any strategys
of playeri we have
fi(s, s−i) − fi(s) = Φ(s, s−i) −Φ(s),
wheres−i is the vector of strategiess for players other thani. The implication of this def-
inition is that individual optimizing activity is tantamount to optimization of the potential
functionΦ.

































































































































= fî(P̂, Q̂) − fî(P,Q),
4Analogous definitions exist for non-atomic games, but are not taken up here, see [26].
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as required.
Since the potential function is proportional to average fitness, it is somewhat unsupris-
ing that many stochastic evolutionary dynamics tend to maxiize average fitness. Indeed,
from the perspective of distributed algorithm design problems of this form are well studied
and generic procedures with strong performance guaranteesexist. For instance, under logit
dynamics players spend almost all of their time at maximizers of the potential function over
the long run as a temperature parameter is taken to zero [25].However, logit bears little
resemblance to the replicator dynamics studied in the non-at mic signaling game.
Many variations on logit have been suggested, motivated by concerns such as informa-
tion and actuation constraints in engineering applications [67] or behavioral tendencies and
rates of convergence [68]. Our work is novel in its insistence on replicator-like dynamics,
although see [69]. The dynamics we suggest are analyzed onlyf r the atomic signaling
game. Characterizing the equilibrium selection properties and rates of convergence of such
algorithms more generally is a future direction.
Let Pǫm,n be the transition matrix corresponding to the Markov chain described above.
It is straightforward to see that this process is irreducible and aperiodic, thus admitting a
unique stationary distribution. We seek to make statementsabout this distribution that will
be valid whenǫ is small.
Let TRi be the set of resistance trees rooted at the recurrent classRi We will repeatedly
make use of the following simple and useful result.
Lemma 4.3.1 LetMǫ be a regular perturbed Markov process and let R1, ...,RK be the

























where the last equality follows from the fact that the directed edges of all spanning trees
have the same set of source vertices.
In the next section we characterize the reccurent communication classes ofP0m,n
4.3.2 Properties ofP0m,n
The recurrent communication classes ofP0m,n are singletons, or, abosrbing states. In partic-
ular, they are the states in which all players use a single langu ge so that
(P,Q) = ((P,Q), (P,Q), ..., (P,Q)) ,
for some (P,Q) ∈ Lm,n. We call these states monomorphic. If a language (P,Q) satisfies
trace(PQ) = min{m, n}, the maximum, then we call that languagealigned. We call the
associated monomorphic stateoptimal. LetO refer to the set of optimal states. The set of








In the next section, we identify the stochastically stable states ofPǫm,n, first for the case
where the number of symbols match (m= n). The case where they do not (m, n), is taken
up in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.3 Efficiency ofPǫm,n when m= n
For sufficiently smallǫ, Pǫm,m spends an arbitrarily large proportion of its time in optimal
states.
Theorem 4.3.2 A state ofPǫm,m is stochastically stable if and only if it is contained inO,
the set of optimal states .
The remainder of this section will develop the proof of the above theorem. We will
need to state and prove several lemmas along the way. In the next section we will address
the case ofm, n.
In order to make use of Lemma 4.3.1 forPǫm,m, we need to find mink, j r jk for each
recurrent classRj. We first consider optimal states.
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Lemma 4.3.2 For any Rs ∈ O we havemink,s rsk = ⌈N/2⌉ and for every Rt ∈ O − Rs we
have t∈ argmink,s rsk.
Proof: Suppose that in state (P,Q) we havek1 ≥ ⌊N/2⌋ + 1 players using an aligned
language (̂P, Q̂), implying that there areK ≤ ⌈N/2⌉ distinct languages in the population.
Let (P̃, Q̃) ∈ LKm,n be the vector of distinct languages, with (P̃1, Q̃1) = (P̂, Q̂). Also, let
ki , i ∈ {2, ...,K} indicate the number of players using (P̃i , Q̃i) so that
∑K
k=1 ki = N. We claim
that from the state (P,Q), the unperturbed processP0m,m returns to the optimal state
(P̂, Q̂) =
(
(P̂, Q̂), (P̂, Q̂), ..., (P̂, Q̂)
)
,
with probability one. We need to show that in (1), we have (Pk̂,Qk̂) = (P̂, Q̂), which implies
our claim by induction.
Assume without loss of generality that (P1,Q1) = (P̂, Q̂) and (P2,Q2) = (P̃2, Q̃2) ,










2(k1 − 1) trace(̂PQ̂) +
∑
i,1



















2(k2 − 1) trace(̃P2Q̃2) +
∑
i,1






























(P̂− P̃2)Q̃i + P̃i(Q̂− Q̃2)
)
. (4)
Let eP ≥ 0 be the number of rows in̂P that do not match̃P2 and similarly leteQ ≥ 0 be the
number of rows inQ̂ that do not match̃Q2. The quantity (4) is greater than or equal to
k1 − 1
N − 1
(eP + eQ) −
k2 − 1
N − 1














(2k1 − N) ≥
eP + eQ
N − 1
(2(⌊N/2⌋ + 1)− N) > 0,
as required, noting that the (P̃2, Q̃2) was an arbitrary language distinct from (P̂, Q̂).
We have thus far shown that so long as a single aligned langauge is used by a strict
majority of the population, the unperturbed process alwaysreturns to the monomorphic
state in that aligned language. It follows that at least⌈N/2⌉ mutations are required to reach
a new absorbing state, implying mink,s rsk ≥ ⌈N/2⌉.
Consider again the optimal state (P̂, Q̂). Let (P,Q) be any aligned language other
than (P̂, Q̂). Suppose that (P,Q) consists of⌈N/2⌉ users of (P,Q), with the remaining
⌊N/2⌋ players using (̂P, Q̂). Assume without loss of generality that (P1,Q1) = (P,Q) and
(P2,Q2) = (P̂, Q̂). We claim that 1∈ argmaxk fk(P,Q), so that the unperturbed process can
experience an increase in the number of (P,Q) users with positive probability due to (1).











2(⌊N/2⌋ − 1) trace(̂PQ̂) + (⌈N/2⌉) trace(PQ̂+ P̂Q)
)
. (7)







as required. We now have⌈N/2⌉ + 1 ≥ ⌊N/2⌋ + 1 users of aligned language (P,Q), so that
the unperturbed process must procede to the optimal state con aining only (P,Q) due to
our previous argument. Since (P,Q) is an arbitrary aligned language other than (P̂, Q̂) the
lemma follows.
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In order to use Lemma 4.3.1 in the proof of Theorem 4.3.2 we also need to know
mink, j r jk whenRj < O, which we now take up.
Lemma 4.3.3 For any Rs < O we havemink,s rsk = 1 and there exists Rt ∈ O − Rs such
that t ∈ argmink,s rsk.
Proof: The proof is constructive, and also works form > n. Let Rs = (P̂, Q̂) be the
monomorphic state in the language (P̂, Q̂), which is not aligned. We will show that there ex-
ists an aligned language (P̃, Q̃) whose associated monomorphic state (P̃, Q̃) can be reached




































































































































































































































































Let (P,Q) satisfy (Pk,Qk) = (P̃, Q̃) for k ≤ K, with 1 ≤ K < N. Further, let (Pk,Qk) =
(P̂, Q̂) for k > K. We will show that{k ≤ K} = argmaxk fk(P,Q) so that, due to (1), the
unperturbed process must increaseK. It follows from induction that the resistance from














Subtracting (9) from (8) and substituting into the trace(·) terms gives




as required. We next illustrate a general procedure for producing languages like (̃P, Q̃).
Let the set
K ≡ {i :
∑
k
P̂ikQ̂ki = 1}, (10)



























P̂i j , i ∈ K
Q̂ ji , i < K ,
∑









P̂i j Q̂ ji = trace(̂PQ̂),
where the inequality follows from (11) and the equality follows from (10). The matrix̃P0
is both column sub-stochastic5 and row sub-stochastic. Therefore, letP̃ be any matrix that
is binary, row stochastic, has no zero columns, and satisfiesP̃i j ≥ P̃0i j for everyi, j
6. Next,
let Q̃7 be any binary, row stochastic, and column sub-stochastic matrix s tisfying
P̃0ji ≤ Q̃i j ≤ P̃ ji ∀i, j. (12)
The reasoning behind (12) is as follows. We start fromP̃′, which is column stochastic,
but may have rows summing to more than one, thereby violatingrow stochasticity. We
need to replace each row summing to more than one with a standard basis vector. This can
clearly be done in such a manner that the second inequality in(12) is satisfied by restricting
ourselves to removing existing ones from̃P′. SinceP̃i j ≥ P̃0i j , the first inequality can always
be satisfied as well. Thus, we have





P̂i j P̂i j = trace(̂PQ̂).
5In other words, column sums ofP̃0 are less than or equal to one.
6Whenm= n, P̃ is a permutation matrix.
7Whenm= n, we can simply letQ̃ = P̃′.
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We also have trace(P̃Q̃) = n. To see this, assume the contrary so that trace(P̃Q̃) < n.
Then, by column sub-stochasticity ofQ̃, there existsi, j such thatQi j = 1 while P ji = 0,
contradicting (12).
As in our example, let (P,Q) satisfy (Pk,Qk) = (P̃, Q̃) for k ≤ K, with 1 ≤ K < N and




2 trace(̃PQ̃) − trace(̃PQ̂+ P̂Q̃)
)
+
N − K − 1
N − 1
(






trace(̃PQ̂+ P̂Q̃) − 2 trace(̃PQ̃)
)
. (13)
The second term of (13) is non-negative, so, combining the first and third terms, we have
that (13) is greater than or equal to
(
2 trace(̃PQ̃) − trace(̃PQ̂+ P̂Q̃)
) K − 1
N − 1
≥ 0,
so that 1∈ argmaxk fk(P,Q) for anyK ≥ 1. It follows that a single mutation is sufficient to
reach (̃P, Q̃) from Rs = (P̂, Q̂), which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Combining Lemma 4.3.1, Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.3, we have for eachRi ∈ O
γ(Ri) ≥ λ(Ri) = ⌈N/2⌉(|O| − 1)+ (J − |O|), (14)
while for Ri < O we have
γ(Ri) ≥ λ(Ri) = ⌈N/2⌉(|O|) + (J − |O| − 1).
The next lemma establishes that (14) is tight so that ifRi ∈ O andRj < O we have
γ(Ri) = λ(Ri) ≡ γO < λ(Rj) ≤ γ(Rj),
whereγO is the stochastic potential of each state inO. Thus, by Theorem 2.2.1, the stochas-
tically stable states ofPǫm,m are precisely the states inO, which proves Theorem 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.3.4 For any Rj ∈ O we have
γ(Ri) = ⌈N/2⌉(|O| − 1)+ (J − |O|) ≡ γO
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Proof: By (14) we haveγ(Ri) ≥ γO, so what remains is to show that anRj-tree achieving
γO always exists. We describe such a tree with a depth of two. ForRi < O, Lemma 4.3.3
indicates that there is a state inO that is reached with resistance equal to one. Thus, one
level of the tree consists of links from states not inO to states inO. The next level is simply
links from eachRk ∈ O, k , i to Rj. By Lemma 4.3.2, these links all have resistance equal
to one as well.
The next section develops a result analogous to Theorem 4.3.2 for the case ofm, n.
4.3.4 Efficiency ofPǫm,n when m, n
From the perspective of stochastic stability, the long-runbehavior ofPǫm,n is the same
whetherm, n or m= n.
Theorem 4.3.3 A state ofPǫm,n, where m, n, is stochastically stable if and only if it is
contained inO, the set of optimal states .
The remainder of this section develops the proof of Theorem 4.3.3. We assume without
loss of generality thatm > n wheneverm , n. The argument is similar to that given for
Theorem 4.3.2, with Lemma 4.3.1 again being the workhorse. Thus, we need to again find
mink, jr jk for different absorbing statesRj. For Rj < O we inherit Lemma 4.3.3, which
nowhere assumed thatm= n. Thus, we havemink, jr jk = 1 whenRj ∈ O. The next lemma
shows that the same is true ofRj ∈ O.
Lemma 4.3.5 For any Rs ∈ O we have mink,srsk = 1.
Proof: Let Rs = (P̂, Q̂) be the monomorphic state in the language (P̂, Q̂). Sincen < m and
Q̂ is row stochastic,Q̂ must have a zero column. Letk1 be the index of this zero column



























P̂i j , i , k1
1, i = k1, j = k2
0, i = k1, j , k2
,
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so that trace(̃PQ̂) = n. Any state that includes users of both (P̂, Q̂) and (P̃, Q̂), but no other
languages assigns the payoff n to each and every player. Thus, the monomorphic state in
either language can be reached without further resistance.The lemma is thus proven by our
now familiar inductive argument.
Combining Lemma 4.3.1, Lemma 4.3.3, and Lemma 4.3.5 we have that for anyRj the
stochastic potential
γ(Rj) ≥ λ(Rj) = J − 1. (15)
ForRj < O, the inequality (15) is strict.
Lemma 4.3.6 For any Rj < O we haveγ(Rj) > J − 1.
Proof: Let Rj = (P̂, Q̂) be the monomorphic state in the language (P̂, Q̂). In order to achieve
γ(Rj) = J+ |O| −1, there must be anRj-tree that achieves a resistance of one at every edge.
To see that this is not possible observe that everyRj-tree must have at least one edge that
emanates from a state inO and terminates at a state not inO. This edge has resistance
strictly greater than one if there exists no language (P̃, Q̃) such that when (P1,Q1) = (P̃, Q̃)
and (Pi ,Qi) = (P̂, Q̂), i , 1 we havef1(P,Q) ≥ fN(P,Q). From (13) withK = 1, noting
that in this case the second term will be negative, we have that f1(P,Q) − fN(P,Q) < 0. 
The proof is complete once we show that forRj ∈ O, the inequality (15) is satisfied with
equality. This requires anRj-tree with a resistance of one for every edge. The construction
of such trees utilizes the following lemma.




1. i1 = s,
2. iK = t,
3. Rik ∈ O for each k∈ {1, ...,K},
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4. rikik+1 = 1 for each k∈ {1, ...,K − 1}.
The proof of Lemma 4.3.7 is somewhat lengthy and can be found in Section 4.8 at the end
of the chapter. The proof of Theorem 4.3.3 is concluded with the next lemma.
Lemma 4.3.8 For any Rj ∈ O we haveγ(Rj) = λ(Rj) = J − 1.
Proof: We need to show that for anyRj ∈ O we can construct anRj-tree with each edge
having resistance equal to one. ForRi < O we can, by Lemma 4.3.3, reach some state inO
with resistance equal to one. FromRi ∈ O,Ri , Rj, we can, by Lemma 4.3.7, construct a
path toRj via states inO with each edge having resistance equal to one. Any redundancies
can be eliminated as we go because allRj-trees have preciselyJ − 1 edges.
4.3.5 Discussion
Theorem 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3 provide that the dynamic proess we have described,
encompassing both mutation and selection, manages to coordinate exclusively on states
that maximize linguistic coherence. The particular language will nevertheless change from
time to time, consistent with observed phenomenon of linguistic drift [62]. In the more
natural case ofm, n, where the number of objects and symbols does not match, thisdrift
ought to be particularly prevalent as the necessary ambiguity provides pathways for such
changes, as described in Lemma 4.3.7. The many well documented cognates in modern
natural languages point to the divergence in the meaning of aparticular form as a vehicle
for linguistic change [65].
In short, the intrinsic randomness that enables the playersto search the set of languages
will prevent settling into any sort of permanent language state. However, despite never
freezing in a particular language, we can expect players to understand each other as well as
possible for a high proportion of the time.
The next section introduces several variations on the dynamics.
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4.4 Variations on the dynamics
Up until this point we have studied the dynamics described by(1), which are somewhat
contrived in that, absent mutations, only the most fit players are able to reproduce them-
selves. In this section we will show that stochastic stability of optimal states is preserved
under a number of more realistic variations on the dynamics.
4.4.1 Twice-perturbed dynamics
One mechanism to enable players other than the most fit to reprduce some of the time is
modification of the perturbation in (1). At each timet we select a playeri according toF,

















(Pk̂,Qk̂), with probability 1− ρǫ
(Pk̃,Qk̃), with probabilityρǫ
, (16)
whereρ ∈ (0, 1/ǫ), k̃ = rand({1, 2, ...,N}) and once again̂k ∈ argmaxk fk(P[t − 1],Q[t − 1]).

















(P̂, Q̂), with probability 1− ǫ
rand(Lm,n), with probabilityǫ
,
while the other players stand pat with
(P j[t],Q j[t]) = (P j[t − 1],Q j[t − 1]) ∀ j , i.
Let Pǫm,n,tp refer to the regular perturbed Markov process induced by these dynamics.
The analysis ofPǫm,n,tp follows directly from that ofP
ǫ
m,n, so we state the main result as a
corollary to Theorem 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3.
Corollary 4.4.1 A state ofPǫm,n,tp is stochastically stable if and only if it is contained inO,
the set of optimal states .
Idea of the proof:While Pǫm,n,tp andP
ǫ





Thus they have the same set of recurrent communication classes and the same resistances
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between those classes. In fact,Pǫm,n does afford reproductive opportunities to players not
among the most fit, but only through rare mutations. This is still true inPǫm,n,tp, but with such
events being more (or less) probable than other mutations byan arbitrary constant factor.
Scaling of perturbation terms by positive, constant factors does not influence resistances,
which can be seen by inspecting (1).
Using multiple, more elaborate scaling factors in the manner of (16) can bringPǫm,n even
closer to the replicator dynamics, which provides reproductive opportunities in proportion
to fitness. We do not develop such a dynamic explicitly here, although stochastic stability of
O would follow from the same argument offered above. We note however, that conclusions
would still only be valid in the smallǫ limit. Thus, the absolute probability that a player
not among the most fit reproduces is still potentially quite small.
In order to arrive at significantly more realistic dynamics that preserve the stochastic
stability properties, substantial structural changes arerequired. The next sections describes
such an approach.
4.4.2 Pairwise competition dynamics
Inspired by pairwise comparison dynamics [70], we propose an intuitive new dynamic. In
pairwise competition dynamics we select two playersi and j with i , j at each timet
according to a probability distribution over pairs that is parametrized by (P[t − 1],Q[t −
1]). That is, (i, j) is distributed asF(P[t − 1],Q[t − 1]), whereF is any family of full
support distributions, noting slight abuse of notation. Assume without loss of generality

















(P j[t],Q j[t], with probability 1− ǫ
rand(Lm,n), with probabilityǫ
, (17)
with all players other thani standing pat. We interpret (17) as localized competition over
reproductive opportunities and resources such as food, nesting sites, and mates. Absent
mutation the fitter player reproduces herself, while the less fit player dies out. The fitness
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function itself still reflects a global interaction— eff ctive communication with the broader
population confers advantages in local competitions. LetPǫm,n,pc refer to the regular per-
turbed Markov process induced by pairwise competition dynamics. We have the following
result, stated without proof, and also a corollary of Theorem 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3.
Corollary 4.4.2 A state ofPǫm,n,pc is stochastically stable if and only if it is contained inO,
the set of optimal states.
The proof of Corollary 4.4.2 is essentially the same as that of Theorem 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
While in this case even the unperturbed process is different, the recurrent communication
classes and minimum resistance paths remain the same.
A variation on pairwise competition dynamics is pairwise competition dynamics on a
fixed graph. That is, we fix a connected graphG whose vertex set is the set of players
{1, 2, ...,N} and select only pairs of players from the edge set ofG. We then proceed as in
pairwise competition dynamics. LetPǫm,n,G refer to the regular perturbed Markov process
induced by pairwise competition dynamics on the fixed graphG. Not surprisinglyPǫm,n,G
follows our now familiar theme.
Corollary 4.4.3 A state ofPǫm,n,G is stochastically stable if and only if it is contained inO,
the set of optimal states.
The proof of Corollary 4.4.3 is again the same as before, noting that any state that is not
monormorphic must have some edge between two players speaking different languages.
The variations on the dynamics we have thus far considered have all utilized the same
model of mutation. At each timet, the player granted a revision opportunity adopts a
random language with probabilityǫ. In the next section we consider instead point muta-




In general, we expect that mistakes or mutations in the updating process ought to lead to
only small, localized changes to the languages that would have otherwise been chosen. In
this section we consider a variation on our dynamic model that restricts mutations to jumps
that are “close” to the nominal parent language in a precise sense. In particular, we suppose
that at each discrete time instantt, a playeri is randomly selected for a strategy revision

























whereBH1 (Pk̂,Qk̂) is the ball of Hamming distance one centered at (Pk̂,Qk̂), given by








|Pi j − (Pk̂)i j | + |Q ji − (Qk̂) ji |
)
≤ 1}.
Put differently, mutations modify at most one row of one of the matrices of the language
that otherwise would have been used. As usual, the other players stand pat. We define the













|P̂i j − Pi j | + |Q̂ ji − Q ji |
)
Let Pǫm,n,pm refer to the regular perturbed Markov process just described. We find that the
behavior of this process is qualitatively consistent with those considered thus far.
Theorem 4.5.1 A state ofPǫm,n,pm is stochastically stable if and only if it is contained inO,
the set of optimal states.
The rest of this section provides the proof of Theorem 4.5.1.SinceP0m,n,pm = P
0
m,n, the
recurrent communication classes are still the monomorphicstates. We will want to once
again make use of Lemma 4.3.1. First considerm> n. Note that the sequences constructed
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in Lemma 4.3.7 always involved modifications to one row at a time, so the lemma holds
for Pǫm,n,pm too. Thus for any stateRs ∈ O we can construct a path inO to any other state
in O that achieves unity resistance at every edge. From states noin O we would like to
piggyback on Lemma 4.3.3, but we must first make a modification, which we present as a
new lemma.




1. i1 = s,
2. iK = t,
3. rikik+1 = 1 for each k∈ {1, ...,K − 1}.
Proof: Recall that given a monomorphic state (P̂, Q̂) < O, Lemma 4.3.3 constructs a
monomorphic state (P̃, Q̃) ∈ O that can be reached with resistance equal to one. Let (P̃, Q̃)
and (P̂, Q̂) be, respectively, the languages that (P̃, Q̃) and (̂P, Q̂) are monomorphic in. It is
possible that (̃P, Q̃) < BH1 (P̂, Q̂), so the resistance between these states is potentially greater
than one forPǫm,n,pm. To resolve this issue we break up the transition from (P̂, Q̂) to (P̃, Q̃)
into a sequence with the resistances between intermediate mono orphic states all equal to
one. This can be achieved by constructing a sequence of languages
(P̃0, Q̃0) ≡ (P̂, Q̂), (P̃1, Q̃1), (P̃2, Q̃2), ..., (P̃L, Q̃L) ≡ (P̃, Q̃)
whereL = dH
(
(P̃, Q̃), (P̂, Q̂)
)
and for each 1≤ k ≤ L we have
dH
(






(P̃k, Q̃k), (P̃, Q̃)
)
= L − k. (19)
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We argue inductively that the monomorphic states associated with any such sequence suf-
fice. To this end, consider a partial sequence
(P̃0, Q̃0) ≡ (P̂, Q̂), (P̃1, Q̃1), (P̃2, Q̃2), ..., (P̃l , Q̃l),
where 0≤ l < L. We assume this sequence satisfies (18) and (19) and that the resistance
between the monomorphic states associated with any pair from left to right is unity. The
base case ofl = 0 is trivial. For the induction step assume we have such a sequence up to
l < L, and extend the sequence by adding any language (P̃l+1, Q̃l+1) satisfying (18) and (19).








), the monomorphic states in, respectively,(P̃l, Q̃l) and
(P̃l+1, Q̃l+1). We need to show thatr ŝt̂ = 1, which follows from the arguments given at
the end of Lemma 3 once we show that trace(P̃l+1Q̃l) ≥ trace(̃PlQ̃l) and trace(̃PlQ̃l+1) ≥
trace(̃PlQ̃l).
Either P̃l+1 = P̃l or Q̃l+1 = Q̃l. We first consider̃Pl+1 = P̃l. In this case we only need
to show trace(̃PlQ̃l+1) ≥ trace(̃PlQ̃l). The two matricesQ̃l andQ̃l+1 differ in a single row,
which we will index with ĩ. Let j̃ be the unique index satisfying̃Ql+1
ĩ j̃
= 1. First, suppose
P̃l
j̃ ĩ








P̃ jĩ(Q̃ĩ j − Q̂ĩ j) = 1−
∑
j
P̃ jĩQ̂ĩ j ≥ 0,
as required. If instead̃Pl
j̃ ĩ








P̂ jĩ(Q̃ĩ j − Q̂ĩ j) ≥ P̂ ĵ ĩQ̃ĩ ĵ − P̂ ĵ ĩQ̂ĩ ĵ ,
where ĵ is the unique index satsifyinĝQĩ ĵ = 1. If P̂ ĵ ĩQ̂ĩ ĵ = 1 then by (10),(11), and (12) we
haveQ̃ĩ ĵ ≥ P̂ ĵ ĩ = Q̂ĩ ĵ, as required.
Next, supposeQ̃l+1 = Q̃l. In this case we only to need to show trace(P̃l+1Q̃l) ≥
trace(̃PlQ̃l). The two matricesP̃l and P̃l+1 differ in a single row, which we will index
with ĩ. Let j̃ be the unique index satisfying̃Pl+1
ĩ j̃
= 1. First, supposẽQl
j̃ ĩ














P̂ĩ j Q̃ jĩ ≥ 0,
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as required. If instead̃Ql
j̃ ĩ








(P̃ĩ j − P̂ĩ j)Q̂ jĩ ≥ P̃ĩ ĵQ̂ ĵ ĩ − P̂ĩ ĵQ̂ ĵ ĩ,
where ĵ is the unique index satisfyinĝQ ĵ ĩ = 1. If P̂ĩ ĵQ̂ ĵ ĩ = 1 then by (10) and (11) we have
P̃ĩ ĵ ≥ P̂ĩ ĵ, as required..
Thus far we have established that forRj ∈ O we have
γ(Rj) ≥ λ(Rj) = J − 1,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.3.1. The bound is tight.
Lemma 4.5.2 Suppose m> n, then for any Rj ∈ O we haveγ(Rj) = λ(Rj) = J − 1.
Proof: We need to show that for anyRj ∈ O we can construct anRj-tree with each edge
having resistance equal to one. ForRi < O we can, by Lemma 4.5.1, reach some state in
O with each resistance along the path equal to one. Redundancies can be eliminated as we
go. FromRi ∈ O,Ri , Rj, we can, by Lemma 4.3.7, construct a path toRj via states inO
with each edge having resistance equal to one. Again, any redundancies can be eliminated
as we go because allRj-trees have preciselyJ − 1 edges.
Resistances between absorbing states inPǫm,n,pm are always greater than or equal to the
corresponding resistances inPǫm,n because the latter does not restrict the allowed mutations.
Lower bounds on resistances derived forPǫm,n, in particular Lemma 4.3.5, continue to be
valid forPǫm,n,pm. Thus, forRj < O we haveγ(Rj) > J − 1, so that the stochastically stable
states are preciselyO.
Next, considerm = n, turning our attention first to the optimal states. Lemma 4.3.2 is
not valid forPǫm,n,pm, neccesitating the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.3 Suppose m= n, then for any(P̂, Q̂) ∈ O, any (P̄, Q̄) = Rt̄ ∈ O, and any
(P̃, Q̃) = Rt̃ < O with (P̃, Q̃) ∈ BH1 (P̂, Q̂) satsifying
dH
(








where (P̂, Q̂), (P̄, Q̄), and (P̃, Q̃) are, respectively, the languages in(P̂, Q̂), (P̄, Q̄), and
(P̃, Q̃), we have rst̃ = mint,s rst = N − 1 when N is even and rst̃ = mint,s rst = N when N is
odd.
Proof: First, considerN even. We have
trace(̂PQ̃+ P̃Q̂) = 2m− 1 ≥ trace(PQ̃+ P̃Q) (20)
for any (P,Q) ∈ Lm,m. Next, let (P̄0, Q̄0) ∈ BH2 (P̂, Q̂) satisfydH
(
(P̄0, Q̄0), (P̂, Q̂)
)
= 2 and
trace(̂PQ̄0 + P̄0Q̂) = 2n− 2 < trace(̃PQ̄0 + P̄0Q̃) = 2n− 1.



























(P̂, Q̂), i ≤ N/2
(P̄0, Q̄0), i ∈ [N/2+ 1,N − 1]
(P̃, Q̃), i = N
.
It is straightforward to see thatPǫm,n,pm can transition from (P,Q) to (P̃, Q̃) = Rt without
resistance so thatrst = N − 1. What remains is to show that this resistance is the minimum
achievable. Suppose there existsRt such thatrst ≤ N − 2. This requires that there exist






(Pi ,Qi), (P̂, Q̂)
)
≤ N − 2,
such that there is some
k̂ ∈ argmax
k
fk(P,Q), with (Pk̂,Qk̂) , (P̂, Q̂). (21)










Otherwise at mostN/2 − 1 players have mutated, which precludes (21) by Lemma 4.3.2.
We claim thati1, i2 < argmaxk fk(P,Q). To see this first note that
trace(P1Q j + P jQ1) ≥ trace(PiQ j + P jQi) − 1
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for all j, and
trace(P1Q j + P jQ1) = trace(PiQ j + P jQi) − 1
requiresdH
(
(P j ,Q j), (P̂, Q̂)
)













































































with each term in the summation in{-1,0,1}. In order for a term in the summation to be
negative we must havedH
(
(P j ,Q j), (P̂, Q̂)
)





(P j ,Q j), (P̂, Q̂)
)
≤ N − 4.
It follows that for every negative term there must be a positive erm, so that the overall
summation is non-negative, proving our claim.




≥ 2. Consider theN − 2 player state
arrived at by removing playersi1 and i2, denoted (PN−2,Q
N−2). Assume without loss of
generality that (PN−21 ,Q
N−2





) = (Pk̂,Qk̂). Due to (20),fk̂(P,Q) ≥
f1(P,Q) implies that in theN − 2 player gamefk̂(P
N−2,QN−2) ≥ f1(PN−2,QN−2) as well.
Proceding like this we eventually obtain a game that contradicts our claim, completing the
proof for N even.
Next, consider oddN. Clearly rst̃ ≤ N since the mutations can simply be applied to
every player. What remains is to show thatN is the minimum achievable resistance. The
proof of this fact is essentially the same as for the previouscase ofN even and is therefore
omitted.
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Lemma 4.5.4 For any (P̂, Q̂) = Rs < O and (P̄, Q̄) = Rt ∈ O there exists(P̃, Q̃) = Rt̃ such
that rst̃ = 1 and
dH
(




(P̂, Q̂), (P̄, Q̄)
)
− 1,
where (P̂, Q̂), (P̄, Q̄), and (P̃, Q̃) are, respectively, the languages in(P̂, Q̂), (P̄, Q̄), and
(P̃, Q̃)
Proof: Let the set
KP̂ = {i :
∑
j
P̂i j Q̂ ji = 1},
and similarly let
KQ̂ = {i :
∑
j
Q̂i j P̂ ji = 1},
these are the rows making positive contributions to payoffs in, respectively,̂P and Q̂. If

















P̂i j , i , î
P̄i j , i = î
,
and letQ̃ = Q̂. In this case, the lemma follows from the same arguments given at the end


















Q̂i j , i , î
Q̄i j , i = î
,
and letP̃ = P̂. In this case, the lemma once again follows from the same arguments given
at the end of Lemma 4.3.3.
Next, suppose that no indices as described above exist for either P̂ or Q̂. Since (̂P, Q̂)
is not aligned there must be some columnĵ satisfying
∑
i P̂i ĵ ≥ 2. Further, let̂i1 and î2
satisfyPî1 ĵ = Pî2 ĵ = 1. At least one of these rows does not match its correspondingrow in
P̄, so assume without loss of generality thatP̂î1 ĵ , P̄î1 ĵ = 0. By assumption,̂Q ĵ î1 = 1 and
105

















Q̂i j , i , î2
Q̄i j , i = î2
,
and letP̃ = P̂ so that the lemma follows from the same arguments given at theend of
Lemma 3..
Based on Lemma 4.3.1, Lemma 4.5.3, and Lemma 4.5.4 it is clearthat forRi ∈ O we
haveγ(Ri) = (N−1)(|O|−1)+(J−|O|) for N even andγ(Ri) = N(|O|−1)+(J−|O|) for N odd.
To construct theRi-tree, simply exploit the fact that from any state we can reach a different
state with minimal resistance that is closer toRi in the sense of Hamming distance. On the
other hand, forRi < O the same three lemmas provide thatγ(Ri) ≥ (N−1)(|O|)+(J−|O|−1)
for N even andγ(Ri) ≥ N(|O|) + (J − |O| − 1) for n odd, completing the proof.
A consistent feature of all of the models we have thus far considered is the complete-
ness of the communication graph. That is, players attempt tocommunicate with the entire
population irrespective of how eff ctively they can do so. A consequence of this assump-
tion is that all of these models predict that monomorphic language states are nearly always
observed. The next section suggests a model where fitness depends only on communication
within linguistic communities.
4.6 Linguistic communities
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics achieve maximum effici ncy in atomic signaling games
over the long run. Why does diversity persist in the modern langu ge landscape despite
clear benefits to linguistic universality? Many researchers do in fact take the models quite
seriously and argue that observed diversity is a transient phenomenon— a relic of a bygone
era of isolation. Models of language competition [63] consider differential equation models
that are closely related to the replicator dynamics in the non-at mic signaling game and
reach very much the same conclusions, painting a bleak picture for any sort of persistent
diversity.
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Exogenous factors such as geographic isolation [64] and langu ge’s role as an in-group
marker [66] have been suggested to account for this discrepancy. More recently, researchers
have proposed homophily, the tendency to associate with similar others, as a mechanism
to account for the persistence of diverse linguistic communities [7]. However, the model
views languages as abstract feature vectors. In this framework, the desirability of a lan-
guage is based solely on similarity with neighbours. In contrast, signaling games model
communication systems that can possess homonymy and synonymy, so that languages have
varying degrees of intrinsic ambiguity. However, linguistic communities are not modelled.
We attempt to explain the observed persistence of diversityby suggesting an augmen-
tation of the model that introduces linguistic community struc ure to agents’ interactions.
Our model is inspired by a model of opinion formation [71]. Inthat model each agents’
opinion is a real number, and at each time step each agent updates her opinion to be the av-
erage of the opinions that differ from her own by at most a fixed threshold. Agents consider
opinions that differ by more than the threshold to be unreasonable. Similarly,our agents
define their linguistic community to be those other agents with hom they can commu-
nicate above a certain threshold. At each time step a randomly selected agent updates to
the language within her community that achieves the highestutility in communication re-
stricted to that same community. Intuitively, such a model ought to be friendly to diversity
because disparate languages can coexist in different communities.
We are able to characterize the stochastically stable states of his model for a restricted
set of parameters. In this case we find that only monomorphic language states are stochas-
tically stable. However, this analysis is relevant only when stochastic shocks are extremely
rare. Disruptive events with profound implications for thelanguage landscape, such as the
reintroduction of modern Hebrew in the 20th century, would seem to betray such assump-
tions. Simulation results are provided for higher levels ofrandomizing behavior, which
suggest a strong tendency towards the formation of distinctli guistic communities. Lin-
guistic coherence is high within these communities, but notbetween them. Alternatively,
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we make recourse to convergence rates. It has been shown in a closely related setting that
systems like our own may require time to convergence that is exponential in the population
size [68]. However, such systems may linger in metastable stat s over the medium-run
[72], [73]. We present simulation results that suggest effici nt but distinct communities can
persist in this manner even when they should be expected to vanish over the long-run. A
final simulation study shows that the threshold parameter defining the linguistic community
structure has substantial eff cts on the relative sizes of the communities observed.
4.6.1 The model
At each timet we select a playeri according toF, as before. This agent’s neighbourhood
hi(P[t − 1],Q[t − 1]) ≡ { j , i : trace(Pi[t − 1]Q j [t − 1] + P j[t]Qi[t − 1]) > r}
∪ { j , i : (P j[t − 1],Q j[t − 1]) = (Pi [t − 1],Qi[t − 1])},
is precisely the agents with whom she can communicate at a level above some fixed thresh-
old r ∈ (0, 2 min{m, n}) along with those sharing her language. If her neighborhoodis
empty, i.e. |hi(P[t − 1],Q[t − 1])| = 0, she picks a new language at random uniformly.
Otherwise, she updates her language as
























trace(P j[t]Qk[t]) + trace(Pk[t]Q j[t]).
All other agents continue with their previous language and anew agent is selected for
revision as above.
Different values ofm, n, andr will give a range of possible network structures. As an
example, we illustrate the structure form= n = 2, r = 3 in Fig. 21. An agent’s neighbours






























































Figure 21: The network structure form= n = 2, r = 3.
linked to in this graph. Notice that for these parameters only 12 of 16 languages possess
links, and only two are linked to themselves.
The model has a somewhat contrived appearance because an agent that can communi-
cate effectively within her community will with high probability eschew the opportunity
to revise her language in order to communicate eff ctively with a larger community. We
are altogether ignoring the advantages of incumbency that models of language competition
concentrate on. It turns out that for smallǫ, even this is not enough. We usePǫm,n,r to refer
to the regular perturbed Markov process induced by the linguistic community model.
Theorem 4.6.1 Let m= n and r∈ (2(n−1), 2n). Then the set of stochastically stable states
ofPǫm,m,r is preciselyO.
As usual we will show that for anyx, y ∈ O we have
γ(y) = γ(x) = λ(x) ≡ γO. (24)
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We then establish stochastic stability ofO by showing that for anyx < O we haveγ(x) ≥
λ(x) > γO.
From here on we refer to recurrent communication classes as just recurrent classes for
brevity. Unlike in the models considered above, not all recurent classes are absorbing
states. Our proof will not characterize the recurrent classes aside from a few key features.
The unperturbed processP0m,n,r is not innovative (i.e. new languages never appear), so
the set of languages in each state in a recurrent class is the sam . More formally, consider
any two statesz = (P,Q) and ẑ = (P̂, Q̂) contained in a single recurrent classRi. For
any j there must existk such that (̂Pk, Q̂k) = (P j ,Q j). While each state in a recurrent
class must have the same set of, the actual number of players sp aking each language can
vary from state to state. However, the number of players speaking each aligned language
is constant across all of the states in the recurrent class. This is because agents speaking
aligned languages never change languages so long as they havneighbours, a claim we
establish with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6.1 Suppose that the state(P,Q) contains an aligned language(Pi ,Qi) with
|hi(P,Q)| ≥ 1 then each




trace(P jQk + PkQ j), (25)
satisfies(Pî ,Qî) = (Pi ,Qi).
Proof: By the definition of the neighbourhoodhi(P,Q) we have
trace(PiQ j + P jQi) ≥ 2n− 1, (26)
for each j ∈ hi(P,Q). Neighbours of an agent speaking an aligned language either speak
the same aligned language or possess a zero column. If agentj ∈ hi(P,Q) possess a zero
column then for anyk ∈ hi(P,Q) we have
trace(PkQ j + P jQk) ≤ 2n− 1, (27)
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and trace(P jQ j + P jQ j) ≤ 2n− 2, so (Pi ,Qi) outperforms (P j ,Q j) against all members of
hi(P,Q) and does so strictly against (P j ,Q j). 
Since the number of agents speaking any aligned language is non-decreasing for any
state trajectory in the recurrent class, all states in each re ur ent class must have the same
number of agents speaking each aligned language.
Consider recurrent classes containing one or more aligned languages. A probability
ǫ event is sufficient to move one agent from a language that is not aligned to one of the
aligned languages present in the recurrent class. It does not matter which state we apply
the perturbation from. This new state may be transient, but we are guaranteed to reach a
new recurrent class with strictly more agents speaking aligned languages. This fact follows
from the preceding lemma. Proceeding like this we can reach an absorbing state in which
all agents speak aligned languages. Agents can then switch from one aligned language to
another via probabilityǫ events so that we reach a state inO and we required only transi-
tions between absorbing states having resistance equal to one. Recall that redundancies are
immaterial.
Next, consider a recurrent classRk without any aligned languages. In this case each
state (P,Q) ∈ Rk contains some agenti achieving
trace(PiQi) = max
j
trace(P jQ j) ≡ c(Rk). (28)
We can reach a state that increases this quantity by one via a single ǫ probability event.
Further, this can be done in such a manner that the agent speaking the new language will
have a non-empty neighbourhood.
Lemma 4.6.2 Supposetrace(PQ) ≤ n − 1. Then there exists another language(P̂, Q̂)
satisfying
trace(̂PQ̂) = trace(PQ) + 1, (29)
and
trace(̂PQ+ PQ̂) ≥ r = 2n− 1. (30)
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Proof: Assume thatP has no zero columns and letQ̂ = P′. The proof whenP has a zero
column is symmetric. Let
C = { j :
∑
k
P jkQk j ≥ 1}, (31)
the set of indices of columns ofQ that do not contribute to trace(PQ). The matrixQ has at
most one zero column. First, supposeQ has a zero column and let
C1 = { j ∈ C :
∑
k
Qk j > 0}, (32)



























1, i ∈ C1, j = min{argmaxk Qki}
0, i ∈ C1, j , min{argmaxk Qki}
Pi j , otherwise.
(33)













































Pi j Q ji = |C1| + |C
c| = n− 1, (37)
which combined with trace(PQ̂) = trace(PP′) = m establishes the first part of the lemma.






































Pi j Pi j (40)
= |Cc| + |C −C1| = trace(PQ) + 1. (41)
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To complete the proof of the lemma we instead suppose thatQ has no zero column. We
define the setC0 ⊂ C so thatj ∈ C0 ⇒
∑
k Qk j > 0 and|C0| = |C1| − 1. Put another way,C0

















Q ji , i ∈ C0














































Pi j Q ji = |C0| + |C







































Pi j Pi j (49)
= |Cc| + |C −C0| = trace(PQ) + 1, (50)
completing the proof.
While the new state just described may be transient, we will eventually reach a recurrent
class containing the new language. This is because the last speaker of this new language
never abandons her language so long as she has a neighbour.
Lemma 4.6.3 Suppose that the state(P,Q) contains a language(Pi ,Qi) with |hi(P,Q)| ≥ 1
such that for all j, i we have(P j ,Q j) , (Pi ,Qi). Further suppose
trace(PiQi) > max
j,i
trace(P jQ j), (51)
113
then




trace(P jQk + PkQ j). (52)
Proof: By the definition of the neighbourhoodhi(P,Q) and the uniqueness of (Pi ,Qi) we
have trace(PiQ j+P jQi) ≥ 2n−1 for eachj ∈ hi(P,Q). Each other languagej ∈ hi(P,Q) has
trace(P jQ j) < trace(PiQi) ≤ n so it achieves a payoff of at most 2n− 2 against itself, while
(Pi ,Qi) achieves at least 2n− 1. Since (Pi ,Qi) outperforms each language strictly against
at least one other language in the neighbourhood (namely, thlanguage itself), it need only
match that language against all other languages. Thus it is sufficient to show that for any
two agentsk, j ∈ hi(P,Q) with k , j we have trace(PkQ j + P jQk) ≤ 2n − 1. Assume the
contrary, i.e. that there exist two agentsk and j with k , j satisfying trace(PkQ j + P jQk) =
2n. This requiresPk = Q′j andP j = Q
′
k. Now since j is in hi(P,Q) we know that either
P j = Q′i or Q j = P
′
i because one of the trace terms must equaln. We will deal with the
former case only since the latter will then follow from symmetry. By the same reasoning
we have that eitherPk = Q′i or Qk = P
′
i . If Pk = Q
′
i then
n = trace(P jQk) = trace(PkQk) < n, (53)
a contradiction. IfQk = P′i then




i ) = trace(PiQi). (54)
If trace(PiQi) = n then all its neighbours possess a zero column, so that at least one of the
requirementsPk = Q′j or P j = Q
′
k will violate row stochasticity.
Of course, we must guarantee that she continues to have a neighbour on the way to
the recurrent class. The next lemma establishes that the last of the neighbors of the agent
speaking the new language never abandons her language. Thatis, unless she abandons her
language for the new language. This can happen only if the newlanguage is aligned, but in
that case we have reached the scenario described above and are done.
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Lemma 4.6.4 Suppose that the state(P,Q) contains a language(Pi ,Qi) with |hi(P,Q)| ≥ 1
such that for all j, i we have(P j ,Q j) , (Pi ,Qi). Further suppose
trace(PiQi) ≤ n− 1, (55)
then either (i),




trace(P jQk + PkQ j), (56)
or (ii), there exists(P̂, Q̂) such that for all




trace(P jQk + PkQ j), (57)
(Pî ,Qî) = (P̂, Q̂) and trace(̂PQ̂) = n.
Proof: We know that for eachj ∈ hi(P,Q) we have
trace(PiQ j + P jQi) ≥ 2n− 1. (58)
Consider any two agentsk, j ∈ hi(P,Q) and assume
trace(PkQ j + P jQk) = 2n. (59)
If this is not possible then (i) obtains. Supposing it is possible we havePk = Q′j and
P j = Q′k. Now sincej is in hi(P,Q) we know that eitherP j = Q
′
i or Q j = P
′
i because one
of the trace terms must equaln. We will deal with the former case only since the latter will
then follow from symmetry. By the same reasoning we have thateitherPk = Q′i or Qk = P
′
i .
If Qk = P′i then




i ) = trace(PiQi), (60)
a contradiction. ThusPk = Q′i so that
n = trace(P jQk) = trace(PkQk), (61)
so that if (i) does not obtain, then (ii) obtains because onlyaligned languages can outper-





































Figure 22: Stability of diversity varies withN; r = 3,m = n = 2, ǫ = 10−4, average of 10
runs.
We can apply the above method inductively so thatc(Rk) increases by one for each
recurrent classRk visited. We eventually reach a recurrent class containing an aligned
language, from which point we have already established the existence of a suitable path to
a state inO. From these states inO all departing edges have resistance at least two. For
a resistance tree rooted at a state inx ∈ O, considery ∈ O, y , x. From any such statey
we can move two players to the aligned language inx, giving a new absorbing state that
achieves the minimum resistance fromy of two. Then, we can move one player at a time
to the aligned language inx, achieving a resistance of one for each absorbing state on our
way tox. It follows that
γ(x) = µ(x) = γO = 2(|O| − 1)+ |O
c| (62)
For any other recurrent classy < O it is sufficient to note that any resistance tree has one
more edge emanating from a state inO, so that
γ(y) ≥ µ(y) = 2|O| + |Oc| − 1 > γO, (63)
completing the proof.
4.7 Simulations
Recall that the stochastically stable states are almost allwe will see in the long-run. For
























Figure 23: Distinct communities thrive over the medium-run; r = 3,m = n = 2, ǫ = 10−4,
average of 10 runs.
at all from the viewpoint of stochastic stability . Our analysis does not preclude diversity
over the medium-run or for larger values ofǫ, perspectives we now take up.
Stochastic stability characterizes long-run behavior, but such predictions may only
become relevant after extraordinary lengths of time. Undermo e reasonable timescales
states that are not stochastically stable may “appear” stable, phenomenon referred to
as metastability. Simulation results illustrated in the leftmost plot of Fig. 23 indicate
this can occur for parameter values covered by Theorem 4.6.1. Two languages satisfy
trace(PQ) = m = n = 2, these are thealigned languages and are represented with dotted
lines. The wider dots indicates the more prevalent of the two8. The solid line sums over
all other languages. Despite eventually settling into monomorphic states, the simulations
indicate a metastable epoch where diverse communities thrive.
Whenǫ is not small relative to the population size, we observe diverse, efficient linguis-
tic communities even over long time-horizons . The impact ofincreasing the population
size withǫ fixed is illustrated in Fig. 22. Forǫ = 10−4 we eventually observe monomorphic
states for smallN, consistent with stochastic stability analysis. AsN grows we observe
two equally sized internally efficient linguistic communities9. Interestingly, the relative
8The identity of the more prevalent language is allowed to change. Either of the two states that is
monomorphic in an aligned language can begin to dominate so,absent our convention, averaging over many
runs would give the misleading appearance of diversity for larget
9Readers should exercise caution in drawing conclusions from these simulations whenN is large because














































Figure 24: Community sizes vary withr; m = n = 2, ǫ = 10−4,N = 1000, average of 10
runs.
community sizes are related to the particular choice of thres old as illustrated in Fig. 24.
4.8 Proof of Lemma 4.3.7









|Ai j − Bi j |.
Let (P,Q) and (P̂, Q̂) be, respectively, the languages thatRi andRj are monomorphic in.
The basic idea of our argument is to construct a sequence of states per the requirements of
Lemma 4.3.7 withP-matrices whose element-wise Hamming distances fromP̂ go to zero.
Suppose that we have a sequence ofL ≥ 1 language(s)
(P,Q) ≡ (P1,Q1), (P2,Q2), ..., (PL,QL),
whose corresponding monomorphic states10 satisfy all the requirements of Lemma 4.3.7
other than the second, so the terminal state is not (P̂, Q̂). If PL = P̂ then let (PL+1,QL+1) ≡
(PL, Q̂) = (P̂, Q̂), so once again the lemma follows from the same argument given at the
end of Lemma 4.3.3. It follows that we need only concentrate on driving down the distance
between theP-matrices, since we can then trivially complete the sequence.
LetK(PL) = {(i, j) : PLi j > P̂i j } and let
K̂(PL) = {(i, j) ∈ K(PL) :
∑
k
PLk j ≥ 2}. (64)
10For the remainder of the proof, when we make reference to sequences of this form, we will assume it is
understood we are referring to the corresponding monomorphic states.
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Suppose that|K̂(PL)| ≥ 1 and let









ki∗ = 0. In this case, since thei
∗th column ofQL is all zeros, we
can modify thei∗th row of PL, with the transition to the new monomorphic state having

















PLi j , i , i
∗
P̂i j , i = i∗
, (65)
so that the sequence
(P,Q) ≡ (P1,Q1), (P2,Q2), ..., (PL,QL), (PL+1,QL) (66)
satisfies all the requirements of Lemma 4.3.7 other than the second, butdH(PL+1, P̂) =




ki∗ = 1. In this case, none of the mismatched rows
in PL correspond to zero columns inQL. The situation can be remedied as follows. Let
î , i∗ satisfyPL
î j∗



























QLi j , i , j
∗
0, i = j∗, j , î
1, i = j∗, j = î
,
so that the sequence
(P,Q) ≡ (P1,Q1), (P2,Q2), ..., (PL,QL), (PL,QL+1)
satisfies all the requirements of Lemma 7 other than the second. Obviously, this addition




ki∗ = 0 so that the sequence can be extended in the manner of (65) and(66).
We have thus far established that the sequence can be extended with dH(PL+1, P̂) =
dH(PL, P̂) − 1 so long as|K̂(PL)| ≥ 1. Next, suppose|K̂(PL)| = 0. In this case we may
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actually augment the sequence in such a manner thatdH(PL+1, P̂) = dH(PL, P̂) + 1, in effect
moving us further from our goal. However, we will be able to guarantee that subsequent
































PLi j , i , j
∗
0, i = j∗, j , ĵ
1, i = j∗, j = ĵ
,
and append (PL+1,QL) to the sequence. Now,dH(PL+1, P̂) ≥ dH(PL, P̂), because the row
of PL that we modify, j∗, already matcheŝP. To see this, assume the contrary so (j∗, j̃) ∈












= 0 by assumption, which
contradicts our assumption that|K̂(PL)| = 0.
Note that after this last addition we now have (î, ĵ) ∈ K̂(PL+1). Next, let ĩ , î satisfy



























QLi j , i , ĵ
0, i = ĵ, j , ĩ
1, i = ĵ, j = ĩ
,





= 0. The sequence can now be
extended extended in the manner of (65) and (66), so that
dH(P
L+3, P̂) = dH(P
L+1, P̂) − 1 ≤ dH(P
L, P̂).
The final step is to show that subsequent steps enable a strictdecrease in this distance when
necessary, which follows once we show|K̂(PL+3)| ≥ 1. To see this, first note that some
column sum inPL+3 is greater than the corresponding column sum inPL+1, but sincePL+1
already had positive column sums (as (PL+1,QL+2) is aligned), that column must sum to at
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least two. ConsiderK(PL), the set of incorrect ones ofPL+1, whose column sums are equal
to one by assumption. Let
K̃(PL) = {k : ∃(i, j) ∈ K(PL) s.t. P̂ik = 1},
the set of columns that the elements ofK(PL) should have ones in. For eachk ∈ K̃(PL)
there existsi such that (i, k) ∈ K(PL), otherwiseP̂ would have a zero column, which is
impossible due to (̂P, Q̂) being aligned. InPL+1 we increase one of these column sums to
two so that inPL+3 a row can be corrected. Correcting a row moves a one to a column
in k ∈ K̃(PL), but there are the same columns asK(PL) so the column whose sum has
increased to two cannot matchP̂. 
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CHAPTER 5
POPULATION GAMES AND PASSIVITY
This chapter begins the second half of this thesis. These results are more abstract than those
described in the first half of the thesis, which were focused on the specific applications of
self-assembly and language. Here we focus on the problem of distributed convergence to
equilibrium more generally.
Stable games [15] have the attractive property of admittingglobal convergence to equi-
libria under many learning dynamics. We show that stable games can be formulated as pas-
sive input-output systems. This observation enables us to identify passivity of a learning
dynamic as a sufficient condition for global convergence in stable games. Notably, dynam-
ics satisfying our condition need not exhibit positive correlation between the payoffs and
their directions of motion. We show that our condition is satisfied by the dynamics known
to exhibit global convergence in stable games. We give a decision-theoretic interpretation
for passive learning dynamics that mirrors the interpretation of stable games as strategic
environments exhibiting self-defeating externalities. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility
of the passivity condition to study the impact of applying various forecasting heuristics to
the payoffs used in the learning process. Finally, we show how passivity can be used to
identify strategic tendencies of the players that allow forc nvergence in the presence of
information lags of arbitrary duration in some games.
5.1 Introduction
Among the oldest problems for game theory is the question of what, if anything, is the
correct solution concept. The stock answer, Nash equilibrium, has well-documented diffi-
culties. While existence is generally not an issue so long aswe allow for mixed strategies,
uniqueness can rarely be guaranteed. A common approach to identifying the “correct” pre-
diction has been to analyze dynamic system models intended to mimic the decision making
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processes of the players. This bottom-up approach is often ref rred to as evolutionary game
theory, or, learning in games. The procedure entails selecting an appropriate “evolutionary
dynamic” (behavioral rule) and proceeding to analyze the action trajectories that the game
induces, which often converge to Nash equilibria. The choice f dynamic is normally based
on exogenous considerations. In particular, the most well-studied dynamic, the replicator
dynamic [74], is inspired by biological evolution. For a thorough background on evolu-
tionary game theory, the reader is advised to consult the many onographs on the subject.
In particular, we will mostly follow the terminology and notation of [27].
Unfortunately, evolutionary game theory frequently failsto provide much additional
clarity because oftentimes the evolutionary dynamic of interest for a game under study will
not induce any stable fixed points, and may even exhibit chaos[75]. In fact, games have
been constructed that can be shown to never exhibit stable Nash equilibria under only very
mild conditions on the dynamics themselves [9]. Thus, from aworst-case perspective, evo-
lutionary game theory has fundamental explanatory limitations. Nonetheless, the situation
is often much better. In recent decades, researchers have sought t identify broad classes
of games for which correspondingly broad classes of dynamics converge to equilibrium,
most notably, potential games [12]. We focus here on the recently proposed notion of a sta-
ble game [15]— a generalization of a number of earlier ideas including concave potential
games and symmetric normal form games with an interior ESS. The appealing property of
stable games is that their Nash equilibria comprise a convexset that many dynamics are
guaranteed to reach [15].
In this paper, we show that stable games can be formulated as passive input-output
systems. Passivity is an abstraction of energy conservation nd dissipation in mechanical
and electrical systems [76] that has become a standard tool in the design and analysis of
nonlinear systems [77], [78], [79]. It provides conditionsunder which particular system
interconnections will be stable. After we identify stable games as passive systems, we
are guaranteed that play by any admissible passive learningdy amic will admit globally
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asymptotically stable equilibria. It turns out that latterr quirement is not especially restric-
tive as we show that the dynamics that guarantee global convergence in stable games are
indeed passive.
Previous attempts at characterization of a broad class of learning dynamics achieving
global convergence in stable games concentrated on the notion of positive correlation [15],
that is, on the inner product between the payoffs and the direction of motion. Learning dy-
namics exhibiting global convergence in stable games can beshown to satisfy positive cor-
relation, or in the case of perturbed best response dynamics, a variant termed virtual positive
correlation [80]. However, a learning dynamic satisfying positive correlation that fails to
converge in a stable game can be constructed, which motivated the additional requirement
of integrability of the revision protocols. Nonetheless, positive correlation and integrability
are not known to provide a sufficient condition for convergence in stable games— suitable
Lyapunov functions must be identified for each learning dynamic independently. Although
our sufficient condition for convergence, passivity, still requires us to find an analogous
function, we find that the form of correlation required is betw en the time derivative of
payoffs and the direction of motion. This correlation suggests an interpretation of passive
learning that mirrors the interpretation of stable games asstr tegic environments exhibiting
self-defeating externalities.
An immediate benefit of our characterization, beyond providing a sufficient condition
for stability, is the novel generalizations it enables. Evoluti nary game theory has histori-
cally placed particular emphasis on the study of memoryless, or “one-shot” games and the
dynamical systems induced by play according to learning dynamics with order equal to the
total number of strategies across all players. While our definitions include this setting, they
are not restricted to it. Dynamic learning schemes that utilize additional, auxiliary states in
reckoning strategy changes can also be analyzed using passivity. In particular, we identify
games that preserve the convergence properties of passive learning dynamics when they are
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combined with prevalent forecasting heuristics like smoothing and trend following. Alter-
natively, certain dynamic games, that is, strategic enviorments where payoffs can depend
on the entire action trajectory, can be shown to exhibit passivity.
Lastly, we probe the limits of the class of passive learning dynamics by suggesting
a learning scheme in which players attempt to update strategies in a contrarian manner.
Specifically, they discount payoffs to actions that have seen a rise in popularity over a
defined lookback period. This scheme leads to an infinite-dimensional system. We find
that this predisposition has no consequences for global convergence of passive dynamics in
stable games and all other passive strategic environments.Furthermore, such behavior has
the added benefit of preserving global convergence guarantees in some games even when
otherwise destabilizing information lags are present.
Passivity techniques have been used in analysis of game theore ic learning dynamics
employed in certain specific engineering models [81], [82],but the notion of passivity
capturing a class of dynamics or games is novel as far as we know.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
LetP = {1, 2, ..., p} be asocietycomprised ofp ≥ 1 populations. We think of each popula-
tion p as a continuum of agents havingmass mp. We can informally think of an individual
agent as an infinitesimal in one of the populations. Each population p has a set of available











p} so that for





p is the set ofsocial states.
In this paper we will insist that the population masses remain constant. This implies
that for xp, yp ∈ Xp we have
∑
i∈Sp(x
p − yp) = 0. Thus admissible changes in strategy are






i }. Similarly, changes in social
state are confined toTX =
∏
p∈P TX
p. We denote the orthogonal projection ontoTX asΦ.
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The payoff functionF : X → R is a continuous map associating each social state with
a payoff vector so thatF pi : X → R
n is the payoff to strategyi ∈ Sp. We will often assume
X to be fixed and refer toF itself as the game.
A statex ∈ X is aNash equilibrium, denotedx ∈ NE(F) if each strategy in the support
of x receives the maximum payoff available to its population, i.e.
x ∈ NE(F) ⇔ [xpi > 0⇒ F
p
i (x) ≥ F
p
j (x)]
∀i, j ∈ Sp andp ∈ P.
We next give a formal definition of deterministic evolutionary dynamics. Define setsF
andT as follows:
F = {F : X→ Rn : F is Lipschitz continuous};
T = {{x(t)}t≥0 ⊆ X : x(·) is continuous}.
A deterministic evolutionary dynamic is a set valued mapD : F → T that assigns each
population gameF ∈ F a setD(F) ⊂ T such that for eachζ ∈ X, there is a trajectory
{xt}t≥0 ∈ D(F) with x0 = ζ. We will give special attention to evolutionary dynamics speci-
fied by the initial value problem,
ẋ = V(x, F(x)) = VF(x),
which we will call traditional learning dynamics.
5.2.2 Stable Games
We say thatF : X→ Rn is astable gameif
(y− x)′(F(y) − F(x)) ≤ 0 ∀x, y ∈ X.
For a detailed discussion of stable games, see [15]. Many evolutionary dynamics are quite
well-behaved when restricted to the stable games. The primary intent of this paper is to
further formalize this observation. The above definition has an intuitive interpretation when
F is continuously differentiable.
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Theorem 5.2.1 [15] Suppose the population game F is C1, then F is a stable game if and
only if DF(x) is negative semidefinite with respect to TX for all x∈ X.
We say that such anF satisfiesself-defeating externalities. That is, the payoff im-
provements to strategies being switched to are dominated bythe payoff improvements to
strategies being abandoned. This is easy to see by lettingz = epj − e
p
i ∈ TX, the difference




∂z , as required.
Many games are known to be stable games. For a thorough list con ult [15] and [83].
We point out only a few important examples here.
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implying F is a stable game.§
Example 5.2.2 (Network zero sum games2) Consider a digraph G withP as its vertex










In the notation of the last example A(i, j) is A1 and A( j,i) = A′2. The source plays the role of
the first population and the sink plays the role of the second.We assume that payoffs are
1In the context of zero sum games it is more common to interpreteach population as a player that random-
izes her actions according to her strategy distribution. Wewill use the population terminology throughout
this paper.
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(zj)′A(i, j)zi − (zj)′A(i, j)zi
)
= 0,
so F is a stable game.§
Example 5.2.3 (Concave potential games)Suppose that F: X → Rn satisfies∇ f = ΦF
for some function f: X→ R. Then we call F a potential game and f its potential function.
If, in addition, f is concave, then we say that F is a concave potential game. Concave
potential games are stable games, as can be seen from
(y− x)′ (F(y) − F(x)) = (Φ(y− x))′ (F(y) − F(x))
= (y− x)′ (ΦF(y) − ΦF(x))
= (y− x)′ (∇ f (y) − ∇ f (x))
≤ 0,
where the second equality follows from symmetry of the projecti n matrixΦ. §
Example 5.2.4 (Congestion games)An important subclass of concave potential games
are congestion games with increasing costs. These games model allocation of resources
among selfish users with inelastic demand. Later on we will present some new results for
this specific class, so we review the definitions here. Congestion games were originally
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proposed in [85] (also see [18], [86]). The form we study is that described in [87]. We
begin with a finite setΨ of facilities. For each p∈ P there is a set Sp of subsets ofΨ—
these are the strategies available to users in that population. Thus for each facilityφ ∈ Ψ









where as,φ is the consumption rate of users of strategy s with respect tofacility φ. Each
facility has a non-decreasing cost function cφ : R+ → R. The payoff function for strategy
s ∈ Sp is given by




The payoffs can be more compactly represented as
F(x) = −U′C(Ux),

































































since the costs are non-decreasing. The stable game property of congestion games can
also be demonstrated by showing that congestion games are concave potential games. We
provide this derivation in order to note that in the case thatthe cost functions are strictly
increasing, DF(x) is negative definite for almost all utilization matrices. However, we note
that in some formulations the as,φ are assumed to all be equal to one, in which case there
are only finitely many U and some of them may not be full rank.§
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We will see that the stable games can be formulated as passivesy tems. First, we review
classical passivity theory.
5.2.3 Passivity
We consider the input-output system
ż= f (z, u)
y = h(z, u)
where the functionf : Rq × Rp → Rq is locally Lipschitz (i.e. Lipschitz when restricted
to any compact set) andh : Rq × Rp → Rp is continuous. This system, given an initial
state vectorz0, can be thought of as an operator from input trajectories{ut}t≥0 ⊂ Rp to
output trajectories{yt}t≥0 ⊂ Rp. We say the system ispassiveif there exists a continuously
differentiable positive semidefinite functionL : Rq→ R+ (called thestorage function) such
that
u′y ≥ L̇ =
∂L
∂z
f (z, u). ∀(z, u) ∈ Rq × Rp
For memoryless systems, we haveL = 0. We assume for convenience thatz = 0 is a
fixed point of the dynamics with zero input, i.e.f (0, 0) = 0. There is no loss of generality
because any fixed point can be shifted to the origin with an appropriate change of variables.
Theorem 5.2.2 If a system is passive with a positive definite storage functio L then the
origin of ż= f (z, 0) is stable.
Proof: TakeL as the Lyapunov function for ˙z= f (x, 0), thenL̇ = 0. 
In order to show asymptotic stability we must either showL̇ < 0 or apply LaSalle’s
invariance principle. We postpone further discussion of these issues. Now consider two
passive systems,S1 andS2:
żi = fi(zi , ui)
yi = hi(zi , ui), i = {1, 2}
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where thefi are locally Lipschitz and thehi are continuous. We are interested in the form
of interconnection shown in Fig. 1, that is:
e1 = u1 − h2(z2, e2)













Figure 25: A negative feedback interconnection of two dynamic systems.
We will assume that these equations have unique solutions for every (z1, z2, u1, u2). This
implies an overall state model:
ẋ = f (z, u)














































































The functionsf andh inherit the smoothness properties offi andhi.
Theorem 5.2.3 The feedback connection of two passive systems is passive.
Proof: Let the systems have storage functionsLi , i = 1, 2. Then
e′i yi ≥ L̇i
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From the interconnection we get
e′1y1 + e
′
2y2 = (u1 − y2)







u′y = u′1y1 + u
′
2y2 ≥ L̇1 + L̇2
Let L(z) = L1(z1) + L2(z2) so that
u′y ≥ L̇
as required.
We will need to modify these definitions a bit before they willbe useful in the context of
population games. We would like to, on the one hand, relax these d finitions so they need
only apply for a restricted set of admissible inputs, while at the same time constraining
interconnections so that they guarantee our trajectories do not generate social states outside
of X. Furthermore, it will be the positive interconnection (as opp sed to negative) that we
are interested in, which will require an appropriate notionof anti-passivity.
5.3 Main Results
We can represent aC1 population gameF as an input-output system,
ẋ = u
π̇ = DF(x)u
y = π̇ = DF(x)u,
which we refer to as thegame subsystem induced by F. Traditionally, we think of games
as memoryless mappings from strategyx to payoff F(x). This alternative description is for
mathematical convenience. We will thus think of games as mappings from strategytrajec-
tories to payoff trajectories. Given an initial condition,x0, any admissible, differentiable
trajectory ẋ can be “fed” into the game as an input. By admissibility we refer to the
requirement that
x(t) = x ∈t0 ẋ(τ)dτ + x0 ∈ X, ∀t ≥ 0.
132
The output ˙π is then just the instantaneous time derivative of payoff. The actual payoff can





In order to extend passivity to a system of this form we need toprecisely define the admis-
sible inputs and similarly define passivity relative to those inputs.
5.3.1 M-passivity
We will see that stable games and certain learning dynamics exhibit a form of passivity for
systems with compact state spaces. Let
U = C([0,∞),Rp),
the set of continuous functions mapping [0,∞) toRp. We start withM ⊂ Rn and define an
input space
UM(v) , {u ∈ U : z0 = v⇒ z(t) ∈ M, ∀ t ≥ 0}.
These are the inputs that keep the state of the system inM when the system is initialized at
z0 = v. Suppose thatUM(v) , {∅} for all v ∈ M. LetA ⊂ M be closed and letY ⊂ M be
a neighborhood ofA. Further, suppose that there exists a continuous functionL : Y → R+
with L−1(0) = A such that
L̇(z(t)) ≤ σu(t)′y(t), ∀ z(t) ∈ Y and∀ u ∈ UM(z0), (67)
where “·′′ refers to the right upper Dini derivative, namely




(L (z(t + h)) − L (z(t))) .
Then we say that the system isM-passiveif σ = 1 andM-anti-passiveif σ = −1. If the
inequality (75) is strict forz(t) < A then the system istrictlyM-passive ifσ = 1 and
strictlyM-anti-passive ifσ = −1. The following theorem extends Theorem 5.2.2 to our
setting.
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Theorem 5.3.1 Suppose a system isM-passive orM-anti-passive with storage function L
and0 ∈ UM(v) for all v ∈ M. Consider solutions to the autonomous systemż = f (z, 0).
If given any bounded setΩ ⊂ Y there exists a bounded setΓ(Ω) such that z0 ∈ Ω implies
z(t) ∈ Γ(Ω) for all t ≥ 0 then L−1(0) is Lyapunov stable. If, in addition to the above, the
system is strictlyM-passive or strictlyM-anti-passive then L−1(0) is asymptotically stable,
and globally asymptotically stable ifY =M.
The proof of 5.3.1 uses standard Lyapunov arguments pertaining to stability of compact
sets, such as those found in [88]. Since Theorem 5.3.1 is a special case of Theorem 5.9.1
below, we prove only the more general result. The existence of the compact setΓ(Ω) is
nearly immediate when dealing with traditional game and dynamics subsystems. We will
show how this requirement can be dispensed with below.
Consider thepositive-feedback interconnection of two systems that are, respectively,
M1-anti-passive wih storage functionL1 andM2-passive with storage functionL2. More
precisely, we set
e1 = −u1 + h2(z2, e2)
e2 = u2 + h1(z1, e1).
In order to extendM-passivity to the interconnection in a meaningful way, we must
identify a non-empty setM12 ⊂ M1 ×M2 so that, for the overall system, 0∈ UM12(v) for
all v ∈ M12.
Theorem 5.3.2 The positive-feedback interconnection of two systems thatare, respec-
tively,M1-passive with storage function L1 andM2-passive with storage function L2, is
M12-passive with storage function L12(z1, z2) = L1(z1) + L2(z2).
The proof is nearly identical to that of the classical passivity theorem. Theorem 5.3.1
can then be used to establish stability properties, the key point being recognition ofL12(z1, z2)
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as the appropriate Lyapunov function. The next section illustrates how our definitions ac-
commodate stable games.
5.4 Passive systems induced by games
Recall the game subsystem induced byF,
ẋ = u
π̇ = DF(x)u
y = π̇ = DF(x)u.




π̇′ ẋ = ẋ′(DF(x))′ ẋ ≤ 0,
which implies
0 ≤ −π̇′ ẋ = −u′y.
 We note here thatDF(x) is not defined for social statesx < X. It follows that the only
allowed inputsu = ẋ are those that that keepx in X. This is captured in the definition of
X-anti-passivity.
5.5 Passive Dynamics
We can similarly view an evolutionary dynamic ˙x = VF(x) in this manner
π̇ = u
ẋ = Vπ(x)
y = ẋ = Vπ(x)
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where ẋ is understood as the time-derivative of the social statex and the definition of
the system output. The social statex appears in both the learning and game subsystems.
Abusing notation slightly, we use the subscripted variables xG and xD to distinguish the
two. It is easy to see that the positive interconnection of the input-output systems associated
with the game and learning dynamics recovers exactly the traditional differential equation
as long as we initialize
xG(0) = xD(0) = x0,
and
π(0) = F(x0),
In particular plugging in for the inputsu in the learning dynamics and game equations gives
π̇ = DF(x)Vπ(x)
ẋ = Vπ(x),
but sinceπ(0) = F(x0) this impliesπ(t) = F(x(t)) for all t so that we have simply
ẋ = VF(x),
as required. However, we have transformed an ordinary differential equation system of
ordern to an interconnection of a system having ordern with a system having order 2n. We
reiterate that forC1 games and traditional learning dynamics this formulation is equivalent
to the traditional one under the natural initialization. Wewill refer to the procedure just
utilized as the natural dimensional reduction.
We seek passive (i.e.Rn × X-passive) dynamics that produce outputs ˙x ∈ UX(x0). We
do not need to restrict the inputs (˙π) to the dynamics in any way. The restriction ˙x ∈ UX(x0)
is needed to ensure that interconnection with the game is meaningful, i.e. that we do not
produce outputs that, when input to the game subsystem, produce motion out ofX. We





















Thus we can regardρpi j (π
p, xp) as the switch rate from strategyi ∈ Sp to strategyj ∈ Sp.
Our first example is the excess payoff target (EPT) dynamics. EPT dynamics have




p, xp) = τpj (π̂
p),
where







is the vector ofexcess payoffs. In this case the dynamics take the simpler form





The EPT dynamics include best response3, logit, and Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynam-




p) is independent of ˆπp
−i, andacuteif
τp(π̂p)′π̂p > 0 whenever ˆπp ∈ Rnp − Rnp− .
We assume thatτp is Lipschitz continuous. The prototype of this subset of theEPT dynam-
ics is the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamic, withτpi (π̂
p
i ) = [π̂
p
i ]+.
In the theorem that follows, we treat EPT dynamics as input-output systems from ˙π to
ẋ, as explained above. The proof is mostly reproduced from [15].















3Strictly speaking, best response dynamics are specified by adifferential inclusion, we do not discuss
these here.
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Proof: It can be verified thatsgn(τi(πi)) = sgn([π]+), so that each integral inLEPT and
















i (s)ds= 0 ∀i ∈ S








= {(x, π) : π̂pi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ S
p, p ∈ P}
= {(x, π) : π − (x′π) · 1 ∈ Rn−}






= {(x, π) : x ∈ NE(π)}
, {∅}.
The last equality indicates thatx is a strategy distribution that is Nash for the constant payoff
gameπ. Note that this has little to do with the traditional notion of Nash equilibria because






































Multiply these terms and use that






























Each summand in the second term in the RHS has the same sign as (ẋp)′πp or is zero
because eachτpi ≥ 0. It was shown in [89] that acuteness ofτ implies that ( ˙x
p)′πp > 0
whenever ˙xp , 0 (positive correlation). Therefore
L̇EPT ≤ ẋ
′π̇ = u′y,
as required. We claim the inequality binds precisely on the set L−1EPT(0). We have that ˙x = 0
on L−1EPT(0) andL̇EPT(x, π) = 0 whenever ˙x = 0. Outside ofL
−1
EPT(0) we have1
′τp(π̂p) > 0 and
(ẋp)′πp > 0, proving the claim.
The next section combines the results of the previous two sections to recover the known
convergence properties of separable, acute EPT dynamics instable games.
5.5.1 Interconnections
In order to realize traditional games/dynamics we restrict ourselves to initializations that
assign the same strategy distributions to both the game and dy amics subsystems. The
payoffs, residing only in the dynamics subsystem, are initializedso as to match the initial
strategy distribution. Formally, we consider initializations from the invariant set
MG,D = {(xG, π, xD) : xG = xD ∈ X, π = F(x)}.
We trivially have 0∈ UMG,D(v) for all v ∈ MG,D.
Combining the storage functions of stable games and separable, acute EPT dynamics
restricted to the proposed invariant set and applying the natural dimensional reduction gives
zero level set for the combined storage function
(LEPT + 0)
−1(0)∩MG,D = NE(F),
corresponding to precisely the set of Nash equilibria of thestable game. Theorems 5.3.1 -
5.5.1 provide an alternative proof of the following known result, reworded below.
Theorem 5.5.2 (Hofbauer and Sandholm [15]) The positive-feedback interconnection of a
C1 stable game F and separable, acute EPT dynamics admits the globally asymptotically
stable set NE(F).
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Proof: Verification of the boundedness requirement of Theorem 5.3.1 is the only step
needed to prove the theorem, since strictMG,D-passivity has already been established
above. SinceMG,D ⊂ X × Rn × X, π satisfyπ = F(x), x ∈ X and F is a continuous
function over a compact set, boundedness follows.
The advantage of the present formulation is that the passivity inequality gives a suf-
ficient condition for converge to equilibrium in stable games. In particular we see that
positive correlation need not be satisfied. Instead, we check the correlation between the
inner product of the time derivative terms ˙x andπ̇. Indeed it had already been shown that
positive correlation in an excess payoff dynamic not satsifying integrability could lead to
cycling in some stable games [15]. In addition, the perturbed st response dynamics, a
class of dynamics not satisfying positive correlation, do achieve global convergence in sta-
ble games [80]. We will illustrate passivity of perturbed best response dynamics, as well as
a third family of dynamics known as pairwise comparison dynamics, below. First, we offer
a decision theoretic interpretation of the passivity inequality for the learning subsystem.
We borrow from the game theoretic interpretation of stable games.
5.5.2 Interpreting the passivity inequality
Inspection ofL−1EPT(0) reveals the basic action of the EPT dynamics. In essence,EPT dy-
namics act as a greedy optimizer. If no exogenous input is supplied (i.e. π̇ = 0), then EPT
dynamics will eventually ensure that only strategies enjoyi g maximum payoff among their
population will be utilized. The passivity of EPT dynamics did not make any assumptions
on π̇. In particular,π̇ need not be generated from interconnection with a game. We will
exploit this property later by generalizing the game subsystem.
The passivity inequality for the EPT dynamics can be given aninterpretation that bor-
rows from the interpretation proposed for stable games. AtL−1EPT(0), all populations are
content. We can thus think ofLEPT as a metric of discontent, although obviously it is not
a true metric. The passivity inequality says that the growthra e of agents’ discontent is
always less than the instantaneous self-enforcing externalities, ẋ′π̇. These are the negative
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of self-defeating externalities. This guarantee is independent of the procedure generating ˙π.
If the source of ˙π is interconnection with a stable game, then instantaneous self-enforcing
externalities are zero and so our metric of discontent does nt grow at all!
To see this more clearly, consider anM-passive system with storage functionL. Sup-
pose that there exists a strictly increasing function
α : R+ → R+







≤ L(z), ∀z ∈ Y.
We then haveα−1(L(z)) as an upper bound on the distance fromL−1(0), along with an upper
bound on the growth rate ofL. In this case, the boundedness requirements in Theorem 5.3.1
can be dispensed with. Since the payoff trajectory need not be confined to any compact set,
we see that the passivity inequality provides guarantees evn for scenarios that do not arise
from interconnection with subsystems induced by games.
We show that such a function exists for acute, separable EPT dynamics and a single
population with unit mass. The extension to multiple populations is straightforward. Let
k̂ = argmaxk π̂k. Then we can lower bound the largest excess payoff term























||(x, π) − ζ ||
)2
Let µ(x, π) = minζ∈L−1
EPT
(0) ||(x, π) − ζ ||, then
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The notion of considering performance guarantees for evolutionary learning dynamics
faced with an arbitrary stream of payoffs is also found in [90], where replicator dynamics
are shown to possess the asymptotic no regret property, alsosee [91].
The next section establishes passivity of two additional families of learning dynamics:
pairwise comparison dynamics and perturbed best response dy amics.
5.6 Other passive dynamics
5.6.1 Pairwise comparison dynamics









where theφpi j : R→ R+ are Lipschitz continuous switch rates that depend only on pairwise































then they are passive.




















having zero level-set{(π, x) : x ∈ NE(π)}.
The proof of Theorem 5.6.1 is a straightforward extension ofthe proofs of Theorem
5.5.1 and the proof of Theorem 7.1 in [15]. Global asymptotics ability of NE(F) upon
interconnection with a stable game is then immediate, providing a slightly different proce-
dure for arriving at Theorem 7.1 in [15]. The novelty of course i that pairwise comparison
dynamics are stable upon interconnection with any passive subsy tem, a property we will
illustrate later.
Thus far we have considered only dynamics satisfying positive correlation. In the next
section we consider perturbed best response dynamics, which do not satisfy positive corre-
lation.
5.6.2 Perturbed best response dynamics
Like the other dynamics we have considered, perturbed best response dynamics admit glob-
ally asymptotically stable rest points under stable games.Unlike the other dynamics, per-
turbed best response dynamice do not satisfy positive correlation. While they do satisfy
an analogue known as virtual positive correlation, this section identifies perturbed best re-
sponse dynamics as yet another passive dynamic. Thus perturbed best response dynamics
support the contention that the essential correlation is that implied by the passivity in-
equality. The analysis is again almost entirely borrowed, with the novel insight being the
identification of passivity as the unifying property sharedby dynamics known to guarantee
global convergence in stable games.
A perturbed best response dynamics is the EPT dynamic obtained whenτp is theper-
turbed maximizer functioñMp : Rn
p




wherevp : int(∆p)→ R is differentiably strictly convex and infinitely steep at the boundary
of ∆p for eachp4. As an example, the logit dynamics are obtained whenvp is the negated































{(π, x) : xp = mp argmax
y∈int(∆p)
(y′πp − vp(y))}.
Proof: The storage functionLPBR(x, π) is clearly non-negative because each term in the


































That the set argmaxy∈int(∆p)(y
′πp − vp(y)) is a singleton follows from strict convexity of
vp, establishing thatL−1PBR(0) is as described in the theorem. The passivity inequalitythen
follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [80] after replacingF(x) with π. 
Further analysis shows that perturbed best response dynamics converge to the unique
perturbed equilibriumPE(F) [80] in stable games. The perturbed equilibrium is a singleton
that approximatesNE(F) when the perturbation is concentrated near the origin.




In this section we consider learning dynamics that are less myopic than the standard exam-
ples we have considered thus far. In particular, we examine the consequences of players’
utilizing either smoothed versions of the payoffs, or payoffs augmented with an additive
term that approximates the time-derivative of the payoffs. Each of these modifications cap-
tures the application of some form of forecasting heuristicto the payoffs. In each case we
show that for games having affine payoffs F(x) = Ax+ b, with A negative definite, neither
anticipation or smoothing have any consequences for globalstability of passive learning
dynamics. The prototype for this class of games is congestion games with affine, strictly
increasing costs and non-singular utilization matrices. Later on we consider some general-
izations of these heuristics.
A potential source of confusion is that we will be analyzing the properties of subsystems
we had previously identified with the “game”. This is for mathematical convenience. The
dynamic learning rules are arrived at by applying a standardlearning dynamic (e.g. EPT)
to modified payoffs π̃. Our approach is to derive passivity results for modified “game”
subsystems that map action trajectories to modified payoff trajectories. Interconnection
with a passive learning dynamic then implies convergence results. Thus the problem of
finding a class of games for which dynamic learning rules are well behaved can be cast as
the problem of finding games that induce modified subsystems that are passive.
5.7.1 Smoothed learning
Suppose thatF(x) = Ax+ b, then we define thesmoothed learning subsystem induced by
F as
π̇ = Au
y = ˙̃π = ǫ(π − π̃).
The term ˙x = u is no longer needed becauseDF(x) = A is now independent ofF. The
operational payoffs π̃ track the usual payoffsπ, reflecting a state of affairs in which players
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utilize smoothed versions of a nominal payoff stream. Given a nominal payoff stream






The operational payoff π̃ is an exponentially weighted moving average ofπwith smoothing
factorǫ > 0. These sort of moving averages are naive yet popular heuristics used to smooth
out short term fluctuations in order to isolate longer term trends. Alternatively, smoothing
may be unavoidable when the players can only process information subject to bandwitdth
limitations.
For games withA < 0 we find that this form of payoff smoothing admits passive sys-
tems.
Theorem 5.7.1 Let F(x) = Ax+ b with A negative definite. Then the smoothed learning
subsystem induced by F is strictlyR2n-anti-passive with storage function
Lsl(π, π̃) = −
ǫ
2
(π − π̃)′A−1(π − π̃),
having zero level set{(π, π̃) ∈ R2n : π = π̃}.
Proof: ClearlyL−1
sl
(0) is as described. We procede to verify the passivity inequality.
L̇sl(π, π̃) = −ǫ(π − π̃)
′A−1(π̇ − ˙̃π)
= − ˙̃π′(ẋ− A−1 ˙̃π)
= − ˙̃π′ ẋ+ ˙̃π′A−1 ˙̃π
≤ − ˙̃π′ ẋ = −u′y.

An immediate corollary of Theorem 5.7.1 is that any learningdynamic obtained from
an admissible passive dynamic with smooth measurement of pay ffs has a stable equilib-
rium. Indeed, for the standard dynamics we have studied global asymptotic stability of the
applicable equilibrium set is guaranteed.
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Theorem 5.7.2 Let F = Ax + b with A < 0 and consider the interconnection of the
smoothed learning subsystem induced by F and either separable, cute EPT dynamics
or impartial paiwise comparison dynamics. Then initializat ons from the invariant set
MG,D = {(πG, π̃G, πD, xD) : πG = F(xD), πD = π̃G},
admit, using the natural dimensional reduction, the globally smyptotically stable set NE(F).
Proof: We first check that the invariant setMG,D, is the right one. It is straightforward to
verify that the overall system reduces to the correct system
ẋ = VDπ̃ (x)
˙̃π = ǫ(F(x) − π̃),
whereD ∈ {EPT, PC}. Also, 0 ∈ UMG,D(v) for all v ∈ MG,D, as required. Boundedness of
the set of solutions follows from the arguments given in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2 and




is globally asymptotically stable. This set is equivalent to
{(πG, π̃G, xD, πD) : πD = π̃G = πG = F(xD), xD ∈ NE(πD)},
which, under the natural dimensional reduction gives precisely the setNE(F). 
An analogous result can be developed for perturbed best response dynamics. To avoid
redundancy, we will mostly avoid providing any more arguments of this form. Instead we
will stop at demonstrating passivity of the subsystems we study, with the understanding
that stability results can then be easily verified. We next consider anticipatory learning.
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5.7.2 Anticipatory learning
Consider the following dynamic system, induced by an affine gameF(x) = Ax+ b.
π̇ = Au
λ̇ = ǫ(π − λ)
y = ˙̃π = π̇ + γ ˙̇λ = A(1+ γǫ)u− γǫ2(π − λ).
We call this theanticipatory learning subsystem induced by F. The intention is that players
respond to an augmented payoff π̃ = π + γω, whereω is an estimate of ˙π andγ > 0 is the
relative weight given toω. In the system above, the quantityλ̇ provides the estimate of ˙π
via an approximate differentiator. The fidelity of the approximation is controlledby ǫ > 0,
with larger values providing better estimates.
The concept of anticipatory learning was introduced in [92], and is inspired by classical
methods in automatic control as well as the psychological tendency to extrapolate from
past trends. In [92], players are able to observe their opponents’ strategies and then use
anticipatory learning to estimate their opponents’ futurest ategy. The players then respond
according to either fictitious play or gradient play. Here, we do not presume that players
can observe their opponents’ actions. The players use anticipatory learning to produce
estimates of future payoffs. We study the stability properties of the overall system obtained
when players respond to the augmented payoffs using passive dynamics.
For affine games withA negative definite, we find that anticipatory learning has no
consequences for passive dynamics.
Theorem 5.7.3 Let F(x) = Ax+ b with A negative definite. Then the anticipatory learning
subsystem induced by F is strictlyR2n-anti-passive with storage function
Lal(π, λ) = −
γ2ǫ3
4+ 2γǫ
(π − λ)′A−1(π − λ),




(0) is as described, and closed. We procede to verify the passivity in-













































































The storage functionLal is valid for anyγ, ǫ > 0, so that passivity is guaranteed regard-
less of the weight given to the approximate derivative or thefid lity of the approximation.
The next two sections provide passivity results for more general forecasting heuristics.
5.7.3 Linear dynamic learning
For the cases of smooth and anticipatory learning we found explicit storage functions for
subsystems induced by affine games with negative definiteA matrices. In this section we
consider the more general case of linear dynamic learning. Suppose that the augmented
payoffs are arrived at by filtering the nominal payoffs (and their time derivatives) with a
linear time-invariant system
ω̇ = M1ω + M2(π − π̂) + B1π̇
˙̂π = M3ω + M4(π − π̂) + B2π̇
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Once again, ˆπ are the augmented payoffs that will serve as the input to the dynamics sub-
system. The auxiliary statesω ∈ Rp are “internal states” of the dynamic learning process
and only impact decision making through ˆπ. Anticipatory learning, smooth learning, stan-
dard learning (i.e. ˆπ = π), and weighted averages of the three forms are all instancesof
this class of payoff augmentations. Recall that a payoff augmentation is a primitive that
induces dynamic learning in the original game when interconnected with a learning sub-
system. It is for mathematical convenience that we lump the payoff augmentation into the
game subsystem.
The overall game subsystem is then given by
π̇ = Au
ω̇ = M1ω + M2(π − π̂) + B1Au
˙̂π = M3ω + M4(π − π̂) + B2Au
y = ˙̂π.
Verifying if a system of this form is passive is challenging igeneral. However, because
this system is linear time-invariant, passivity can often bverified using a computationally
efficient procedure. Linear systems possessing the property ofpositive realness5 are pas-
sive. A linear system is positive real if and only if an associated system of linear matrix
inequalities (LMI) has a feasible point.
5We will not formally define positive realness here because wewill be able to construct sufficient con-
ditions for passivity and prove their correctness without doing so. Formal treatments can be found in many
standard texts such as [79].
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Due to the linearity of the system, if an appropriate storagefunction exists for the
system then its domain can always be taken to be all ofR2n+P. As with our earlier ex-
amples, we are concerned with stability properties of the Nash equilibria of the “one-
shot” game. Therefore, we seek to verify passivity with respect to the equilibrium set
{(π, π̂, ω) : π = π̂, ω = 0}. Establishing global convergence upon interconnection with
a learning subsystem (e.g. impartial pairwise comparison dynamics) then follows from
arguments that are nearly identical to those given in Theorem 5.7.2. The following theo-
rem provides a sufficient condition for passivity of subsystems induced by linear dynamic
learning payoff augmentations of affine games.
Theorem 5.7.4 A system induced by linear dynamic learning in an affine game isR2n+p-
anti-passive with respect to the equilibrium set{(π, π̂, ω) : π = π̂, ω = 0} if there exists












PM̂ + M̂′P PB̂+ Ĉ′
















































Moreover, if a strictly feasible solution to (69) exists then the system is strictlyR2n+p-anti-
passive.
Proof: First, we perform a change of coordinates that reduces the stat pace toRn+p and







y = ĉz+ B2u,
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which is equivalent to our original system in the sense that,given any inputu, the two
systems produce precisely the same outputy. Suppose that the conditions of the theorem
are satisfied. What remains is to show that the modified systemis Rn+p-anti-passive with
respect to the origin. Use the storage functionLldl(z) = 12z
′Pz, so thatL̇ldl + u′y
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The conditions of Theorem 5.7.4 are necesarry and sufficient conditions for positive
realness, a property of the Fourier domain representation of the system. However, they are
only sufficient conditions for passivity. The appeal of Theorem 5.7.4is that it provides a
condition that is efficiently checkable using widely available software packages.
The next section considers dynamic learning based on payoff ugmentations that are
nonlinear.
5.7.4 Nonlinear dynamic learning
Consider the following dynamic system, induced by an affine gameF(x) = Ax+ b,
π̇ = Au
˙̂πi = ψi(π − π̂) i = 1, 2, ..., n
y = ˙̂π,
where for everyi, ψi : R → R is Lipschitz continuous, nondecreasing, and satisfies
ψ−1i (0) = {0}. We furnish two examples.
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−βi , y ≤ −α
βi
α
y, −α < y ≤ α
βi , y ≥ α
, (70)
where eachβi > 0. Obseve that
lim
α→0
ψi(y) = βi sgn(y),
so that for smallα theψi approximately correspond to players discretizing the timederiva-
tives of the payoffs so that|π̇i | ∈ {0, βi} for each i. That is, they believe that when payoffs
change they must do so at the constant rates given by theβi. It is straightforward to constuct
ψi that implement more finely grained approximate discretizations of the payoffs’ rates of
change, including asymetric discretizations whereψi(y) , ψi(−y). §
Example 5.7.2 (Heterogeneous smoothing)Suppose thatψi(y) = ǫiy for each i so that
players perform smoothed learning, but with different smoothing factors for each strat-
egy. Despite this case being an instance of linear dynamic learning, it was not covered by
Theorem 5.7.1.§
For a restricted class of games we find that the sometimes bizarre biases captured by
nonlinear payoff augmentations have no consequences for global convergencewhen inter-
connected with passive learning dynamics.
Theorem 5.7.5 Let F(x) = Ax+ b with A = diag(a1, ..., an) negative definite. Then the
system induced by F under nonlinear dynamic learning is strictly R2n-anti-passive with
storage function























= −u′y+ y′A−1y ≤ −u′y.

In the next section we examine the consequences of dynamics in the assignment of
payoffs.
5.8 Dynamic games
The interconnection of a passive earning dynamic with a subsystem induced by a stable
game is stable. However, since any passive subsystem is stablized by passive dynamics,
we can identify subsystems not induced by games in the traditional sense that will also be
stable under passive dynamics. In particular, we consider games with memory. That is,
strategic environments where payoffs are allowed to depend on not just current play, but
potentially the entire history of play. Both differential games and Markov games possess
this feature. The equilibrium notions in those settings aremore sophisticated than the “one-
shot” equilibria studied in population games due to the moreelaborate policy spaces that
players are assumed to utilize. We instead study the stability of fixed points of dynamic
games under myopic passive dynamics. This sort of mildly dynamic game environment is
similar to the state based potential games [93]. In our framework, the game dynamics are
a nuisance—players’ strategic decisions are predicated onwhere actions and payoffs have
been, not where they might go. The dynamic games we consider will again be induced by
static games that are affine in the strategy distribution, that isF(x) = Ax+ b.
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5.8.1 Smooth measurement of actions
Consider the following dynamic system,
ẋ = u
˙̃x = ǫ(x̃− x)
y = ˙̃π = Aǫ(x̃− x),
which we call the subsystem induced byF under smooth measurement of actions. The
operational strategy distribution ˜x ∈ X is a smoothed version of the true strategy distribution
x. The parameterǫ > 0 controls the weighting of actions in the more distant past relative to
more recent ones. The payoffs awarded are based on the operational strategy distribution.
This framework models smooth assignment of payoffs. That is, the game “remembers”
where the strategy distribution was in the past and only slowly updates it’s estimate of the
strategy distribution used in assigning payoffs.
We leave it as a simple exercise for the reader to verify that if x andx̃ are each initialized
in X, then x̃ remains inX as long asx does. We find that for a restriced class of games,
smooth action measurement has no consequences for the stability of passive dynamics.
Theorem 5.8.1 Let F(x) = Ax+b with A symmetric and negative semidefinite with respect
to TX. Then the system induced by F under smooth measurement of actions is X× X-anti-
passive with storage function




having zero level-set{(x, x̃) : x = x̃}. Moreover, if A is negative definite with respect to TX
then the system is strictly X× X-anti-passive.
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Proof:
L̇smp = −ǫ(x− x̃)
′A(ẋ− ˙̃x)
= − ˙̃π′(ẋ− ˙̃x)
= − ˙̃π′ ẋ+ ˙̃x′A ˙̃x
≤ − ˙̃π′ ẋ = −u′y,
noting that the inequality is strict forz < L−1smp(0). 
The proof of Theorem 5.8.1 is of course very similar to that ofTheorem 5.7.1. We
can similarly define dynamic games with anticipatory payoff assignment, as well as linear
and non-linear generalizations in the manner of Theorem 5.7.4 and Theorem 5.7.5. In each
case, demonstration of passivity is a straightforward extension of the arguments for the
corresponding dynamic learning scheme
All of these dynamic learning schemes and dynamic games entail some form of memory
of past payoffs or actions through the presence of auxiliary states in the syst m. In the next
section we consider a more direct notion of memory. That is, games and dynamics whose
evolution is allowed to depend explicitly on prior actions and states.
5.9 Time delays
In this section we propose methods allowing for global convergence to equilibrium in the
presence of time delays, also referred to as information lags. The prospect of time delays
destabilizing an interior ESS under replicator dynamics isstudied in [94]. A similar anal-
ysis is carried out for discrete time replicator dynamics in[95]. The region of stability for
replicator dynamics in the multiple access game and hawk-dove game under asymmetric
delays is characterized in [96]. The emergence of cycling behavior in congestion games
with binary choices under discrete time dynamics subject totime delays is studied in [97].
We begin our discussion with a brief review of the theory of reta ded functional differential
equations.
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5.9.1 Retarded functional differential equations
Let C([−T, 0],Rq) denote the set of continuous functions mapping the interval [−T, 0] into




along with the associated Banach space
C̄([−T, 0],Rq) = {z ∈ C([−T, 0],Rq) : ||z|| is finite}.
Let D be a subset ofR × C([−T, 0],Rq), f : D → Rq, and let “·” represent the right-hand
derivative, then we call
ż(t) = f (t, zt) (71)
a retarded functional differential equation(RFDE) onD. This form of course includes
ordinary differential equations. IfΩ ⊂ D is open,f : Ω → Rq is continuous andf (t, φ) is
Lipschitz continuous inφ when restricted to any compact subset ofΩ then there is a unique
solution on some interval to the initial value problem corresponding to (71) for any (σ, φ) ∈
Ω. This fact follows from the Schauder fixed point theorem, see[98]. Global existence
of solutions however is not in general guaranteed and the existence of non-continuable
solutions follows from Zorn’s lemma. Appropriate Lyapunovarguments will be introduced
later towards that end. Whenf depends onzt evaluated at only finitely many points−T ≤
τ1, ..., τl < 0, many authors write simply
ż(t) = f (t, z(t), z(t − τ1), ..., z(t − τl)), (72)
to emphasize that the right-hand derivative depends on the usual state as well as a lagged
version of that state, as opposed to the entire infinite-dimensional statezt ∈ C([−T, 0],Rq).
As before in the finite-dimensional setting, we will supposethat the non-autonomous (i.e.
time varying) component of the system is supplied by some exog n us inputu so that
ż(t) = f (zt, u(t)), (73)
y(t) = h(zt(0), u(t)) (74)
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whereu ∈ U and the system outputh : Rq × Rp → Rq are continuous. We will sometimes
refer tou : [0,∞) → C([−T, 0],Rp), i.e. in functional form, in order to describe depen-
dencies on lagged inputs. Lyapunov stability (and hence passivity) can be extended to this
setting.
5.9.2 Passivity of RFDE’s
The passivity definitions in this section will follow those in Section 5.3.1. As before, we
will want to accommodate restrictions on the set of inputs aswell as the possibility of
equilibrium sets. We start withM ⊂ C([−T, 0],Rq) and define an input space
UM(v) , {u ∈ U : z
0 = v⇒ zt ∈ M, ∀ t ≥ 0},
wherezt, t ∈ [0,∞) is a solution to the initial value problem (73) forv ∈ M. These are
the inputs that keep the state of the system inM when the system is initialized atz0 = v.
Suppose thatUM(v) , {∅} for all v ∈ M. LetA ⊂ M be closed and letY ⊂ M be a
neighborhood ofA. Further, suppose that there exists a continuous functionL : Y → R+
with L−1(0) = A such that
L̇(zt) ≤ σu(t)′y(t) − δ||y(t)||2, ∀ z(t) ∈ Y (75)
and
∀ u ∈ UM(z
0),
whereδ ≥ 0, and “·′′ refers to the right upper Dini derivative (assumed to be finite and
measurable), namely








Then we say that the system isM-passiveif σ = 1 andM-anti-passiveif σ = −1. If the
inequality (75) is strict then the system isstrictlyM-passive ifσ = 1 andstrictlyM-anti-
passive ifσ = −1. If δ ≥ 1 then we say the system isoutput strictlyM-(anti)-passive.
Theorem 5.3.1 can be extended to this setting.
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Theorem 5.9.1 Suppose an RFDE system isM-passive orM-anti-passive with storage
function L and0 ∈ UM(v) for all v ∈ M and consider solutions to the autonomous system
ż = f (zt, 0). If given any bounded setΩ ⊂ Y there exists a compact setΓ(Ω) such that
z0 ∈ Ω implies zt ∈ Γ(Ω) for all t ≥ 0 then L−1(0) is Lyapunov stable. If, in addition,
the RFDE system is strictlyM-passive or strictlyM-anti-passive thenA is asymptotically
stable and globally asymptotically stable ifY =M.
Proof: Givenǫ > 0 andζ ∈ A, chooser ∈ (0, ǫ] such that
Br(A) = {z ∈ C([−T, 0],R
q) : min
ξ∈A
||ξ − z|| ≤ r} ⊂ Y.
Let
Qr(A, ζ) = {z ∈ Γ (Br(ζ)) : min
ξ∈A
||ξ − z|| = r}.




let β ∈ (0, α), and let
Ωr,β(ζ) = {z ∈ Γ (Br(ζ)) : L(z) ≤ β}.
The setΩr,β(ζ) must be in the interior ofBr(A) becauseβ < α. If z0 ∈ Ωr,β(ζ) thenzt ∈
Ωr,β(ζ) for all t ≥ 0, for otherwise there existsτ > 0 such thatzτ is in Qr(A, ζ), implying
L(zτ) ≥ α, which contradictṡL ≤ 0. Now, letδ satisfyBδ(ζ) ⊂ Ωr,β(ζ) so that
z0 ∈ Bδ(ζ)⇒ z
t ∈ Ωr,β(ζ) ⊂ Br(A) ⊂ Bǫ(A),
as required. Next, assume the system is strictlyM-passive or strictlyM-anti-passive.
Arguments given above indicate that for anya > 0 we can chooseb > 0 such that
Ωr,b(ζ) ⊂ Ba(A), so it is sufficient to show thatL(zt) → 0 as t → ∞. SinceL(zt) is
monotonically decreasing and bounded from below by 0, it must have a limitc ≥ 0 as
t → ∞. We reason by contradiction thatc = 0. Supposec > 0. Continuity ofL implies that
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there existsd > 0 such thatΩr,β(ζ) − Ωr,c(ζ) lies outside ofBd(A), so thatL(zt) → c > 0
implies thatzt is outside ofBd(A) for all t ≥ 0. Let
Er,d(ζ) = {z ∈ Γ (Br(ζ)) : min
ξ∈A






L(zt) ≤ L(z0) − γt,
which contradictsc > 0 since the right-hand side must eventually become negative. For
global asymptotic stability supposec = L(z0) then there existsr > 0 such thatΩ0,c(z0) ⊂
Br(A) and the rest of the proof is similar to that given for asymptotic stability.
The boundedness requirements of Theorem 5.9.1 are not necessary, but are met by
the examples considered in this paper. The functionL must satisfy additional conditions
if one wishes to provide a passivity definition that leads to stability without additional
boundedness assumptions. We can also give an analog of Theorem 5.3.2.
Consider the positive-feedback interconnection of two system that are, respectively,
M1-anti-passive with storage functionL1 andM2-passive with storage functionL2.
e1 = −u1 + h2(z2, e2)
e2 = u2 + h1(z1, e1).
In order to extendM-passivity to the interconnection in a meaningful way, we must
identify a non-empty setM12 ⊂ M1 ×M2 so that, for the overall system, 0∈ UM12(v) for
all v ∈ M12.
Theorem 5.9.2 The positive-feedback interconnection of two RFDE systemshat are, re-
spectively,M1-anti-passive with storage function L1 andM2-passive with storage function
L2, isM12-passive with storage function L12(z1, z2) = L1(z1) + L2(z2).
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The proof is again just a straight application of the classical passivity theorem. For
the examples we consider, stability results follow once we show compactness ofM12 and
apply Theorem 5.9.1.
If the two systems exhibit, respectively, output strictM-anti-passivity, and output strict
M-passivity, then passivity follows even for delayed interconnections. In particular, sup-
pose that the two systems are interconnected as










which we refer to as the (T1,T2)-interconnection of the two systems, whereT1,T2 ≥ 0 and
without loss of generalityT1 + T2 ≤ T. Some authors write these equations as
e1(t) = −u1(t) + y2(t − T2)
e2(t) = u2(t) + y1(t − T1),
to emphasize that each systems input is the sum of the exogenous i putui and the lagged
output of the other system. We will follow this latter conventio to conserve notation. The
reader should be advised however that (T1,T2)-interconnection will in general require us to
redefineT so thatzti(−Ti) is meaningful for eachi. We once again assume these equations
have unique solutions for all (z1, z2, u1, u2). The (T1,T2)-interconnection does not preserve
passivity in general. However, the following result, a slightly modified version of Theorem
2 in [99], provides for passivity of the (T1,T2)-interconnection given that the two systems
exhibit their appropriate forms of output strict passivity.
Theorem 5.9.3 The (T1,T2)-interconnection of two RFDE systems that are, respectively,
output strictlyM1-anti-passive with storage function L1 and output strictlyM2-passive













= − (−u1(t) + y2(t − T2))
′ y1(t) − ||y1(t)||
2 + (u2(t) + y1(t − T1)))
′ y2(t) − ||y2(t)||
2
=u(t)′y(t) − y2(t − T2)




























































where the second inequality follows from the polarization identity and the third inequality





















Givenu(t), t ≥ 0 and a solution (zt1, z
t
2), t ≥ 0 and anyτ ≥ 0 we have that for anyh ≥ 0
L1(z
t+h
1 ) + L2(z
t+h









sinceLchannel ≥ 0. This fact relies on the fundamental theorem of calculus for Dini deriva-
tives. What is required is that the theLi , i = 1, 2 are continuous with finite Dini derivatives
that are integrable in the sense of Riemann, Lebesgue, or Denjoy-Perron, see [100]. The
above expression will be familiar to many as the integral form of passivity. Substituting
u = 0 gives a monotonically non-increasing Lyapunov function from which stability re-
sults follow. In order to complete the proof of the theorem wemust recover the differential
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u(t + c(h))′y(t + c(h)) = u(t)′y(t),
where the exisence ofc(h) ∈ (0, h) satisfying the last equality follows from the mean value
theorem.
The next section introduces a class of learning dynamics formulated as RFDE’s.
5.9.3 T-contrarian dynamics
In our earlier examples of dynamic learning, players’ substitution of augmented payoffs
for nominal payoffs was described within the game subsystem. This was for mathetical
convenience— players implemented dynamic learning schemes by employing traditional
static learning schemes “as if” their incentives were described by the augmented payoffs.
Here, we will find it more convenient to describe the payoff augmentation in the dynamics
subsystem directly. In particular, suppose that players peceive advantages in avoiding
strategies that have seen net increase in usage during the most immediateT seconds. This
is consistent with each agent maintaining a contrarian disposition with respect to the other
agents in her population. These percieved incentives are incorporated into the decision-
making framework via payoff augmentation
π̂ = π − (x(t) − x(t − T)),
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with the players then reacting to the augmented payoffs. Formally, given a nominal evolu-
tionary dynamic of the usual form
π̇ = u
ẋ = Vπ(x)
y = ẋ = Vπ(x)
we define theT-contrarian subsystem induced by Vas








y(t) = ẋ(t) = Vπ̂t(0)(x
t(0)),
where (xt, π̂t) ∈ C̄([−T, 0],Rn × X).
TheT-contrarian augmentation preserves passivity.
Theorem 5.9.4 If V is a (strictly)Rn × X-passive dynamics subsystem with storage func-
tion LV having a zero level set containing only equilibrium points,then the T-contrarian










having zero level set
{(πt, xt) : (πt(θ), xt(θ)) = (π̄, x̄) ∈ L−1V (0) ∀θ ∈ [−T, 0]}.
Proof: The storage functionLV satisfies
L̇V(π(t), x(t)) ≤ (u(t) + y(t − T) − y(t))
′ y(t).
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||y(t − T)||2 + ||y(t)||2 − ||y(t − T) − y(t)||2
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and the last equality follows from Liebniz’s rule. The functional Lchannel is clearly non-
negative and equal to zero on the set described at the end of the theorem becauseL−1V (0)
contains only equilibrium points so thatVπ̂t(s)(xt(s)) = 0 for s ∈ [−T, 0] whenever ˆπt, xt take
only constant values inL−1V (0). 
The proof of Theorem 5.9.4 was again similar to [99]. Inspection of the zero level set
indicates that the infinite-dimensional system induced byT-contrarian tendencies contin-
ues to be passive in the appropriate sense with respect to theoriginal equilibrium set, with
the points in that set extended to constant-valued functions. Theorem 5.9.4 is conservative
in thatT-contrarian augmentation preserves passivity even when the form of the learning
dynamic is more general. For instance, the theorem goes throug even if the dynamic uti-
lizes additional auxiliary states beyondπ andx. Furthermore, RFDE learning dynamics can
also be accommodated, the simplest example of which is dynamics arrived at by repeated
T-contrarian augmentation.
Theorem 5.9.4 says that, from the perspective of passivity,T-contrarian tendencies are
without consequence. Guarantees that apply to passive dynamics, such as global conver-
gence to equlibrium in game subsystems induced by stable gams, will generally apply to
their T-contrarian counterparts. In particular, consider Theorem 5.9.1, the analog of theo-
rem 5.3.1 for RFDE systems. To establish thatT-contrarian augmentation of evolutionary
dynamics satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5.9.1 (and henceare stable), we must show
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that for any bounded setΩ ⊂ C̄([−T, 0],Rn × X) there exists a compact set setΓ(Ω) such
thatz0 ∈ Ω implieszt ∈ Γ(Ω) for all t ≥ 0. GivenΩ, let S(Ω) ⊂ C̄([−T, 0],Rn × X) be the
states visited by solutions originating inΩ. Boundedness ofS(Ω) clearly follows from the























Of course, bounded subsets ofC̄([−T, 0],Rn × X) are not necessarily contained in compact
subsets ofC̄([−T, 0],Rn × X)6. However, we find thatcl(S(Ω)) is indeed compact. To see
this, we make use of the following result (simplified slightly for our purposes), which is
classical.
Theorem 5.9.5 (Arzela-Ascoli) If a subset of̄C([−T, 0],Rn × X) is equicontinuous and
bounded then its closure is compact.
A subset ofC̄([−T, 0],Rn × X) is equicontinuousif given θ ∈ [−T, 0] andǫ > 0 there
exists a neighbourhoodU of θ such that||g(θ) − g(φ)|| < ǫ for all φ ∈ U and allg in the
subset. Equicontinuity ofS(Ω) follows from boundedness of ˙x and ˙̂π, which implies that
Γ(Ω) = cl(S(Ω)) suffices.
Intuitively, T-contrarian tendencies are sensible in settings where players prefer to be
isolated in their strategy choices, such as congestion games. All else being equal, strategies
that have seen a net increase in usage over the most recentT seconds are less attractive
than strategies that have seen less of an increase or a decrease over the same period. Such
behavior is especially advantageous when payoffs are delayed. This is because the disutility
caused by the recent uptick in usage is not yet reflected in theobs rved payoffs. In a
class of games including certain congestion games with increasing costs we find that these
intuitions translate into a concrete guarantee, describedbelow.
6Recall non-compactness of the unit ball.
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Theorem 5.9.6 The(0,T)interconnection of
• a C1game subsystem with all eigenvalues of DF(x) in [−2,−1] for all x ∈ X
• a T-contrarian dynamic subsystem induced by a strictly X×Rn-passive evolutionary
dynamic V,









• πt(θ) = F(xt
G
(θ)) ∀θ ∈ [−T, 0]





Consequently the system admits the globally asymptotically stable set
{π̃t = πt = π̄ ∈ Rn, xtD = x̄ ∈ X s.t.(x̄, π̄) ∈ L
−1
V (0)}.
Since the statement of Theorem 5.9.6 is a bit cumbersome, we first attempt to clarify. Theo-
rem 5.9.6 essentially says that if players augment their payoffs withT-contrarian tendencies
and then employ a standard passive dynamic on the augmented payoffs, then they will con-
verge to equilibrium in the specified games, even if they experience delays in receiving the
true payoffs. What is required is that the lookback periodT match the time delayT that
the payoffs are subject to. Additionally, the restriction on the eigenvalues ofDF(x) ensures
that payoffs are not either too sensitive or too insensitive to strategychanges. The class of
games covered by the theorem includes certain congestion games with increasing costs.
By substituting into the equations for the dynamic and game subsystems according to
the relations specified byMG,D it can be verified that the overall system is simply
ẋ(t) = Vπ̂(x(t)),
as claimed. Furthermore, the equilibrium set is just the natural extension of the equilibrium
set of V itself. Thus with separable, acute EPT dynamics for instance, players achieve
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global congvergence to precisely the setNE(F), while with logit they would converge to
PE(F). All the infinite-dimensional states converge to constantfu ctions that correspond
to Nash or perturbed equilibria of the underlying game exactly.
Proof of Theorem 5.9.6:Our technique is to first show that this interconnection can
be transformed into a (0,T)-interconnection of two modified subsystems, each exhibiting
their respective forms of output strict passivity, and thenapply Theorem 5.9.3.
Step 1: Transform the systems.Consider the game subsystem given by
ẋ(t) = u(t)
π̇(t) = DF(x(t))u(t)
y(t) = π̇(t) + ẋ(t) = (DF(x(t)) + I )u(t)
along with the dynamics subsystem given by,
˙̃π(t) = u(t) − Vπ̃(t)(x(t))
ẋ(t) = Vπ̂(t)(x(t))
y(t) = ẋ(t) = Vπ̂(t)(x(t)).
The (0,T)-interconnection of these two finite dimensional systems is equivalent to the in-
terconnection described in the theorem. We will use the subscript G̃ andD̃ to distinguish




2 ≥ 0. Note that this inequality implies that the modified
game subsystem is strictly outputX-anti-passive with storage function 0. Restriction to









where symmetry ofM̃(xG̃) follows from the eigenvalue assumptions. Next, let
Q−1(xG̃)Λ(xG̃)Q(xG̃) = M̃(xG̃),
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where for eachxG̃ ∈ X, Λ(xG̃) is a diagonal matrix with elements on the main diagonal









The inequality follows from negative semidefiniteness ofΛ(xG̃) + Λ
2(xG̃), which follows
from the elements on the main diagonal ofΛ(xG̃) being in [−1, 0] for all xG̃ ∈ X.
Step 3: Show u′
D̃
yD̃−||yD̃||
2 ≥ LV(xD̃, π̃). This isoutput strict X×R
n-passivity. To verify
the inequality simply note that
(uD̃ − yD̃)
′yD̃ ≥ LV(xD̃)
follows directly fromX × Rn-passivity of the subsystem induced by the evolutionary dy-
namicV, since the modified game subsystem is just that system with its input set touD̃−yD̃.
Step 4: Apply Theorem 5.9.3 and verify the setMG,D. This step is almost immediate
and is thus left to the reader, completing the proof.
A more general version of Theorem 5.9.6 can be proven that allowsT-contrarian aug-
mentations of non-traditional passive dynamics to achievethe same guarantees. Further-
more, the requirement on the eigenvalues ofDF(x) can be relaxed so that they need only re-
side in [−2α, α] for anyα > 0 so long as we add complementary scaling to theT-contrarian
augmentation. Put another way, the most negative eigenvalue has magnitude less or equal
to twice the magnitude of the least negative eigenvalue.
The requirement that the lookback periodT in theT-contrarian augmentation match the
time delayT that payoff measurement is subject to is not essential. The two time horizons
only need to be sufficiently close, which follows from inherent robustness properties of




The fact that so many learning dynamics are so well-behaved in the stable games can be
explained by the passivity properties of the relevant subsystems. We also showed that con-
vergence properties of other learning paradigms can also bedescribed using passivity. One
issue in particular remains open— the status of the replicator dynamics. The Lyapunov
function typically employed for replicator dynamics in stable games is the KullbackLeibler
divergence between the current social state and the social state at equilibrium. Our frame-
work does not allow the storage function of the learning subsystem to exploit properties of




The preceding three chapters described the contributions of this thesis to the area of dis-
tributed learning. Some of these results were aimed at more specific applications while
others were more general in scope. In this final conclusion, we adopt a bird’s eye view
and highlight two central research themes that are especially we l-motivated in light of the
results described above.
6.1 Convergence rates and metastability
Much of the research in distributed learning has emphasizedth prospect of convergence
to equilibrium without paying much attention to the amount of ime required. This has
changed in recent years with a number of new results providing both good and bad news
concerning convergence rates [68], [101], [102], [103], [104]. This list not exhaustive
and the study of convergence rates in distributed learning has picked up considerably very
recently with many new results appearing. These papers for the most part bound the time
to convergence for deterministic dynamics or the mixing time for stochastic dynamics.
In engineering settings, the objective is to identify distributed algorithms that reach an
acceptable outcome sufficiently quickly. In natural and social sciences where the agnda
is essentially descriptive— how long does the relevant dynamic take to reach the predicted
outcome? In this case, when convergence is extremely slow, the validity of the supposed
prediction is called into question. Instead we should be intrested in describing the transient
medium-run behavior of the model. These middle-ground outcomes are called metastable.
For instance, in Section 4.7 we saw that the stochastically st ble states were only observed
after a very lengthy mixing time, but the simulations were nonetheless highly stable and
predictable in the linguistic community structures that they exhibited in the initial phase.
Unfortunately, we were not able to support this observationwith rigorous analysis. At this
171
point, rigorous characterizations have been limited to very simple cases [72], [105], [106].
The identification of procedures for characterizing metastable states in more general setting
seems a paramount concern for distributed learning.
6.2 The relevance of equilibrium
In this thesis we have assumed throughout that the appropriate way to arrive at predictions
is by modeling the decision-makers iterative processes dirctly. Readers unacquainted with
the game theory literature more generally will be surprisedto learn that this approach is
somewhat unconventional. Equilibrium analysis has historically been the dominant en-
deavour without much reference to what sort of disequilibrium process is required to reach
said equilibrium. This is not necessarily problematic, except for a particular consequence
we now describe.
Research in distributed learning and particularly game theoretic learning has been es-
pecially preoccupied with achieving convergence to equilibrium and in particular Nash
equilibrium outcomes. It is possible that this preoccupation stems from historical consid-
erations. Even in this thesis perhaps undue attention was paid to justifying the prediction
of Nash equilibrium play. Of course, everywhere that equilibrium analysis has appeared,
refinements motivated by dynamic considerations have been off red up. For instance,
stochastic stability in the evolution of social conventions [14] and efficiency of equilib-
ria, [107] and evolutionarily stable states (ESS) in biology [108]. Nonetheless, the focus
on Nash equilibria remains, provoking some authors to pointout more and more drawbacks
to this disposition, such as inefficiency relative to dynamic outcomes [109].
Nash equilibria is certainly relevant in a setting like stable games where convergence
to equilibrium is so well-established. However, the analysis proceeds in perhaps the wrong
direction. That is, researchers look for settings where convergence to Nash is achieved by
a wide range of learning dynamics. Researchers in distributed learning may instead begin
by classifying dynamics by their satisfaction of certain axioms. Then the appropriate set of
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dynamics can be identified for a particular strategic setting a d the chips can be allowed to
fall where they may. If metastable, chaotic, or cycling behavior is predicted, then so long
as the dynamics under study are justifiable, then these outcomes should not be written off
a priori.
Several classes of learning dynamics have been identified. Some prominent examples
include positively correlated dynamics, no regret dynamics, and now passive dynamics.
These classes are typically understood in terms of the equilibri m set they eventually reach,
i.e. correlated equilibrium with no regret dynamics in all finite games, and Nash equilibria
for positively correlated and passive dynamics in, respectiv ly, potential games and stable
games. Since non-equilibrium outcomes are not controversial, esearch perhaps ought to
think about what sort of exogenous criteria would lead us to prefer one of these classes over
another for a particular model. If this is not possible, thenp rhaps new classes should be
considered that are better suited to this exercise.
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